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... tout komme est suspendu aux recits, aux romans, qui lui 
revelent la verite multiple de la vie. Seuls ces recits ... le situent 
devant le destin. Nous devons done chercher passionnement ce 
que peuvent etre des recits}
l Georges Bataille, Le Bleu du Ciel, Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1963, 
Preface, p. 7.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is about reading. It asks the question: how is it that stories can make 
sense? This question, like so many questions in philosophy, seems unproblematic 
at first blush. But the more one thinks about the problem, the more mysterious do 
stories become. A fictional story is about no one and nothing. Yet, we become 
excited when we attend the playhouse or the cinema. We become anxious about 
the fate of the heroine in a story. We can’t put a book down. We may become so 
involved in the action and so involved with the characters, that we exhibit 
emotional reactions like those we exhibit in the presence of real events and 
persons. We may react even more strongly to a story than we do to an event in the 
world. How can this be?
This thesis takes a common fagon de parier, the idea that a story makes a world, 
and uses it to construct a theory of how stories can function. We make worlds 
from stories when we interpret what we read. I will call a world so-made, a story- 
world. This thesis argues that this simple idea can show how stories make sense: 
how they can be understood by a reader and why we react to them as we do.
We can understand Aristotle’s claim that a story is mimetic, by treating mimesis 
under the rubric of representation. A story represents a story-world. There may 
be many possible, different story-worlds able to be made from a particular text. A 
brief consideration of a story such as The Turn of the Screw, demonstrates this.
But, if reading a story causes us to make a story-world, then experiencing the 
“real” world also causes us to make a world within which that experience is 
located. That is to say, we describe and, thus, fashion the world in which we live;
I call a world so made an actual world. We make our actual world by 
symbolising, usually in words or language. We make both kinds of worlds, story 
or actual, through imagination. Story-worlds are things we can “observe” but we 
do not live in them and we cannot alter them; we do live in our actual world and, 
within strict limits, we can change it. Therefore, story-worlds and actual worlds 
are different; yet they have much in common. That is why we react to stories in 
ways that are like the ways we react to real-world situations. This is why we can 
talk about stories and their characters in ways that are like the ways we talk about 
our world.
Yet, stories go beyond a few tears or some excitement. They can, it is often 
claimed, teach us things. I argue that story-worlds (can) operate as metaphors for 
actual worlds. We (can) see our actual world in metaphoric terms, terms dictated, 
or suggested, by the story-world. Metaphor is a pervasive feature of language. It 
is not restricted to single words or phrases but metaphor, as a linguistic device, 
extends to take in whole discourses, including stories.
In developing its argument, the thesis considers several stories, including some 
drawn from popular genres, to show how the thesis can account for the claims 
made for them. We can see why we react as we do, and why stories can be 
enjoyed, appreciated and learned from. This thesis claims to provide good 
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I have long considered reading to be an important pastime (if “important” and 
“pastime” are not mutually exclusive terms) and, from as early as I can remember, 
have been a reader. I have always preferred those works usually described as 
“classics” to most others. My experience is hardly unique. It was only natural 
that, when offered an opportunity to conduct some extended work in a field of 
philosophical study, I would choose something associated with reading and with 
reading fiction in particular. As a dedicated reader, but a poor writer, the 
emphasis of this thesis falls on the reader.
One could say that the philosophy of the last century has been preoccupied with 
the attempt to understand how language, ordinary language that is, works. 
Progress in our understanding of the mysteries of language has been made, but it 
could not be said that the problems have been solved and there are still many 
competing theories and different ways of analysing this problem. Aesthetics has, 
however, for some time now, been unfashionable.
This thesis falls into the gap between aesthetics and language. It is my belief that 
we will learn more about the way that language works by studying complex usages 
than we will ever learn by worrying about the difficulties of “snow is white”. 
Stories are an example of a complex use of language to create something new. I 
believe that a clear understanding of how stories can have meaning should throw
-viii-
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considerable light on the general problem of meaning as well as progress our 
understanding of a number of aesthetic questions. These are my hopes for the 
longer-term prospects of work, which can only be commenced here. We will have 
to content ourselves now with more modest outcomes than those just suggested. 
But an understanding of how stories can have meaning is a start and I submit this 
thesis as a contribution to the study of how language works and how the language 
of stories, in particular, functions to weave its magic.
Like most philosophical questions, stories seem unproblematic at first glance. 
Yet, the more they are considered, the more mysterious they become. We become 
very worked up over them. We talk about popular or well-known fictional 
characters in the same terms as we talk of people we have met and know. We talk 
about Harry Potter or Anna Karenina and no one is confused. Harry Potter and his 
concerns seem to be of more significance to many than the fates of whole 
countries. Yet neither Harry Potter nor Anna Karenina exists or ever existed; they 
are, as characters appearing in fictional stories, “made up”. Why waste our time 
with such things? Yet we do “waste” our time on stories; some of us “waste” a 
great deal of time, even whole careers, on them.
Many of us are convinced that stories are an essential human artefact. Many of us 
are convinced that a Shakespearean play can do more than just divert us and 
entertain us for a brief period. Why would we endure the stress and pain of a play 
such as King Lear unless we believe that it has some value for us?
This thesis sets out to consider these, and similar, questions and to provide 
answers that are a step further along the path to understanding how these artefacts 
work and why they are important.
The major questions that this thesis asks are: how do stories work and why should 
they work at all? In our case, we are asking how they work when they are read, 
rather than what authors do to write stories in the first place. In large measure, 
thus, this thesis takes stories as given. Neither is this primarily an aesthetic study
Preface -x-
into why we consider some works great or beautiful. I will introduce some 
material towards the end of the thesis, to show how some works can have a 
meaning that, seemingly, transcends the story. This thesis, thus, falls into the 
domain of hermeneutics as well as into the domains of language and knowledge.
It should be clear that I consider that this thesis falls into the general discipline of 
philosophy rather than of literature. Although I use a number of literary examples 
(novels, both “good” and “bad”) in the discussion, I make no claims to be a 
literary analyst. My literary examples are just that: examples designed to put flesh 
on the underlying philosophical theory. The work should be judged on that 
theory, rather than the many limitations in my expounding of literary theory or my 
comments on the works of literature that I use as examples.
To conclude this preface there are two things to be said. The first is a note on 
quotations. As a general rule I have removed emphases from all quotations 
reproduced in this text, to prevent unwanted emphasis distracting from the flow of 
the argument. On those few occasions where I have left the author’s emphasis in 
the quotation, I have noted the fact.
The second is to thank people. I will start by taking the opportunity to thank a 
number of people at the Australian National University. I would like to thank 
Paul Thom, Udo Thiel and Brian Garrett who have taken turns to supervise the 
work, the task of oversighting the finishing of this work, falling to Brian. I would 
also like to thank my advisors: Simon Haynes, Livio Dobrez, Jeremy Shearmur 
and Richard Campbell for their many suggestions and assistance. I would 
particularly like to acknowledge the assistance of Simon who got me over a 
number of rocky patches and of Livio who introduced me to the hermeneutists 
discussed in my conclusion and gave me a great deal of assistance in coming to 
grips with their work. Richard made a great many helpful comments, detailed as 
well as general. Elizabeth Minchin, of the classics department, has assisted me 
considerably with an understanding of some of the Greek terms important to the
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thesis. Thomas Mautner has been of great assistance with the many drafting 
issues that one confronts when undertaking a work of this kind. The philosophy 
department at the Australian National University has been a good home to me 
over the several years required to carry out this work. The time spent on this study 
has been made very pleasant by the good grace and friendship of many members 
of the university staff, both academic and administrative, as well as the other 
students. Many hours are spent in discussions with others (and particularly with 
other post graduate students). I would like to thank all these people for their 
opinions, advice and forbearance.
I would also like to thank my many friends for their support and encouragement. 
In particular, I would like to thank Clive Monty and Helen Yapp, who generously 
used their time to read and comment on a final draft of the thesis. Without their 
advice the text would be much less satisfactory.
Perhaps the greatest load in the development of a project such as this falls on the 
long-suffering family of the student. I strongly suspect that my wife, Robyn, and 
daughter, Heloise, would have resisted my embarking on this project had they 
known what it would entail. Fortunately, they did not and neither did I. I would 
like to publicly thank them for their endurance and forbearance as well as for the 
multitude of small tasks that they carried out. These range from making coffee 
through to being harangued on various topics associated with the work as well as 
listening to the text of the work at various stages of its development and to the 
making of many valuable suggestions. .
Of course, valuable as all this assistance is, it can never prevent the obdurate from 
making errors and any such are, of course, my own misdoing.
INTRODUCTION
Is there a problem with stories?
It is well known that Jeremy Bentham considered fictional stories to be a waste of 
time. John Stuart Mill reports him as thinking that in poetry “[w]ords ... [are] 
perverted from their proper office [because they are] employed in uttering 
anything but precise logical truth.”2 Mill, further, reports Bentham as saying that 
“‘[a]ll poetry is misrepresentation.’”3 Plato’s relationship with stories is 
ambiguous, but, in some dialogues, he seems to agree with Bentham. For 
example, in The Republic, he tells us that stories are merely false and to be 
contrasted with the truth, which is to be valued highly.4 He certainly considers 
many stories to be unsuitable for the education of the young (or any one else).5
A fictional story is about no one and nothing; it is “made up”. A story concerns 
the doings of people or creatures that do not exist and, in some cases, could not 
exist. So, is Bentham correct? Should we agree with Plato? Do we waste our 
time and effort on them? Are they merely lies?
J. S. Mill, “Bentham”, in J. S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham (ed. Alan Ryan), 
Utilitarianism and Other Essays, 1987, p. 173.
Ibid., p. 174.
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There are a small number of people, like Bentham, who are not interested in 
stories. But most people treat them with great seriousness and do not see them as 
meaningless. People encounter stories almost every day and care about them 
deeply. It takes a lot of time to read a long novel. Many of the world’s great 
religions are based on stories (the stories of Jesus and the doings of the Hindu 
gods for example). People follow television programmes avidly, attend the 
cinema and playhouse, and read books. No one likes to have a story cut off part 
way through. We resent it if the last page of the book is missing or the telephone 
rings near the end of a television programme.
We all know that the story is made up. We all know that, in essence, Bentham is 
correct: stories are a “misrepresentation”. Nevertheless, we get excited when we 
go to a horror film (we may even scream). We are sorry for Anna Karenina (we 
may even cry). We read desperately onward, to see what will happen. Why do we 
care, and care so passionately? For Bentham, such behaviour is absurd and 
irrational.
Yet, as I have just said, we do care. How is that possible? Are we being tricked 
by a perverted misrepresentation? Are stories merely an idle waste of time and 
should be eschewed by rational minds. How can they mean anything at all or 
make any sense? There are no fairies or gnomes or such like creatures. King Lear 
never existed and many of us do not believe that there is a hell or a purgatory like 
those described by Dante. So why read about such things?
I have already suggested that there must be good reasons why we enjoy stories. I 
take it as given that stories are important human artefacts and that they 
considerably enrich our lives. It seems that stories are a fundamental part of what 
it is to be human. I take it that, at the very least, stories do make sense and that we 
are not engaged in a fool’s task when we read and enjoy them. I take it, therefore, 
that there must be an answer to this puzzle. The purpose of this thesis is to
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enquire into that puzzle. How do stories function? Why do we care? How can 
they make sense? Can we learn anything from them and, if so, how?
It is not, of course, possible to say all there is to say about stories (or any other 
thing) in a thesis such as this. It is necessary to draw a boundary around the 
inquiry. We will limit our inquiry to a consideration of how stories function; how 
they function to make their magic. How can they make sense at all? Why do we 
react so strongly to stories and the characters in them? From there, it will be 
possible to consider stories as metaphors in an attempt to explain why they matter; 
how they tell us new things; how they produce their unique knowledge. But that 
is as far as we will be able to go. The thesis asks why do readers react as they do 
and how can we learn from stories. These questions are questions about readers 
(rather than authors). Consequently, the thesis is readercentric. It will rarely 
consider the creative act of the author.
Studies into stories have not been at the forefront of philosophical work in the 
twentieth century, but there are signs that stories are now receiving more attention 
than they have in the past. There are some interesting answers to the questions 
posed and some “near misses”. The answers provided to date fail, in my opinion, 
to explain fully the phenomena under investigation. In this thesis, I propose a new 
approach to the question. I will take the familiar concept of the story as making a 
world and attempt to turn a literary fagon de parier, into a philosophically 
respectable theory. The idea of fictional worlds or story-worlds, as I will call 
them, is seen by some as already discredited. Gregory Currie goes so far as to call 
fictional worlds “despised”.6 Perhaps he has a point. He refers to Pavel’s 
discussion which he calls “unilluminating”. Certainly Pavel’s discussion is
Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990, p. 62.
Thomas G. Pavel, Fictional Worlds, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986.
Currie, The Nature of Fiction, p. 56, and also footnote 6.
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vague. Nevertheless, the idea of a story-world is still immensely appealing and I 
am hoping that this thesis will go some way towards restoring faith in such 
constructs by casting a stronger light onto them. I will argue that stories, or story- 
texts, represent a world, what I will call a story-world. When we read the story, 
we make that world, or, rather, a version of that world. I will, further, argue that 
we do something similar when we learn about this world (what I will call simply 
“the world”).
The argument I will put sees very great similarities between stories and “reality”. 
I will argue that the way we talk about stories and the way we talk about the world 
are similar. There is no great gulf between scientific and literary discourse. I will 
talk about literary discourse without implying any value judgment about the work 
in question. Any story, no matter how banal, is “literary” in the sense in which I 
will use the term. I will also use the term “art” in a similarly inclusive sense.
- 0 -
It is usual, in an introduction, to outline the argument being put forward and to 
draw a boundary around the discussion to clearly identify what is to be covered 
(and why) and what will not be discussed (and why not). I will now proceed to do 
those things, taking the second of them first.
There is a certain psychology in reading stories. Why did Bentham consider them 
a waste of time, while most people enjoy them? Mill said that music was 
Bentham’s “favourite amusement” and that he liked painting, sculpture and the
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other arts.9 It is unusual for someone to like these arts and, yet, find stories a 
waste of time. We might want to enquire into the psychology of Bentham’s 
unusual attitudes. Why do you laugh at a story, while I cry at the same story? 
These questions are questions about the psychology of individuals and of human 
beings and are well outside the scope of this enquiry.
Neither is this an aesthetic enquiry. By aesthetics I mean the philosophy of beauty 
and taste. Why do we consider some things to be beautiful? Why do some people 
find certain things beautiful while others do not? Is there some standard of 
beauty? These, and many others, are questions that are, largely, outside the scope 
of this work. I will not ask why some stories are well written (or what it is for a 
story to be well written) and some poorly. I will, briefly, need to consider the 
question of style because of the way it affects how we interpret a work.
This thesis is concerned with story content rather than any “poetic” values a story 
may have or may be said to have. A poem, such as Matthew Arnold’s Sohrab and 
Rustum, can be analysed as poetry or (these are hardly exclusive) as a story. An 
analysis of the poem as a poem would concentrate on things such as its use of 
assonance, repetition of words and similar matters. To concentrate on the story is 
to analyse the plot and the way it develops. It is the latter that is our current 
concern. There can be no doubt, however, that the effect of a work like Sohrab 
and Rustum depends in large part on the poetic nature of the whole work. It is 
clear, to follow through with this example, that the pathos of the story is built by 
Arnold’s use of poetic devices. Some features of the work, surely, count towards 
both: the way Arnold describes the scenes and the battles, the dream like qualities 
of much of the language contribute towards the way the plot develops and also 
towards the poetic effects. The poem borders on the maudlin but, I think, just 
escapes that because of Arnold’s skill as a poet and his use of such devices. 
Presented as a “straight” story, I think this work would fail where, as a poem, it 
succeeds. Clearly, style does make a significant contribution to a story.
9 J. S. Mill, “Bentham”, p. 173.
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If Sohrab and Rustum is a story, which clearly it is, then what is the story content 
of a poem such as Keats’ La Belle Dame Sans Merci or Wordsworth’s 1 Wandered 
Lonely as a Cloud? Any story content would be slight in the case of the Keats’ 
poem and very slight in the case of the Wordsworth (/ Wandered Lonely as a 
Cloud does have a story line, although thin). Yet many people think that these 
two poems, certainly La Belle Dame Sans Merci, are better poems than Sohrab 
and Rustum. If this is so, it is some “poetic” quality that is the differentiating 
factor. We do some sort of violence to a work when we carve it up and describe it 
as “poetry” or “story” or analyse it under these different heads.
We will consider, briefly, the question of style. It is clear that the style of writing 
of a story can make all the difference to a story, raising it from the banal to the 
great (that has just been observed). However, we will only be concerned to note 
the way the style of a work influences the way we treat the story; we will not be 
considering style as a pointer to either “good” or “bad” writing. Our purpose will 
be limited to the recognition that style makes a considerable contribution to a 
work and the way it will probably be understood.
As already indicated, we will avoid the standard questions of aesthetics as not 
germane to our discussion. There will be no definitions of art or of literature. 
Many people consider that some stories are literature (or art) and that others are 
not. That may be so, but I will ignore such distinctions. Some stories “work” 
better than others and some stories are powerfully effective where others are not. 
Some stand the test of time, while others are ephemeral. These are questions that I 
will not address directly, although the thesis might shed some light on questions 
such as these. The thesis must account for any story and, therefore, I will need to 
define a story.
That is easily done. I will define a story as something with a plot: a plot is a 
sequence of events (not necessarily told in chronological order but, by implication, 
at least, occurring in some order). A story is, thus, a narrative. In a story, time
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passes. I will refer to stories as “stories” rather than as “narratives”. This 
definition will allow almost anything to be treated as a story, provided it meets the 
simple requirement. Plays, novels, poems may all be stories. A plot may be 
simple and the story may concentrate on characters and their development or even 
on place. A simple description of something, however, is not a story unless it 
supposes a succession of events. A collection of impressions or ideas is not a 
story. A character description alone is not a story unless something happens to 
cause that character to develop or change in some way or unless a plot unfolds to 
reveal things about a character. However, a story such as Beckett’s Waiting for 
Godot is a story; time passes while people wait for something to happen. It is the 
passage of time and the failure of Godot to arrive which, in this case, constitute 
the plot in the terms I am using. A story written using the “flashback” method is a 
story, for there is an implied sequence of events. Sometimes it may be very 
difficult to recover the sequence of events but that is a problem of interpretation. 
Time is, thus, an essential element in a story.
We should notice that this definition covers any story and not just fictional stories. 
The definition offered covers fiction but also covers stories of other kinds (for 
example: history or gossip). We are not yet in a position to offer a definition of 
“fiction”. That will become possible when the thesis has developed its material 
further and, so, we will need to visit this question again later.
The definition given above is very like Aristotle’s famous definition of a story as 
something with a beginning, a middle and an end.10 The plot, Aristotle claimed, is 
“what tragedy is there for and that is the most important thing of all.”11 However, 
as I have said, I will accept something with a minimal plot or something that 
concentrates on character or place as a story, provided there is an (implied) 
chronology in the writing. Where Aristotle’s definition emphasises plot (at the
Aristotle, Poetics (transl. Malcolm Heath), London: Penguin Books, 1996,
1450b.
l i Ibid., 1450a.
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expense of character or place) the definition provided here is inclusive allowing a 
far wider scope to the idea of story. A story is constructed from words, which may 
be spoken or written. I will talk of the writer and the reader and the text, although 
there are obvious correlates to the speaker, hearer and telling or to television and 
film or to a play. My thesis covers stories in any of these forms but I will use 
writer/reader terminology for convenience. We have already noted that there are 
elements in any text that are not, strictly, “the story” as we have defined it. Such 
elements are descriptions and stylistic devices and so forth; in a spoken text, these 
include the speaker’s intonation and other verbal clues. These elements are an 
integral part of any text and we will find that they affect how we understand the 
story. No text can consist of nothing but a plot; there will always be such 
components.
I will use examples (painting in particular) drawn from art forms other than story, 
to illustrate some points, but my thesis is about stories and I will not develop a 
general theory about such art forms. The use of illustrations drawn from these arts 
is intended only to illuminate the thesis and make it clearer.
There are (at least) two ways of seeing a story: the author’s and the reader’s. A 
discussion of story must take one point of view or the other; to take both points of 
view into account would be a very large task. My major orientation will be, as has 
already been said, that of the reader. This is an important constraint on the work. 
We will not be looking at the question of writing and the creativity of authors, 
novelists, playwrights or other artists.
There are many theories of fiction or of art, which are based around the author and
what she does when she writes. Some of these revolve around the question of
authorial intention. In this line of thinking is Searle’s speech act theory: a story is
12fictional if the author makes a certain kind of speech act, otherwise it is not.
12 John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, in Peter 
Lamarque, Philosophy and Fiction, 1983, pp. 320-327.
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Currie’s theory of art takes a similar approach, centring the question of fiction in 
authorial intentions. 13 Art arises from the action of the artist, according to such 
theories. These theories are taking a different approach to stories from that taken 
here. Some may be incompatible with the claims made in this thesis but many are 
quite compatible. Further, such approaches are concerned, from the start, with 
identifying fiction and non-fiction; this is Searle’s and Currie’s concern. This 
thesis will need to approach this question, but it is not of immediate importance to 
our purpose.
This thesis, as already said, asks why the reader becomes emotionally involved; 
why readers can talk about stories and characters in them. The thesis will usually 
avoid questions such as those about authors; sometimes, however, an abbreviated 
discussion will be unavoidable. This is not to say that the author is unimportant; 
that is obviously not so. With no author, there would be no story. Suffice it to say 
here, that I consider some writers to be extraordinarily creative people. But, we 
will be looking at the creative task (and it will turn out to be a very creative task) 
of reading, understanding (and responding to) a story. The questions we are 
asking concern the reader, rather than the writer, and the way the reader responds 
to a story.
The other thing an introduction should do is to introduce and summarise the 
argument.
This thesis presented here is very simple. I argue that, when we read a story we 
make a world, a story-world, in which the characters dwell and the action occurs. 
Our definition of a story implies that, in a story-world, there will be events and 
time. That is not to suggest that we cannot (or do not) make worlds where there 
are no events or time (a painting may be an example where a world is static). 
Such possibilities are, in general terms, outside the scope of this thesis.
13 Currie, The Nature of Fiction.
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I will commence my argument by taking up the Aristotelian idea of mimesis. I 
will argue that a story is, as Aristotle argued, mimetic. A bare claim like that 
would beg the question. It is essential in order to sustain such an argument, to 
show what “mimesis” means. I will argue that mimesis is representation. A 
story, that is, a text, represents the characters, the locations and the actions 
depicted, which is to say, a story-world. The characters exist within, and the 
events take place in, the story-world. When we read a text (which is presented to 
us in a symbolic form) we construct those things from the textual representation. 
What we construct is what I am calling a story-world. A story-world is, clearly, an 
intentional object made by the reader. 14 On this argument, a mimesis is a 
representation of the story-world and that story-world is the totality of what the 
story describes or tells us about. The characters are denizens of the story-world, 
which is the locus of the action. The time in the story passes in the story-world 
and it may, almost certainly will, pass at a different “rate” from time in our world. 
We can already see that description of places, such as those in Sohrab and 
Rustum, contribute to the story-world, for they describe its geography and so forth.
A very clear example of this claim is to argue that, say, Dante’s Divine Comedy, 
represents a world, the Divine Comedy story-world. The major action (Dante’s 
journey through hell, purgatory and heaven), plus the minor actions (the various 
conversations and punishments) take place in the Divine Comedy story-world. 
The characters (those in hell, Dante, Virgil, Beatrice and so forth) all inhabit the 
Divine Comedy story-world. The world of Dante’s story is, supposedly, no less 
than the realm of the dead. How we take this world (in terms of our world) is a 
matter for further discussion. We may take it that hell is very like Dante’s 
description or we may take hell to be very different from that (or non-existent). 
But to understand the Divine Comedy, at least in the first instance, is to make a 
Divine Comedy story-world, and to do that is to interpret the text.
14 Any involvement of authors with story-worlds is a different question.
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lt follows from this example, that the story-world is self-contained. Any overflow 
from that world to this (and there is, of course, such an overflow) is to do with 
how we see this world and that is a separate topic, but one we will cover late in the 
thesis. The making of the story-world requires the placing of events and objects 
(including characters) within that world.
The thesis then argues that, in like manner, we make the real world (what I call an 
actual world) by symbolising it. We experience the world (that is, whatever it is 
that we experience) and we make sense of that experience by symbolising our 
experience as a world. I call a world so made an actual world. It is also clear that 
an actual world is an intentional object. No two actual worlds are identical. That 
is to say that my actual world (how I make the world) is slightly different from 
your actual world (how you make the world). Of course, our worlds have a lot in 
common. Were it not so, we would not be able to communicate.
I will further claim that there are many ways we might make an actual world from 
our experience. There are, thus, many actual worlds all of them acceptable, which 
is to say workable, versions of what there is. I will call such a world, “right”. I 
will talk of right worlds rather than “true” or “correct” worlds, for many worlds 
can be right, but only one, if any, could be “true”. Not just any world, however, is 
right. A world that will not allow us to prosper (or even survive) is wrong, for it is 
not workable. This thesis owes much to Nelson Goodman and his approach to 
worldmaking. Yet, Goodman, who was a logician at heart, argued that a world 
must be completely consistent. It is probably impossible to make a world that is 
completely consistent. I will, therefore, allow some, undefinable, level of 
inconsistency into an actual world and also into a story-world.
Just as we can make many versions of the world (to make a multiplicity of actual 
worlds), it is possible to (legitimately) interpret a text in many ways. Right ways 
are in harmony with the text and wrong ways do violence to it.
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I will then look at imagination as the way we make worlds. I will argue that the 
making of worlds, both story-worlds and actual worlds, is an exercise of that 
creative ability we call “imagination”. I will argue, with Kant, that imagination is 
a pervasive synthesising capability that we have. Those writers, Sartre for 
example, who see imagination as less than pervasive, I will argue, are restricting 
the operation of imagination arbitrarily.
We will readily see why we can talk about stories and why we react to them as we 
do. That discussion will tell us nothing about why it might be valuable to read 
stories or how stories can affect our lives. We will see why stories make sense but 
we need to shed some light on how (or if) stories are able to teach us anything. 
Many readers, myself included, maintain that stories are able to do this. For many 
readers that is why some stories are great. I do not wish to become sidetracked 
into questions of greatness but I do wish to suggest how a story might teach us 
things.
To argue that, I will turn to the writings of Paul Ricoeur on metaphor. I will argue 
that metaphor is a pervasive linguistic device extending from very simple 
metaphors to extraordinarily complex ones. Some metaphors are merely trite, but 
some metaphors can shed great light on how things are. I will argue that (some) 
stories present us with complex metaphors for how this world is. This will show 
how stories (through the operation of metaphor) can create new knowledge. That 
will conclude my main argument. Aristotle insisted that one of the major benefits 
of the tragedy was that we learned from the experience. He also argued that 
metaphor is a wonderful stylistic device. Our argument takes this idea, with Paul 
Ricoeur, to a higher level. Thus, the argument presented here starts and ends with 
Aristotle taking an excursion through some other ideas to end where it started, 
with Aristotle and The Poetics. This argument might leave the door open for 
others to pursue questions of value, but, as said, I will avoid that debate. I will, to 
conclude, illustrate the thesis in action via a brief excursus through some popular 
and serious works. That will bring my main argument to a close.
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In my conclusion, I will briefly consider other approaches to stories as 
worldmakers, particularly that of Roman Ingarden. I will then consider the 
hermeneutic tradition, particularly as exemplified by Gadamer. I will show how 
that work dovetails with this to provide a powerful way of understanding stories. 
It will be apparent that the thesis developed here, by way of Aristotle and 
Goodman, is very sympathetic to that developed by the hermeneutic tradition.
In terms of the layout of the work, the argument proceeds by way of a 
consideration of mimesis (chapter 1), which, I argue, is best thought of as 
representation. Chapter 2 considers the matter of interpretation of stories. I 
continue with an analysis, largely favourable, of Nelson Goodman’s approach to 
worldmaking (chapter 3) and an analysis of our worldmaking capability, which, I 
will argue, is an imaginative one (chapter 5). In chapter 4, I draw out the 
consequences of the comparison implied by chapters 1 and 3. The penultimate 
chapter (chapter 6) provides a discussion of metaphor and the final chapter 
(chapter 7) provides a case study. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of, 
and comparison with, the hermeneutic tradition.
We will see that there is much common ground between the ways we make actual 
worlds and story-worlds. There is a temptation to multiply similarities between 
the two activities. There are many. There is a sense in which to do that would 
strengthen the thesis; yet, to do that would be merely tedious. I will identify 
certain similarities where they are important to the overall argument, but I will try 
to resist the temptation to multiply similarities unnecessarily. Any reader, who 
accepts the thesis being argued, will easily multiply similarities for him or herself, 
if so inclined.
I think that this thesis is simple and elegant and answers many questions left 
unanswered by other approaches to stories. That is its strength. My claim is that 
the thesis put forward here allows us to see stories in a light that concurs with 
commonsense. It explains how we can talk about stories as we do and why we
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have (real) emotional reactions to them; it does these without recourse to devices 
such as pseudo-emotions. As well as making sense, stories (or, at least, some 
stories) will turn out to be powerful metaphors for how things are. This is what 
we expect and this is the claim that the thesis makes on its own behalf.
This thesis is avowedly relativist. I will, therefore, need to consider the question 
of relativism and absolutism; I do that in chapter 3 towards the end of my 
discussion on the making of actual worlds. There, I will also consider just how 
strong a relativist position the thesis requires. However, here, I want to say just a 
little about the nature of philosophising, and the sorts of arguments that we can 
expect to carry weight in support of this, or any other, thesis.
There was a time when philosophers expected to be able to produce knock down 
arguments to disprove their opponents’ cases and they sought similar arguments to 
prove their own cases. It was believed that such proofs are possible. Plato, 
thought, for example, that he had proven Protagoras wrong once and for all. 
There was the expectation that a single, universal philosophical theory would 
(eventually) be proven to be the Truth. Fortunately, for philosophers, this project 
has not succeeded, and is unlikely ever to do so, for its success would lead to the 
demise of philosophy. Even worse, it would lead to a situation where we would 
no longer need to ask basic questions about how things are. I believe that it is the 
discussion of philosophical questions is more important than the results of those 
discussions. Philosophers speak for and, sometimes, challenge the beliefs and 
actions of their age. They show how the age understands the world and why it 
sees the world the way it does. Philosophers may provide a critique of the 
fashionable beliefs of a time and point towards new ways of seeing things.
Thus, Thomas Aquinas reflected his age and its concerns and, at a philosophical 
level, its beliefs about the world. As we come to understand the world in new 
(more appropriate for us, but not necessarily better or more correct) ways, so new 
approaches need to be developed. Most of us, while admiring the work of St
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Thomas, do not now accept his philosophy. It has become, as eventually any 
philosophy must, outmoded.
We can, I claim, no longer expect to provide a deductive proof of how things are 
(if, indeed, they are any particular way). I will argue, in chapter 3, that things are 
not any given way, but that we human beings determine, in a dialectical manner, 
how things are. That is not to say that philosophical writing can be without 
argument; it cannot. We can no longer ask of any thesis that it prove its case with 
mathematical rigour. It is to say that the test of a thesis is what that thesis says, 
how it says it and how well it (seems to) explains the phenomena under 
investigation. I claim that the ideas put forward here do just that; I claim that the 
thesis developed here explains why and how we respond to stories as we do; why 
Bentham was wrong to pay them such scant regard. I think the claims I am 
making satisfy our beliefs about the world (for example, that we experience real 
emotions, and not some sort of pseudo-emotions, in the presence of the tragedy of 
King Lear). My claim is simply that the findings of this thesis provide better and 
more complete answers to some of the mysteries of stories than do alternative 
proposals. I cannot and will not provide knock down arguments for or against my 
case or those of others. I, further, claim that this account is simple and elegant 
and, generally, gives credence to the way we do in fact react to and understand 
stories and it does so without recourse to artificial notions such as pseudo­
emotions.
To concede this much is to admit that the thesis put forward here, falls under the 
hammer of its own claims. I have indicated that it will be necessary to consider 
relativism and the classic arguments against it. I will suggest that those arguments 
are not persuasive and that relativist theses must be considered as possible ways of 
explaining phenomena. Relativist theses must, however, always leave the door 
open to competing claims. We all must accept that. As already suggested, that 




There have been stories as long as there have been human beings. Stories have 
existed to entertain as well as to tell us about our past. Stories have been used to 
explain why things are the way they are and to justify that way. The Biblical 
stories of western Christendom are a good example of this. There have been 
stories of gods and of men and of lesser beings. It is natural that philosophers 
started to wonder how stories function from the very beginning of philosophical 
speculation. The earliest theory that we have on the matter dates from the time of 
Plato and Aristotle, but there is little doubt that their theory was, at least in part, 
already extant by the time they adopted it. This is the idea that stories are 
mimetic.
The support of names as illustrious as Plato and Aristotle established the thesis 
that stories are mimetic as the standard theory about the operation of stories for 
centuries. However, lately, the theory of mimesis has fallen into disrepute. 
Stephen Halliwell suggests that this is not so much because of difficulties with 
Aristotle’s theory but, rather, with the “adaptation and misinterpretation”15 to
Stephen Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis Revisited”, in Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 28, (1990), p. 487.
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which the theory has been subjected. Any theory of such long-standing currency 
can be, and probably will be, modified and then misunderstood. Having been 
transmogrified, the theory can be rejected.
I want, here, to reconsider mimesis as a way of understanding stories. To do that, 
I want to go back to the writings of Aristotle and to consider what he meant by 
“mimesis”. However, we will not stop in the Greece of Aristotle’s day, for we 
need a theory which will accommodate not only the sorts of stories that Aristotle 
was accustomed to, but any story, including the modem novel. My purpose in this 
chapter is to gain a clear understanding of Aristotle’s approach to stories and adapt 
that approach to accommodate, not only works such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia and 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, but also works such as Kafka’s Metamorphosis.
I want to argue that stories are, indeed, mimetic but that mimesis is best 
understood under the general notion of “representation” rather than, as has become 
customary, under the idea of “copy” or “imitation”. Stories, I will argue, represent 
something. That something, I will further argue, is a world; the world of the story 
or, as I will call it, a story-world. It will be clear fairly early in the discussion what 
I do not mean by “representation”, but it will not become apparent what the term 
does mean until the argument has progressed some way. To assist us to come to 
grips with the writings of Aristotle, we will rely heavily on the writings of the 
scholars Stephen Halliwell and Leon Golden.
In The Republic, Plato derided stories and said that poets should be banished from 
his utopia.16 Artists, he claimed, are mere copiers of the world. They hold a 
mirror up to the world and the mirror reflects what is there.17 Of course, in Plato’s 
philosophy, the world is, itself, merely a copy of the eternal Forms which alone 
are ultimately real. Everything else derives its qualities from these Forms. So, for 
Plato, a work of art is a copy of a copy and is, thus, twice removed from ultimate
16 Plato, The Republic, 595b.
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reality. “‘[Representative art is’”, he says, “‘an inferior child bom of inferior 
parents.”’18 We note this in passing, but there is no need for us to consider Forms 
theory further in this thesis. What Plato’s mirror shows is less than the world it 
reflects, although, as Danto observes, “there are things we may see in [mirrors 
that] ... we cannot see without them, namely, ourselves.19 The word that Plato 
used to describe this “reflection” is the Greek word “pijutioig”. This word is 
usually translated into English as “copy” or “imitation” although sometimes the 
word “mimesis” is used. It is, therefore, often said that Plato and, by extension, 
Aristotle, argued that stories are imitations or copies of life.
Plato’s remarks apply, in the first instance, to the painter or sculptor. It is an 
image that the mirror reflects. However, the dialogues make it clear that the real 
target of Plato’s attack is the poet to whom he principally applied his comments. 
The poets, among whom Homer was pre-eminent, told the myths and the stories of 
the gods. However, Plato says, many of their stories are unwholesome: stories 
about philandering and warring gods (the poets’ gods are human, all too human, 
for Plato). The poets do not tell only the truth, for some of what appears in their 
stories is not factual. Therefore, the poets lie. Even worse, the lies they tell are 
made to seem real and seductive by the manner of their telling. Poets do more 
than merely relate their tales. A simple recitation of events is closer to the truth 
than, for example, the use of speech and the imputation of thoughts to the 
heroes. Poets, to give their stories a false verisimilitude, use such techniques.
It is well known that Plato’s writings on this matter are not consistent and one 
suspects that he had a somewhat ambivalent attitude to the poets. He, himself,
Ibid., 603b.
Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy 
of Art, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 9.
Plato, The Republic, 394.
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uses the dialogue form21 to put words into people’s mouths. He, himself, suggests 
the use of myths to maintain political order in his utopia. Not only does he use 
poetic literary forms but also, in some other dialogues, he seems to talk highly of 
the poet. For example, in the Ion, Plato says that “the Muse ... inspires men 
herself... [and they] compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are 
inspired and possessed.” Some writers, Martha Nussbaum for example, 
suggest that Plato’s inconsistencies are more apparent than real. Nussbaum 
suggests that Plato’s work becomes more sophisticated in the later dialogues. The 
Republic, being of the middle period, does not, in Nussbaum’s opinion, reflect 
Plato’s mature view. We will set this difficulty aside and pursue Plato and his 
problem no further. My purpose in this brief discussion has not been to present a 
comprehensive discussion of Plato’s approach to art but, rather, to place the 
present discussion in its overall context. The view of Plato presented here is the 
common understanding of Plato’s approach to stories. If this is unfair to Plato, we 
will apologise and move forward.
If we turn to Aristotle, we see a rather different attitude to the works that Plato 
appears to have condemned. Aristotle, like Plato, described stories (principally 
the tragedies of ancient Greece) as “mimetic”. Rather than treating such works as 
false, Aristotle accords them a high place; they tell forth universal truths. The 
mimetic effect is, for Aristotle, one of showing the universal in the particular. 
Since Aristotle thought that there are no ideal things, we rely on art to idealise: 
that idealisation helps us to understand the commonplace. Aristotle may have 
intended to go so far as to say that only an artistic idealisation can portray the
Aristotle refers to, inter alia, Plato’s dialogues as a form of mimesis, 
Poetics, 1447b.
For example, in Plato, The Republic, 414.
Plato, Ion (transl. B. Jowett), New York: Random House, 1937, 534.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy rev. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2001.
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essence of a thing just because it is a copy. Famously, Aristotle compared art with 
history. “[Pjoetry,” he said, “is more philosophical and more serious than history. 
Poetry tends to express universals, and history particulars.” The value of art, 
thus, exceeds that of history. Aristotle turns Plato on his head.
But, I want to suggest that “copy” is a poor way of understanding “mimesis”. 
“Copy” or “imitation” is the usual English translation of the Greek word. But 
does such a translation adequately convey Aristotle’s meaning? For over two 
millennia, it has been taken to be so. In an era when it was supposed that the 
purpose of the artist, particularly the painter, was to render things with a high 
degree of verisimilitude, this might have been an understandable attitude. Before 
the arrival of the modem novel, abstract art, and other new forms, this may have 
seemed an obvious requirement of art. Verisimilitude leads, fairly easily, to the 
idea of copying. It is not surprising that there has been, for a very long time, little 
argument over the claim that a mimesis is a copy or imitation. But, in a modem 
context, a work of art is obviously not (just) a copy. It is not, therefore, surprising 
that the idea that a story is mimetic, where a “mimesis” is construed as being a 
copy, has become discredited.
We will, therefore, commence our work by briefly considering the case against the 
idea that a work of art is a copy or an imitation. We will do this, in the first 
instance, without recourse to the writings of Aristotle.
Firstly, many works do not, in fact, imitate or copy anything.
Suppose that a painting is a copy (or imitation) of something and that a story 
describes that of which it is, supposedly, a copy. This approach seems to work for 
some objects. A painting describes by making an image with paint (or some other 
suitable medium) while a story describes in words. Rubens’ Self Portrait 
(National Gallery of Australia, Canberra) is an image of the painter. Even this
25 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b.
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idea is not uncontroversial. What is a copy? In what ways does the portrait 
resemble Rubens? After all, Rubens’ Self Portrait is more like another painting, 
say, Constable’s The Hay Warn (National Gallery, London) than it is, or ever was, 
like Rubens. A story is given in words. Events (except, perhaps speech events) 
are not given in words and certainly they are not usually printed. So, how can a 
text be a copy (except of another text)? A declaimed text may, perhaps, imitate an 
original speech and one painting may copy another. Even if we ignore the 
considerable difficulty of saying how a story can be a copy, we are left with 
further problems.
It is clearly not possible to copy something which does not exist. It is not 
possible, for example, to paint a copy of Pegasus since we cannot put Pegasus on 
the table to copy. Even if Zeus exists, we cannot put him on the table to copy. If 
we take two different Madonnas, for example that of Botticelli (Academia 
Gallery, Florence) and that of Filippino Lippi (Uffizi, Florence), it is clear that 
they cannot both be copies of the same mother. One of them, at least, must be 
“false” as a copy! Of course, they could both be “false”.
Consider the Venus of Urbino by Titian (Uffizi, Florence). It is clearly not a 
portrait of Venus. It may be a portrait of Titian’s model. If so, that fact seems to 
be largely irrelevant. It is a painting (or an image) of Venus lying naked on a 
couch and we take it to be so (partly from the inscription beneath the work in the 
gallery but partly from its subject matter and other internal clues). What is the 
case with Manet’s Olympia (Musee d’Orsay, Paris) with its obvious reference to 
Titian’s work? Of whom, or of what, is it a copy?
The same kinds of problems arise with stories (or any literary production). Some 
readers, but by no means all, may be prepared to grant that an historical account, 
such as Caesar’s Gallic Wars, is a description of events that occurred, albeit a 
partial one. We may be prepared to agree that such a work imitates or copies 
(using the medium of words) the events described. What are we to say of a play
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like Shakespeare’s Julius Caesarl It is not an historical description but a version. 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth is even further from the “truth” in that it completely 
misrepresents the historical data. In what sense can Tolstoy’s War and Peace be 
considered historical; it seems to contain historical characters. If we consider a 
novel such as Pride and Prejudice, we have a story, which is not a description, so 
far as we know, of any persons or events (although it seems possible that it is). 
We can take a step further and consider Henry James’ The Turn of the Screw, 
which contains sorts of characters (ghosts) which we do not think are denizens of 
this world. A story like Kafka’s Metamorphosis, describes events that, I take it, 
cannot occur. People do not turn into giant beetles. Fantasy and science fiction 
stories, novels such as The Lord of the Rings or Dune, contain characters and 
events (sorts of events such as extended life spans, invisibility rings, travel 
through “hyper space”) which, we take it, are not possible. These things do not 
seem to be possible in this world and may not be possible in any world.
These things do not exist in the actual world and cannot, therefore, be copied. It 
might be possible to suggest that Titian’s Venus, is an imitation of the goddess 
(although I do not see how), but invisibility rings do not imitate anything or any 
possible scenario. Fictional novels, generally, describe events which have not 
occurred.
The second objection argues that a copy, however realistic, is only ever a point of 
view. A story is always told from some point of view. It is not possible to tell it 
as it is (and who would want to read it if it were, somehow, told in all its 
unvarnished detail). The storyteller selects, edits and arranges material. There can 
be many, very different, accounts of the same (actual or imagined) event(s). There 
can be many paintings of the same subject (there are, as we have observed, 
numerous Madonnas, no two exactly alike). The students in an art class can all 
paint the same nude and yet produce twenty different paintings. No painting or 
story can tell everything and to tell less is to select and, thus, to produce a version. 
But a version is not a copy; it may be a representation. We acknowledge that a
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photograph is an artistic production just because it does select what and how to 
present its material. Not even Plato’s reflection in a mirror represents an absolute 
point of view. Aristotle was well aware that tragedies select an event or a myth 
and tell it from a particular point of view to gain the desired (artistic) effect.
The final objection asks the difficult question: what is it to provide an imitation or 
a copy? We have already suggested that the answer is far from obvious. To 
explore the question it will be necessary to use the terms “imitation” and “copy”; 
they will be used in a very loose way to demonstrate that they cannot be the 
answer to our problem.
If there is a painting on the wall, I can copy it to make a painting that is like it. If I 
do a good enough job, it is conceivable that the copy would be indistinguishable 
from the original. If my copy is not quite so good, to that extent, it is not a copy, 
for there are things in the “copy” that are not in the original and vice versa. I can 
imitate something. I can imitate the way you walk by walking that way. I can 
imitate the style of a painter by painting in that manner. It is conceivable that an 
imitation of that sort could deceive an expert into believing that this was a 
painting by the painter in question; that may be the intention as is the case with a 
forgery or it may not be. There have, of course, been such cases in both the areas 
of painting and of music. I may imitate the style (even subconsciously) of 
someone whose work I like. But these are not copies in the sense we are 
considering. I cannot imitate Venus and neither can a painting.
How can I copy or imitate, even a factual situation let alone a fictional one, using 
words? How is a play a copy of an historical incident, say? We might agree that 
it reproduces or represents that incident. We might call it a re-enactment. But it is 
not a copy. If I paint a portrait, in what sense is that a copy of the sitter? Again, 
we might say that it is a likeness of the sitter. Even then, the problems in using 
that term abound. If I make a bronze statue or a plaster “likeness” of someone, is 
that a copy? After all it is only made of plaster, and not flesh and blood. How do
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we copy the gods, or how do we imitate them? How do we copy or imitate a 
situation that is not, never has been and almost certainly never will be? Perhaps 
there is no need to continue this line of reasoning. We can see that the claim that a 
story copies or imitates anything quickly becomes incoherent. Our earlier 
objections suggested this result.
If “mimesis” just means “copy” then that would be the end of the argument. But I 
do not think that was Aristotle’s use of the term. Both Aristotle and Plato were 
aware that not everything the poet tells us is simply a copy. This was Plato’s 
objection; the poets “make it up” or tell lies. Aristotle said that the mimesis 
idealises things to display their essence. Mimesis, therefore, cannot be simply a 
copy or an imitation.
I will argue that a better understanding of the meaning of “mimesis” is gained 
through a consideration of the wider concept of representation. I will suggest that 
a work of art, and a story in particular, is representational. I will argue both that a 
theory of mimesis as representation better accords with Aristotle’s Poetics and 
also provides a way of understanding modem literary works. A copy or an 
imitation can be a representation but a representation need not be a copy. I will
suggest that this approach subsumes the idea of “copy”, at least in the context that
26is of concern to us, while incorporating its best features.
A story, I thus claim, represents something. We will discuss the general notion of 
“representation” before specifying precisely what it is that a story represents. Not 
all art, it might well be argued, is representational. Much painting is non- 
representational and some poetry may be non-representational. An example of the 
latter might be a work such as Jabberwocky. Certainly much modem painting is 
not representational (although, perhaps, not as much as some people suppose).
There is, of course, the use of the word “copy” to mean, roughly, 
“replicate”. That use applies to genetic material and, possibly, to artefacts 
coming from a production line or, even, to the printing of books. But that 
usage is not applicable here and “represent” can hardly subsume it.
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But most written work represents something and certainly a story, I claim, does so. 
I am not, here, assuming what I set out to show; I merely need to exclude certain 
types of work from our discussion. I still must show that “representation” is a 
more appropriate concept than “imitate” or “copy”. A “story” which could not be 
subsumed under the idea of representation would have no plot and, thus, not be a 
story at all (in terms of our definition). Such work is, by definition, excluded from 
this thesis.
In general terms, representation allows us to imagine, and perhaps identify or 
recognise, the thing represented. An art book contains representations of works of 
art hanging on gallery walls. We may even call such things copies, although what 
we see in an art book is, in many ways, quite unlike the painting hanging on the 
wall. The police may show us a photograph of a suspect and ask us if this is the 
man we saw. The photograph represents the man so that we can (or at least might) 
recognise him from the photograph. If we see him on some other occasion, we 
may remember the photograph and report the fact.
Suppose I ask you for directions to Tom’s place and you tell me to continue 
straight ahead and take the second on the left, saying that Tom lives five houses 
along in the house with the blue door. I can follow these directions to get to 
Tom’s house under normal circumstances. This would represent (in language) the 
directions; it is hardly a copy or an imitation. A map is a representation. It needs 
a special sort of understanding, however, for the “reader” to decipher the 
representation. If you give me, in a lecture, an outline of David Hume’s 
philosophy, I learn something. All of these are forms of representation. It is 
possible to represent falsely. For example, the directions to Tom’s house may be 
wrong and may, thus, represent falsely. This may be done deliberately or in error. 
Things, which are not, may be represented; and things may be represented which 
are not (as, many say, is done in a fiction). Thus, a unicorn or time travel can be 
the subject of representation.
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As we have noted, it is clear that Aristotle and Plato were not ignorant of any of 
this. Plato wanted to exclude poets just because they had the capacity to represent 
falsely. Aristotle claimed that the representation (could be) a universalising thing 
just because it is not specific to any one thing, that is to say, not a simple copy.
I am not (necessarily) claiming that all art works are representations. As I have 
already said, those that are not, are not mimetic. I am, at least prima facie, 
ignoring abstract paintings and music. I do not argue either that these are or are 
not representations but, for our purposes, stories, as defined, clearly are and that is 
sufficient. I have, in this discussion, used paintings and verbal artefacts (including 
“plain” speech) as illustrations keeping to conservative examples. There may be 
cases where there is not agreement over what is a representation, for example, is 
Picasso’s Weeping Woman (Penrose Collection, London) a representation? It may 
not allow us to identify the model in the same way as a photograph of the criminal 
may allow us to identify the criminal. I think the Picasso painting is a 
representation, (it clearly represents something, namely, a weeping woman, but 
perhaps not a particular weeping woman). It is no argument to claim that we 
would not recognise the sitter for the painting, for we are not required to do so. I 
may also fail to recognise the criminal in the police file photograph. Is 
Jabberwocky a representation? It is probably not a representation; the best that 
can be claimed for it is that it is suggestive. Again, such marginal cases are not 
important and do not affect the argument. Alice in Wonderland is, I think, a 
representation. It is clearly a story; events (strange events admittedly) occur.
I think it is fair to suggest that, in Aristotle’s day, all works were representations, 
at the “conservative” end of the spectrum of representation; there was no 
recognised abstract art or nonsense poetry, although some of Aristophanes’ plays 
may come close to the modem theatre of the absurd. No doubt, with the exception 
of pure decoration, Aristotle thought his theory covered all art. He even included 
music as being covered by his theory of mimesis. He argued that music was 
mimetic in that it rouses the emotions. Its emotive value was linked to the mode
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of the music. We may not agree with his analysis. In ancient Greece, music 
existed mainly to complement performances of some sort — either drama or dance 
— and certainly, Aristotle’s analysis of music could not accommodate the modem 
symphonic work. We do not need to consider this particular aspect of Aristotle’s 
theory further. I merely observe that Aristotle included all art in his mimetic 
theory. We need not follow him that far; it is sufficient to note that stories are 
mimetic. We can, therefore, exclude so-called abstract art and music from our 
discussion. That is not to take a stand on this issue but to recognise that the failure 
to substantiate any claim in the matter does not affect the more restricted claims 
being made here.
We have already defined a story as having a plot. That is to say it represents a 
state-of-affairs as changing or unfolding in time. A story contains characters; 
these characters may develop over the time of the story; we may see their 
“personalities” change as the story unfolds or we may learn more about those 
personalities. Such characters may be complex or simple. A story also has a 
location. That is to say that the plot and the characters develop at a place or 
places. The plot may develop at just one location (in the story), as is so in The 
Turn of the Screw or Hamlet, or the plot may develop in a very elaborate and 
complex location, as in The Divine Comedy. But how can any of these things be 
represented if they are not actual? As I have said above, I will defer that question 
for the moment. I will, later, attempt to provide some sort of analysis of the 
boundaries of stories. I am not claiming that all writing is representational. It is 
possible to write in a non-representational manner (where language is used for its 
own sake, playfully). Some “novels” and poems may be of that kind. To the 
extent that they do not represent, I will argue that they (or parts of them) are not 
stories. A work such as Jabberwocky is, to put it bluntly, clever and tantalising
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but meaningless. We will, in the next chapter, have occasion to consider a work 
by Gass27 that presents similar difficulties.
It has often been noted that rarely is the imitation or representation “good” enough 
to fool us into thinking that the thing being represented is “real”. The ancients 
talked about the painting of Xeuxis as being so good that the birds pecked at the 
grapes (only, I presume, to be disappointed at the result); occasionally a trompe 
Voeil picture may fool us (if only briefly). We are, however, not fooled into 
believing that Anna Karenina “really” committed suicide. Yet we still cry for her 
and her fate. We may take some stories, such as the legends surrounding King 
Arthur to be about people who may have really existed or we may come to believe 
that the legends are based on some distant reality, but we certainly recognise that 
many stories are not so based.
Translating Aristotle
Most translators of Aristotle’s Poetics still use the word “copy” or “imitation” to 
translate the Greek word “juijur/oic;”.2* Halliwell talks of the “dangerous 
inadequacy”29 of this translation for a proper understanding of Aristotle. He is 
adamant that the word, “pi/itjoK;” is better translated as “representation” and he 
uses that term, or the (English) word “mimesis” consistently.
William H. Gass, Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife, Normal, IL: Dalkey 
Archive Press, 1998.
This Greek word, may also be translated into the English
equivalent “mimesis” and it is this word that will be used in this thesis. 
Our immediate purpose, now, is, however, to come to a suitable 
understanding of the meaning of the term.
Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis Revisited”, p. 489.
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Malcolm Heath, who translated the Poetics for Penguin, uses “imitation”. He 
does, however, admit that “[m]any scholars would object to this rendering, and 
prefer ‘representation’.’00 Heath gives as his reasons for preferring “imitation” 
firstly, that mimesis implies a similarity that does not rest simply on convention. 
A representation, he says, may be purely conventional and, as such, is not 
adequate to give Aristotle’s meaning. Secondly, he says that mimesis has a 
continuity across a number of uses, including animal mimicry and children’s 
games. He says that representation lacks both these aspects.31 Yet, Heath 
concedes that the word “imitation” is not quite right either. Butcher, a much 
earlier translator, makes similar comments. He calls the word “imitation” 
“inadequate” but uses it as being the most suitable English word available. 
Butcher says that he prefers to avoid the use of terms such as “symbol”. Symbols 
are, he claims, conventional. A symbol signifies by convention and, so, he claims, 
lacks the element of similarity that is, he claims, captured by “copy”. He seems to 
be in agreement with Heath. Butcher says, for example, of facial expressions 
(which may be taken to symbolise varied emotions) that, “they are not 
conventional symbols, ... but living signs.” He means, I think, that some things 
are natural symbols and are understood by the viewer (or reader) to be like the 
thing symbolised so that the “meaning” of the symbol is understood apart from 
convention. Such symbols, I presume, he would be prepared to count as mimeses.
Butcher puts forward no argument to substantiate this claim but seems to suppose 
that it is self-evident. But it is not self-evident. In what way is an actor’s facial 
expression symbolic of grief? The expression certainly represents grief. Butcher, 
we remember, says that some things are natural symbols. But what things and 
how is something artificial in contrast to something else which is natural. In many
Aristotle, Poetics (transl. Malcolm Heath), translator’s introduction, p. xiii. 
Ibid.
S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art with a Critical 





cultures the throwing of ashes symbolises grief. In other cultures, professional 
mourners attend funerals. But need these things: throwing ashes or facial 
expressions, function as natural symbols? In other societies, the same actions and 
expressions may be used for some other purpose. Actors do use facial expressions 
which, in our society, are so taken. That is all we can say.
Heath seems to agree with Butcher, for he argues that a dot on a map may 
represent an airport but it is not a mimesis. A scale plan would, he says, be!34 
Yet, a scale plan is only a representation. It is necessary to pick out how and in 
what ways the drawing copies the original. It is lines on paper; it is not made of 
concrete; it does not contain reinforcing steel; planes do not leave the scale plan or 
the dot on the map. That is to say, we need to know how the drawing represents 
the (actual) airport. This is a conventional thing. In like manner, the dot on the 
map also represents the airport. It represents it in terms of its location vis-a-vis 
other (suitably scaled) landmarks such as roads or, even, land masses. We are 
taught to read plans and maps at school. Many works of art require training for 
their representational qualities to become apparent. Such works are mimetic but 
an understanding of the conventions that underpin them is necessary if the works 
are to be understood. This is so, not only of modem works but also of art works in 
general. It is so of ancient works or Christian painting of the middle ages, or of art 
produced by other cultures, for example, the dot painting of the Australian 
Aborigines, and it is so of Greek tragedy. It is also the case with works produced 
by our own culture; we have learned to recognise them and to live with them so 
readily that we often fail to recognise any problem.
The tragedies of Aeschylus and other Greek tragedians were usually based upon a 
well-known mythical, or historical event. The play, as presented, was designed to 
evoke and, in some sense, reproduce that event. Greek painting and sculpture 
were what is called “realistic”. But they were not copies of things. Phidias, I
33 Ibid., p. 127.
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presume, had never seen Athena. We have already observed that, in Aristotle’s 
day, most art was either decorative or “realistic”. This measure of verisimilitude 
may allow translators such as Butcher to get away with using a word like 
“imitation”. But, in our context, the inadequacies of this word become manifest.
It is not my purpose, here, to engage deeply with questions about the translation of 
Greek philosophical works. Such a task would require a different thesis from this 
and it would require a scholar schooled in Greek. Here we are simply attempting 
to come to a suitable understanding of the term “mimesis”. A suitable 
understanding, for our purposes, is one that must serve us in our present context. 
That includes Plato’s and Aristotle’s usage and must cover the works extant when 
they were alive, but must extend to include the sorts of works that are available 
today. To arrive, therefore, at a suitable understanding, we may start with Plato 
and Aristotle and their translators but we cannot stop there. Our notion of 
mimesis must be wide enough to encompass the modem novel and modem 
paintings and plays; we have already noted this requirement. We need a notion of 
mimesis that will accommodate the sorts of plays and other works, principally 
sculpture and painting, with which Aristotle was familiar but will also 
accommodate more recent works.
Mimesis and Catharsis
I want to turn now to the analysis of mimesis offered by Leon Golden.35 Golden, 
in looking to understand mimesis, considered, first, what Aristotle means by
34
35
Aristotle, Poetics (transl. Malcolm Heath), translator’s introduction, p. xiii.
Leon Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Artistic Mimesis, Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1992.
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catharsis. Golden observes that, for Aristotle, the mimesis produces the catharsis;
o r
so, a tragedy produces its effect by KaOapoiq. Golden commences with this 
question as a means of working towards a better understanding of Aristotle’s idea 
of mimesis. Golden argues that to understand mimesis it is necessary, first, to 
understand catharsis. Further, any understanding of how mimesis works must be 
such that the mimesis is capable of producing the cathartic effect.
We attend a performance of a tragedy. We see, represented there, distressing 
events. We enjoy ourselves (amid our tears). Why do we go to see such 
performances? How can we enjoy ourselves? Aristotle tells us that we experience 
catharsis when we attend these performances. The question of the meaning of 
“catharsis” has been much discussed but I will restrict my discussion to the work 
of Golden.
This term has been variously understood as: a medical effect wherein excess 
stresses are purged leaving the body clear and healthy; a psychological effect 
whereby excess emotional energy is discharged leaving the person psychologically 
refreshed; the final contender is an intellectual effect where the viewer of the play 
is brought to understand and to see things more clearly leaving the intellect clear.
Golden dismisses the first two possibilities as being inadequate for the result that 
Aristotle attributes to tragedy in particular. Golden acknowledges that there is a
'X 'lmedical usage of the term and that Aristotle uses it in the Politics. But, Golden 
then claims that the idea of “medical purgation” is “intrusive”38 in the context of 
the Poetics and is inadequate for the task that Aristotle encompasses there.
Golden uses the word “katharsis” as a transliteration of the Greek word, 
“KaOapoK;”. We will follow normal practice and use the English word, 
“catharsis”.
38
Ibid., p. 37. 
Ibid.
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Golden points to Aristotle’s claim that “by nature, all men long to know.” 
Aristotle’s claim is, Golden argues, that it is this desire to know which underpins 
the satisfaction we feel at the theatre. This cathartic effect is, he claims, also the 
cause of the pleasure we feel at the comedy or, indeed, in the presence of any art 
work. This result is primarily an intellectual result and can comprise a number of 
aspects of coming to know or of understanding. We can learn a wide variety of 
things from such works: we can learn about the world or about ourselves. We can 
also learn moral lessons.
Moral lessons, it has often been claimed, are what literature and art are for. Sir 
Philip Sidney, for example,40 put forward this argument to defend poetry against 
its detractors. Poetry, he said, has value because it teaches us moral lessons. 
Golden agrees that, sometimes, poetry can teach us such lessons. There are many 
stories telling of the triumph of good over evil; even the phrase is hackneyed. 
Golden cites Sophocles’ Antigone as an example where a play may be considered 
to point a moral lesson. The moral conundrum is discussed: should Antigone 
obey the law of the land imposed by Creon or the natural law of affinity for her 
brother? This is a complex moral issue and not the simple good versus evil that 
seems to be so common. Yet stories do not always show the triumph of good or 
point a moral lesson (at least not directly). In Monteverdi’s beautiful opera, The 
Coronation of Poppeia, for example, evil wins out.
So, we cannot argue that poetry teaches us morality simpliciter! Golden does not 
so argue. His claim is that we learn from such works. Moral lessons are only one 
sort of intellectual catharsis we may obtain from a work. What we leam may be a 
moral lesson, but it may be that a play teaches us other lessons, for not all lessons 
are moral lessons. We may leam instantly or we may take a long time to digest
Aristotle, Metaphysics (transl. Hugh Lawson-Tancred), London: Penguin 
Books, London, 1998, 980a.
Philip Sidney, A Defence of Poetry (ed. J. A. Van Dorsten), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1966.
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and learn from a story. Golden says that there are many ways, of which moral 
lessons are but one, in which we can gain an intellectual catharsis from such 
works. So there must be a wider use of the term, for Aristotle, as a mode of 
learning.
Golden, thus, argues that catharsis is a wide term, incorporating the idea of 
emotional purgation but emphasising the notion of understanding. This is the 
effect we experience when we attend the tragedy but also when we attend the 
comedy. Catharsis cannot be limited to a narrow mode of operation.
Catharsis, he says, is not a simple phenomenon but a
credible mechanism for subsuming under a single concept, many 
diverse views. It recognises the powerful role emotional 
motivation and emotional response play in tragedy; it accepts the 
centrality of ethical issues in many tragedies ... and it fully 
acknowledges the possibility of a therapeutic effect as a result of 
the encounter with the tragic mimesis. It requires, however, that 
we understand that central to all of our experiences with tragedy 
and other literary genres is an act of intellectual insight elicited 
by verbal stimuli.41
Although Golden, here, concentrates upon the intellectual effects of catharsis, he 
makes it clear that catharsis can operate at any level and that the principle holds 
good for works of any “literary genre”. Before completing Golden’s argument, it 
is important to understand the scope of catharsis. In The Poetics, Aristotle was 
concerned mainly with tragedy. Aristotle is widely believed to have written a 
companion volume, now lost, concentrating on comedy. Some, therefore, argue 
that any result we can derive from The Poetics, is only applicable to tragedy and 
that we cannot generalise, as we wish to do, to other forms of literary works.
Golden emphatically rejects such an argument. There is no big division between 
comedy and tragedy. For Aristotle, tragedy and comedy are all mimetic.42 “The
Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Artistic Mimesis, p. 39. 
Aristotle, The Poetics, 1447a.
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essential difference between tragedy and comedy for Aristotle lies in the opposed 
kinds of character and action both represent”43, Golden argues. Tragedy is about, 
essentially, noble characters caught up in circumstances, where comedy concerns 
itself with the “laughable”44, that is ignoble characters caught up in problems of 
their own making. If tragedy reveals something about ourselves, so does comedy. 
Aristophanes’ plays, for example, show up, in their comic denouement, how those 
flaws make the characters ridiculous and fail. If pity arises from the tragic, 
indignation arises from the comic. Just as we pity the tragic hero, we become 
indignant at the ridiculous behaviour of the comic character, when ignoble 
characters fail, we experience catharsis also. Golden, thus, argues that “one 
essential pleasure is assigned [by Aristotle] to all forms of mimesis, including 
tragic and comic mimesis, and that is the pleasure of learning and inference.”43
Some stories may offer very little in the way of an intellectual catharsis and, at the 
end of this thesis, we will consider some popular and some classic literary works. 
The catharsis may not always be “deep”. Some works may have more value as 
entertainment or diversion than they have as the vehicle for an intellectual 
catharsis. They may be gruesome, exciting or romantic. However, works of that 
kind are never tragedies and it is tragedies that require the full extent of catharsis 
if they are to work. Anything less would result, not in a tragedy or a comedy, but 
in a farce.46
We will have more to say about learning from stories much later in this thesis, 
where we will establish a means whereby the (intellectual) catharsis can be 
generated. Before we can do that, we need to establish our main thesis. We 
should, however, note that Golden is claiming that catharsis is a general effect
Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Artistic Mimesis, p. 67.
Aristotle, The Poetics, 1448b. Golden translates this word as “ridiculous”.
Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis, p. 102.
For example Romeo and Juliet is tragedy but the similar “Pyramus and 
Thisbe” story in A Midsummer Night’s Dream is a farce.
46
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applying to art works in general, including stories of both the comic and the tragic 
kind. It is also an encompassing effect. It ranges from some form of intellectual 
relief (perhaps what is called escapism) through an emotionally restorative effect 
to an intellectual awakening. The cathartic effect has value in different ways and 
can teach us lessons of all kinds.
Let us, now, return to the detail of Golden’s argument and bring it to a conclusion. 
Golden argues that Aristotle’s use of the term “mimesis” must be consistent with 
the idea of “catharsis” as he has expounded it. If Aristotle puts such emphasis on 
mimesis as effecting catharsis in this manner then mimesis, whatever it is, must be 
up to the task. This is not to say that a story can never be understood as an 
imitation but it is to say that imitation is not an adequate concept to cover all 
stories. To do that, we need to move to a wider concept and the concept I am 
proposing is representation. This is a result with which Halliwell, as we have 
already noted, strongly agrees.
Golden summarises his claims about Aristotelian mimesis by saying that mimesis 
is “a tightly structured process involving, in different arts, different means of 
representation, different manners of communicating that representation to an 
audience, and different moral and ethical states as the object of artistic 
representation.”47 He proceeds by observing that some arts use paint and colour 
and similar means to represent where others, such as the play, use words and 
require a stage and so forth. We also notice that, in this passage, Golden 
specifically describes a mimesis as a representation.
My argument is simple: one cannot imitate or copy the gods, or the characters and 
events in many modem novels, for they are very unlike anything we know. But 
one can represent these things. Mimesis is representation. A story, I am claiming, 
represents something. What is represented is still to be identified. That will be 
our next task.
47 Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Artistic Mimesis, p. 64.
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Neither am I claiming that a work is no more than a representation. Any work 
requires material and skill for its creation. The quality or supposed realism of a 
representation may or may not contribute to the aesthetics of the work. The ways 
the materials (words, or paint or whatever the work is made from) are used by the 
work’s creator obviously contribute significantly to the work and the way it will 
be understood and accepted. Such questions are aesthetic questions and lie 
beyond the scope of this work. At this stage of our argument, we have not proved 
Aristotle to be right. His discussion of the problem is, merely, our starting point, 
although, we will discover, that our pathway from here to its end continually 
intersects with the lines of Aristotle’s thinking. When we reach that end, we will 
have a comprehensive account, starting with this understanding of mimesis and 
catharsis, of how stories can make sense.
Representing Story-Worlds
In the previous section, I have argued that a mimesis is a representation. If this is 
so, then what does a story represent? What does a story such as Metamorphosis 
represent? Clearly, it cannot represent any state-of-affairs in this world. For it to 
do that it would have to, at least, relate events that have occurred. But these 
stories have not, so far as we know, occurred. So, how can we represent such 
things? How can we represent people turning into giant beetles, or the goddess 
Venus, or Pegasus, or anything that is not there (to be represented)? We seem to 
have gained very little. We must now, as promised earlier, answer this question.
A photograph of a criminal, perhaps for identification, represents the criminal in 
question. It is intended that we see the criminal and recognise him from the 
representation. Instructions to get to Tom’s house may be followed to get to
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Tom’s house. A portrait represents the sitter and so on. In these cases I have 
argued that representation is a better way of seeing a work than copy or imitation. 
A photograph of a criminal is not a copy of the criminal, neither is it an imitation. 
The dot on the map represents the airport; so does the plan or the painting or the 
scale model. Representation can exist in very many forms. The essential 
requirement, in these examples, is that we can identify or imagine the thing 
represented. The dot on the map allows us to identify the airport; a skilled pilot 
can follow the map to arrive at the correct dot (something which always amazes 
me). The photograph allows us to identify the criminal.
But not everything is so neatly settled. Manet’s Olympia is not a portrait of 
anyone. Neither is Titian’s Venus ofUrbino. To the extent that these things may 
be a representation of the painter’s model, that is irrelevant. Pride and Prejudice, 
although we may consider it to be “realistic”, does not represent, so far as we 
know, any actual persons or events. Certainly Metamorphosis does not do so. 
Sometimes a writer uses events and characters she knows and bases her work 
around these. The painter may have used a model to paint a work; but that does 
not make the work a portrait of the model. What the Venus of Urhino represents 
is Venus and not the woman who was used by Titian as his model even though, as 
a “copy”, it is a better “copy” of the model than it is a “copy” of Venus. What 
then does a mimesis of Elizabeth Bennet, in Pride and Prejudice, represent? Even 
if the "portrait" of Elizabeth given to us by Austen is a realistic description of a 
certain person known to Austen,48 the novel does not represent that person. If it 
is, as is quite likely, an amalgam drawn from a number of acquaintances, we 
would not want to say that the novel represents any (or all) of those people. It is 
likely that some of the characters in the novel are, largely, drawn from 
acquaintances of Austen's. The character of Mrs. Bennet, for example, borders on 
caricature. A caricature, such as is used by political cartoonists, may represent 
someone in the world, such as a politician. But the character of Mrs. Bennet,
48 So far as I am aware, it is not.
Story-Worlds -39-
although it may capture some characteristics of some people, could hardly be said 
to represent any particular person in this world.
Of course, it is possible to see Titian's painting as a portrait. The model may have 
been independently famous and the painting may provide a likeness, or I may have 
a personal interest in the model (she may have been a forbear of mine). Similarly, 
there may be characters in a novel that are drawn from known persons in whom 
we are, independently, interested. It would be a legitimate activity to use such 
material for historical purposes. But then, we would not be treating that material 
as a story, and certainly not as a fictional story. The material, in that case, would 
be input to a critical, historical analysis and be raw material for that. It is, of 
course, necessary to interpret any work and it may be important to distinguish 
fictional stories from those which are (or purport to be) non-fictional. We will 
consider the question of interpretation in the next chapter and the question of 
fiction and non-fiction in a later chapter.
So, what is represented? The answer I give is simple-, a story or a fiction 
represents a world. According to Halliwell, this view of representation is quite 
consistent with Aristotle’s argument. He says that “Aristotle believes that 
mimetic representation is a formal equivalent of an imaginable reality.”49 This is 
an important claim. I am suggesting that Aristotle’s imaginable reality is the 
world of the story. Halliwell further argues that this representation occurs through 
“significant verbal structures”50 that is to say, through the text (or its equivalent). 
We will explore the imaginative creation of that world in a later chapter.
The story, Pride and Prejudice, represents a world, namely, the world of Pride 
and Prejudice. That world is like the world described in the novel. I will refer to 
such a world as a story-world. The world of Pride and Prejudice is the Pride and 
Prejudice story-world. The world of the Venus of Urbino is the Venus of Urbino
49
50
Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis Revisited”, p. 498. 
Ibid., p. 501.
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story-world. The Pride and Prejudice story-world has a more complex plot than 
the Venus of Urbino story-world but the latter is richer in other ways. It is, 
perhaps, arguable that the Venus of Urbino implies a story but many observers 
would say that it fails to meet the requirement of being a story (since it is a 
painting and does not, formally at least, have a plot). Since we are looking 
specifically at stories, we will not worry about any supposed deficiencies with the 
Venus of Urbino story-world but, rather, concentrate our attention on the story- 
worlds arising from novels and other written (or spoken) works.
It is a commonplace to talk of “the world of ...” where we can fill in the 
placeholder with different types of things. We can talk of the world of Elizabeth 
Bennet or the world of Pride and Prejudice or the world of Jane Austen or the 
world of early nineteenth century rural England. We can talk of the world of 
Sherlock Holmes, meaning some sort of composite world drawn from the totality 
of the Doyle Sherlock Holmes stories and peopled with the various characters 
mentioned in those stories. It could be argued that Conan Doyle invites such a 
treatment of his work where, for example, Jane Austen does not. In this thesis, I 
want to concentrate on story-worlds made from just a single story, that is, a story 
which involves one connected narrative. This is a simplification but it is not one 
which will affect our discussion or invalidate our findings. These findings could 
be extended, in obvious ways, to take in forms and combinations such as those 
just mentioned. When I say a single story, I mean what is commonly understood 
to be just one story. Such a thing may be a story or novel printed between the 
covers of a book or a set of books suitably labelled (the ubiquitous trilogy). Or it 
may be a short story, printed as such, in a collection of short stories. It may be a 
recitation or a play or a film. It will not affect our findings if we cannot agree, in 
marginal cases, if a story is one story or several (because, as I have just suggested, 
the thesis could be extended to cover such cases). Not all stories are simple. We 
will have occasion to note some of the complexities of Hamlet for example. But 
the things I am calling stories, including Hamlet, are unified in the way just 
identified. It is easy to extend the treatment offered here to story-worlds
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constructed from some sort of amalgam of several stories, although, as has been 
suggested, we will not follow that path. The world of Jane Austen is, however, an 
attempt to reconstruct some (supposed) historical reality — a time and place based 
around a person of interest to us; such a usage is not one that this thesis is 
considering.
Using this simple and commonplace idea of a story-world for the purposes of 
explaining how stories can make sense is hardly new, but what is new is, I think, 
the way in which the idea is used in this thesis as more than just a fagon de parier. 
A story-world may be simple or complex. The story may be a “simple” recitation 
of events or it may include detailed and complex information about the dramatis 
personae and their thought processes. It may be presented in many different 
forms: as a recollection in the first person; as a detective style reconstruction; as a 
straight narrative presented by an omniscient narrator; and so forth. The method 
chosen to tell the story, may affect our reaction to the story, but that is a matter 
that does not bear directly on our problem yet.
A world is what a story describes. The answer to the question: “what does the 
Oresteia represent?” is “it represents the world of the Oresteia or the Oresteia 
story-world.” The question of the veracity or the status of the story vis-a-vis this 
world then becomes a separate issue from that of the story itself. We can 
profitably read, for example, The Bible, without saying it is true of this world 
(although we may also say that). But it can still be true of its own world (and it 
must be).
Some of the stories mentioned so far could represent the “real” world. Pride and 
Prejudice could, we all suppose, occur. So could War and Peace. It is even 
possible that The Divine Comedy represents things as they are (many of us will be 
very surprised should it turn out to be so). We take it that Metamorphosis or The 
Tempest could not represent a possible state-of-affairs in the “real”, or, perhaps, 
any other, world. It is impossible to decide where realism starts and ends. But we
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don’t need to do so. This approach is indifferent to how realistic a work is (or is 
claimed to be). We are not talking of Lewisian possible worlds.51
Most commentators do not take it that Dante or Kafka lied to us by representing 
things as they are almost certainly not. Yet it is common to suppose that the 
representation must be realistic and many people do not enjoy fantasy or science 
fiction for just that reason. It is common to hear certain novels criticised as 
unrealistic. To criticise Metamorphosis on such grounds seems to be beside the 
point. We will need to understand how this can be. That discussion will be taken 
up in following chapters.
The story-world includes everything that is necessary for the understanding of the 
story. There are ghosts (at least one) in the Hamlet story-world. There may or 
may not be ghosts in the “real” world. The story-world is that thing represented 
by the story and is, therefore, the way the story is (or is interpreted, by the reader, 
to be). Clearly, different readers interpret stories differently and this question 
must be taken up in the next chapter. We will set this question aside for the 
moment and, at this stage of our argument, talk as if a story-world is a unique 
thing (that is to say, as if stories have a single interpretation, and we all know what 
it is).
Some approaches to stories treat those stories as providing information about 
something else. Stories are not, these approaches claim, about story-worlds, or 
anything else like that. They are about something hidden deep within the 
psychology of human beings or the author. Structuralism and deconstruction are 
cases in point. They treat stories as being about something other than the world of 
the story. Structuralism, for example, claims that the "real" meaning of any story 
lies in its deep structure. Deconstruction looks for details in a text and uses them 
to undermine the assumptions built into that text.
51 I will take up David Lewis’ thesis of possible worlds, known as modal 
realism, in a later chapter.
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Vladimir Propp52 analysed fairytales, or that group of fairytales called 
wondertales, into strands or pieces of narrative. Different stories exhibit these 
pieces; perhaps some pieces are missing from some stories but the pieces are 
always presented, in the story, in the same sequence. The purpose of structural 
analysis is to map a particular story (the one being analysed) to a standard set of 
ideas, motives or themes. Propp “boldly reduced all folk tales to seven ‘spheres of 
action’ and thirty one fixed elements or ‘functions.’ Any individual folk tale 
merely combined these”54 to produce the given story. Propp said that this “fact” 
allowed him to analyse the stories using a method that “makes it possible to rise 
above the plot [of an individual wondertale or fairytale] and study the genre of the 
wondertale as a whole”.55
The structuralist approach to stories separates the details of plot and character 
from what the story is said to be "really" about. It is not clear what the stories are 
really about if it is not witches, tsars and princesses but Propp seems to think that 
the “meaning” lies buried within human psychology or ancient cultural norms of 
which it “preserves traces”.36 Most of the work carried out under the structuralist 
banner, while interesting, does not use sophisticated examples but concentrates on 
the analysis of (apparently) simple stories, mainly fairytales and folktales. The 
most sophisticated story analysed, so far as I am aware, by structuralist 
commentators is Balzac's short story Sarrasine\ Barthes offers a structuralist
52 I am treating Propp as if he were a structuralist. But Propp would have 
described himself as a formalist, see, for example, Vladimir Propp, Theory 
and History of Folklore (ed. Anatoly Liberman, transl. Adriana Y. Martin 
and Richard P. Martin et al), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984, p. 67, where he describes Levi-Strauss as a structuralist in contrast to 
himself. The difference will not affect the argument presented here.
Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, (2nd ed.). (transl. Laurence 
Scott, rev. Louis A. Wagner), Austen, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1975, p. 22.
34 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 104. 
Propp, Theory and History of Folklore, p. 72.
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reading of this story in S/Z.51 The structuralist approach seems to deny any status 
to stories at all. They have a structure and that is all (at least, that is all that is of 
interest to the structuralist reader). As for characters, they have been completely 
subjugated to the structure. Barthes recognises this as a problem, claiming that it 
is a problem he shares with Aristotle.58 He moves to a solution of this problem, 
by defining the characters as operating within the plot and their characters as 
constructed from the relevant elements of the plot. Barthes calls such characters 
actants, to emphasise that role.
I do not wish to deny that a story may have some such structure and that one may 
be able to analyse stories in these terms. However, to treat them thus is not to 
treat them as stories. That is to say, the details of the plot and characters are 
treated in a violent manner and are assimilated to a standard, external to the story 
and its text. I also suggest that structuralism does violence to how we "read" a 
story. We do see it as telling us about something: dragons and witches, men and 
women. We do not (usually) search the details of the story, manipulating them as 
we go and stringing them out into discreet pieces.
To read a story and to make a story-world is to treat a story as something creative 
and interesting in its own right rather than as grist for some other mill. To repeat, 
I am not arguing that stories cannot be treated in the manner required by 
structuralist analysis or in the way they are used by deconstruction. Plainly they 
can be so used. I am not even arguing that such analysis is illegitimate. This 
thesis says nothing, either in favour or against such a methodology. All I am
Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, p. 87.
Roland Barthes, S/Z (transl. Richard Miller), London: Jonathan Cape, 
1975.
Peter Lamarque, “The Death of the Author: An Analytic Autopsy”, in 
British Journal of Aesthetics, 30, (1990), p. 331, says that Barthes presses 
his technique “almost ad absurdum'.
Roland Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives” in 
Image, Music, Text, 1977, p. 104.
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arguing is that stories, considered qua stories, are used to make a story-world and 
that the story represents that world.
We find that Barthes, himself, starts to talk about stories and films as representing. 
Film is, he says, a way of representing (his italics) the action. “Representation,” 
he says, “is not defined directly by imitation ... There will still be representation 
for so long as a subject (author, reader, spectator or voyeur) casts his gaze towards 
a horizon.”59 I have introduced structuralism at this point, as an example of a way 
of reading a text that denies that a text can represent a story-world; to a 
structuralist, texts represent some deep structure. Structuralists, such as Barthes, 
further argue that the notion of mimesis is outdated. I am suggesting that the shoe 
is on the other foot and that a structuralist reading is able to do some (interesting) 
things but cannot offer a satisfactory philosophical account of stories. Barthes 
seems to have already conceded the point.
Making the Story-World
We will spend most of the remainder of the thesis considering how this leading 
idea shows how we can make sense of stories. In subsequent chapters, we will see 
ways in which our responses to stories and the way we approach them can make 
sense. But already, we have a simple heuristic tool which answers some of the 
problems we have identified. I want to draw some preliminary conclusions now. 
This will allow us to see exactly what a story-world is. It will be necessary to 
draw further conclusions later and to refine and amplify these preliminary results.
59 Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein”, in Image, Music, Text, 
1977, p. 69.
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A story-world is what a story represents and that world is, therefore, as the story 
(or the text) says it is. We do not need to treat the text of a story differently from 
the way we treat any other text; we read the story and we make the story-world as 
we do so. We understand the text of the story in the same way we understand any 
other text (say a newspaper article or a history text book). We must, of course, be 
aware that we are reading a story and we must make the appropriate world. If we 
take the story to be an accurate account of events in this world we may make a 
serious error; we will consider this problem further in chapter 4. As we make the 
story-world we are also making the entities which the story represents. As a very 
general rule, in doing that we take the author of the story to be telling the truth 
about events, places and people, although we will see, in the next chapter, that we 
need not always do that. We understand references to events, places and people 
just as we would such references in any other text. Those events occur within the 
story-world; those places are located within the story-world and those people exist 
within the story-world. When we read anything, we take it that circumstances are 
“normal”, unless the text says otherwise. By “normal” I mean that grass is green, 
snow is white, it takes 12 or so hours to drive from Sydney to Melbourne and such 
like. We fill in this sort of detail (consistently with the story) when we read a text. 
We do the same when someone talks to us.
Some things, such as those just given, can be taken for granted. Other things that 
depart from “normal” would need to be indicated in the story if they are important 
to the story. We would need to be told that the grass was yellow if that were 
important. L. Frank Baum (in The Wizard of Oz) tells us that the road is yellow 
brick; therefore, it is. Jane Austen (in Pride and Prejudice) does not tell us what 
colour hair Elizabeth Bennet had, and it is not critical to the story. Therefore, we 
are free to fill in that detail if we wish; we are also free not to imagine her any way 
in particular. We do not expect Gregor Samsa (in Kafka’s Metamorphosis) to turn 
into a beetle and, of course, we have to be told (by some means) that he has done 
so.
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A story-world is not static. Events occur (those events described, or represented, 
by the text). This is, to put it simply, what we know as the plot. Characters 
develop: they have experiences and those experiences (may) change them. Places 
change: buildings rise and fall; plants grow and so forth. Many stories are more 
about the development of characters than they are about anything else. Stories 
which concentrate on character or even place may, of course, be legitimate stories. 
Character changes or changes to places are represented by the text as taking place, 
over time, within the story-world.
Statements made about the story-world, by readers, are simply that. They may be 
true or false, reasonable, likely or unlikely. If I say “Elizabeth Bennet married 
Darcy” that is a true statement if said about the Pride and Prejudice story-world 
(either overtly or by implication). If I say “She only married him for his money” 
that is false, for the text says otherwise. If I say “Elizabeth Bennet was a redhead” 
I can have no warrant from the text, for the text does not say. However, that 
suggestion is reasonable, and certainly does no violence to the text, but that is all 
we can say; we could not infer such information from what we are told.
In the next chapter I will consider interpretation and the effect of differing 
interpretations in particular. For now, we will notice that if someone takes a story 
and changes it in some manner, then we have a new story. The new story 
represents a different story-world from that represented by the original story. The 
definitions provided say nothing about the originality of the story. Some authors 
are highly imaginative and creative people; others are merely hacks. I must still, 
when I read the work of a hack, make the story-world. I will have more to say 
about such questions later.
For example, the story-world of Nahum Tate’s revision of King Lear (where 
Cordelia survives and so forth) is a different world from that of Shakespeare’s 
(original) story. This forces me to accept that even small changes to a story lead 
to different story-worlds. There are many versions of some stories (Cinderella, for
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example). To the extent that these are all different, each version makes a different 
story-world. I have no difficulty accepting that conclusion. A rewrite of a story 
presents a different story and represents a different story-world (but one that is 
similar to the story-world of the original story). Taking a story and relocating the 
action also changes the story-world. A Shakespearean play presented in a modem 
location (say New York) presents a different story-world from that presented when 
Shakespeare originally presented the play. A producer of a play must make many 
interpretive decisions and these will all affect the finished production, which is a 
form of collaboration between the playwright (who may be dead) and the 
producer. We may question the apropos of some of these variants (and many 
people have questioned Nahum Tate’s revision) but to do that is a different 
problem, relating to taste or some other aesthetic consideration, from our problem.
What of the simultaneous creation of two stories that are exactly alike? Again, in 
this unlikely event, we would have to say that the two authors have described the 
same story-world. I would prefer not to arrive at that conclusion, but I think that 
such events are rare (probably non-existent except in a trivial sense) and the 
conclusion is one that is of no substantial concern. Similarly, Lamb’s Tales from 
Shakespeare, may represent the same story-worlds as the original plays. At least 
they do to the extent that Lamb’s descriptions are faithful. He certainly tried to 
make them so, but his is an interpretation none the less. Conceptually a 
completely successful attempt to do this must be taken as representing the same 
story-world; I think that is a theoretical possibility. It is, practically, inevitable 
that the casting of a story into a different form, will cause some changes in the 
story-world. But there can be (and are) different representations of a thing; 
Lamb’s Tales may be an example of that.
I will leave this line of argument at this point. We will touch on this material 
further when we come to comparing story-worlds and this world in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 2
Interpreting Worlds
We read the text of a story and we make a story-world from our reading. The act 
of making a story-world is an act of interpretation. To make a story-world, we 
must read and interpret the text, for the text represents the story-world. If we are 
unable to do that, we can make no sense of the text. Making a story-world from a 
text is, at least at a basic level of understanding, the interpreting of that text. We 
will, toward the end of this thesis, look at further ways of giving meaning to a 
text; we will do that when we consider texts as metaphorical devices. In this 
chapter we, therefore, want to consider the question of interpretation as a means of 
making the story-world. I will argue that any single text may be interpreted in, 
potentially, many different ways to arrive at different (and possibly incompatible) 
story-worlds. No single interpretation can be privileged.
A story-world may be a very complex place represented by a long and complex 
text. The plot may twist and turn, the characters may be complex (psychological) 
entities and the geography of that world may be difficult to understand. The act of 
making such a world may be difficult and complicated. To read the text and to 
make the story-world may be likened to visiting that world. We may give the text 
a close reading and enjoy our visit to the world savouring every detail. We may 
put a lot of effort and work into a visit. We need not do that; we may quickly 
survey the scene and be done with it. But, to read the story is already to be there. 
“To read a text or to look at a painting means”, says Pavel, “already to inhabit
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their worlds.”60 For to give the story any sense, is to make the world. We can 
immerse ourselves in that world (as observers) to a greater or lesser degree. In 
one sense the making of a story-world is difficult; in another it is very easy and 
natural — so easy and natural that we do it with hardly a thought. We will return 
to this point. However, we may abandon the attempt to make the world as too 
difficult or, in our opinion, not worth the effort (we throw the book away). We 
may quickly read a story giving the text less attention and effort than, perhaps, it 
deserves. This might mean that we do not “see” the world properly but, as just 
suggested, only glimpse it here and there. We may do the same to any scene; we 
do not and cannot pay careful attention to everything. Peter Lamarque states that 
this is all obvious. He points out that it is clear that “reading fiction requires 
active involvement: readers ‘fill out’ characters, draw implications, form 
hypotheses, and make judgments.”61
Wolfgang Iser says that it is the reader who produces from, the text, the reality 
which is the story. The text, he says, “offers us guidance as to what is to be 
produced.”62 The reader does the producing or “synthesising”63. Iser continues by 
making the points above. “[T]he whole text”, he says, “can never be perceived at 
any one time.”64 Reading is a serial activity; we are presented with a varying and 
constantly unfolding panorama, possibly from the different viewpoints of different 
characters. We must make the story-world, but it is a mistake to think that, once 
made, the whole world is retained and can be viewed, as it were, from some 
Olympian perspective. We forget details only, perhaps, to remember them later 
(maybe one of the characters reminds us of something). But we do the same with
Pavel, Fictional Worlds, p. 74.
Peter Lamarque, Fictional Points o f View, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996, p. 19.
Wolfgang Iser, The Act o f Reading: A Theory o f Aesthetic Response, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 107.
Ibid., p. 111.
Ibid., p. 108.64
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our experience of this world also. I will have more to say about that activity in the 
next chapter.
Some texts are vague or confusing and may only hint at the story-world. The 
world represented by Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, is the room and its contents; 
what lies outside that room is only tantalisingly hinted at. We may feel that we are 
seeing the story-world through a fog or with a light on part, only, of the world (the 
contents of the room) and with the remainder obscured. We may read and reread 
the text to make the Endgame story-world. We may make the story-world one 
way and, I will suggest, later decide on a different way of making it (which we 
might prefer). We may make the story-world in several different ways and hold 
the different worlds in some sort of suspended state without deciding on any 
particular world. That is to say, we may refuse to decide between conflicting 
possibilities but visit the different worlds in turn.
We cannot approach a text with a blank mind. We will already be predisposed to 
treat the text in certain ways by our background knowledge of the text or the 
author, by things we have heard about the story, our understanding of this world, 
our experience of this world and so forth. We may make the story-world in a 
particular fashion because of certain stylistic considerations to be found within the 
text itself. Such “literary” considerations are, in general, outside the scope of this 
thesis, but we cannot completely ignore them.
In this thesis, we are considering the reader’s reaction to the story-text. But, 
should that reader be looking for the (one) right interpretation of a text and set out 
to make the right story-world? I will argue that we must interpret any text within 
its own terms; we are not free to interpret a text just anyway. There must be some 
limits to how it is to be interpreted. We cannot interpret Endgame as describing a 
train journey from Sydney to Melbourne; that would do violence to the text itself. 
That claim seems right, but can we go the next step and say that there is only one 
correct interpretation, and that any interpretations, other than that one, are wrong?
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Many people argue that there is only one correct interpretation, and that is the 
interpretation that the author of the text intended. That would, at least, rule out 
apparently legitimate interpretations because they depart from the author’s 
intention, without necessarily seeming out of order with the text itself. As a result 
only one, or a small family of related, interpretations would count as correct. This 
is a question Gary Iseminger asks, in the preface to a collection of essays on this 
topic: “[w]hat is the connection, if any, between the author’s intentions in (while) 
writing a work of literature and the truth (acceptability, validity) of interpretive 
statements about it?”63 he asks. He continues, drawing the battle lines between 
the older view represented by Wimsatt and Beardsley which says there is no 
connection and the more recent view presented by E. D. Hirsch claiming that a 
work means what the author intended. The debate between these two is 
characterised by Dickie and Wilson as follows:
Beardsley claims that combinations of words can have a specific 
meaning independently of anyone’s intention. Hirsch claims 
that combinations of words can not have a specific meaning 
unless that meaning is intended by the author and further that an 
author’s intention determines the meaning his combinations of 
words can have.66
Put thus, Hirsch’s thesis seems improbable but the suggestion that a text means 
what its author intended might seem, on the surface, to be attractive, particularly if 
it is not possible to determine just one meaning for a given text.
However, I will argue that a text can have many legitimate meanings and that it is 
not possible to restrict its meaning to just one possibility (even if the author did 
intend just that one particular meaning). In the next chapter, I will mount a similar 
case for suggesting that there are (potentially) many legitimate ways of seeing the
Gary Iseminger (ed.), Intention and Interpretation, Philadelphia, NY: 
Temple University Press, 1992. preface, p ix.
George Dickie, and Kent Wilson, “The Intentional Fallacy: Defending 
Beardsley”, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53, (1995), 
p. 235.
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world. When I suggest that there are many legitimate possibilities for interpreting 
a text (or understanding the world), that is because, partly, there is no way of 
legitimising any given interpretation over any other. Hirsch argues that there is 
such a way: namely, the way the author intended (but, possibly failed to make 
clear). It does not follow, from my argument, that just any interpretation must be 
given credence and, neither, does it follow that all texts have multiple 
interpretations. There are probably a great many texts which can only be
understood in one (general) way without doing violence to the text itself. Many 
texts are clear and seemingly explicit. But not all. Where the text is not clear and 
explicit, a space for multiple interpretations opens.
In order to better approach this question I want, firstly, to indicate briefly what an 
interpretation is and then to consider possible interpretations of a particular work, 
Henry James’ The Turn of the Screw. Then we can return to the general question 
of interpretation.
What is an Interpretation?
Iseminger suggests that we indicate an interpretation of a work, by making further 
statements about that work.67 In this chapter we will consider interpretations that 
are expressed as statements about a story. We read a story and, unless the text is 
to be just a jumble of sounds (as it might be if we are reading a language we do 
not understand), we interpret what we have read to make a story-world. That is 
what it is to understand the story-text qua story. When we interpret a work, we 
say things about that work. Of course, some such statements are evaluative (that
67 Iseminger, Intention and Interpretation, editor’s introduction, p. 1
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is to say are broadly about the aesthetics of the work) but some are about the story- 
world. It is these latter that are to hold our interest here.
We represent the world of the work by, inter alia, symbolising that world in 
words. That is what it is to write a story (to write words that represent, in some 
manner, the story-world) . 68 We might interpret a work by drawing a picture (as an 
illustrator of books might) or by some other symbolising means. But, here, I will 
limit the discussion to interpretations made using words. What I say in terms of 
interpretation couched in words could be extended to include other forms of 
interpretation and I am not intending to exclude other interpretive mechanisms as 
possibilities. It is more convenient and less prolix to simply consider word-based 
interpretations. This is, of course, how school teachers and university professors 
test interpretation of literary (and other) works. They set comprehension tests and 
require students to submit essays.
Comprehension tests are marked as incorrect if the student provides an answer 
which is incompatible with the text to be comprehended.69 University essays may 
be credited with more or less insight and appreciation of the text. This leads 
professors to award different grades for work. Many essayists are required to go 
beyond the making of the story-world of a work and apply that work in some way 
or to make comparisons. Such activities, while valid, go, as we have noted, 
beyond the task of making the story-world.
The most basic (but perhaps not the simplest) interpretation of a text that one can 
offer is simply the text itself.70 If I am asked what is the meaning of a work, I may
I would not want this very generalised claim to be interpreted to mean that 
a story-world is (fully) conceived by an author and then the text inscribed. 
Obviously authors often write in ways other than that.
Or they may be marked more narrowly than that.
Not everyone will agree that to, merely, repeat a text is a (form of) 
interpretation. They would argue that the interpreter must alter the text or
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respond by quoting the text of that work verbatim. It would be difficult to dispute 
that I have, indeed, given the meaning (that is to say, a suitable interpretation) of 
that text by so doing. However, I may respond by making one or more statements, 
which discuss or, somehow, describe the work in question.
I want to base this discussion around an interpretive question that arises when we 
consider Henry James’ short novel, The Turn of the Screw. In order to place this 
discussion in a context, I will make a short detour through some of the 
possibilities that this work raises. The purpose of that detour is not to present a 
scholarly analysis of James’ story nor to argue a case for any particular 
interpretation, but to illustrate the argument I wish to present.
The Turn of the Screw
James first published The Turn of the Screw in 1898 and revised it for the 
definitive edition published in 1908. The story contains a number of ambiguities: 
for example, the dialogue may be read in different ways. It also contains several 
unanswered questions: for example, we never really find out what Miles did at 
school, to result in the children’s being under the care of the governess. This lack 
of conclusion in the text, opens that text up to different interpretive possibilities, 
as critics and the “ordinary reader” try to supply (and justify) answers to these, and 
other, questions.71 The answers or, at least, the sorts of answers, we give to such 
questions will have a great bearing on how we understand the text, that is to say, 
on how we make the story-world.
say something about it. This is a point that I will pass over, as it does not 
impact my discussion.
Of course, answers supplied by the reader to fill a hiatus in the text need 
not be complete; they may be vague but suggestive.
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Many readers allow their understanding of the real world to colour their reading of 
a text. This is not an error on the part of the reader but necessary, for we cannot 
approach a text with a blank mind and expect to make anything at all from that 
text. If a reader does not think there are ghosts in the real world, that reader may 
read The Turn of the Screw in such a manner as to discount the existence of ghosts 
in their The Turn of the Screw story-world (although to admit ghosts to that world 
is not to admit them into this world). Other readers will not be troubled by an 
interpretation, which populates the story-world with ghosts. In either case, we 
know what sorts of things ghosts are, yet we must allow any ghosts in the story to 
be as the story says (however that may be).
We do, of course, see the Turn of the Screw story-world as, in many ways, like 
this world: we take it for granted that, for example, night follows day in the Turn 
of the Screw story-world as it does in this world. We can have no warrant for 
thinking otherwise.
The story of The Turn of the Screw is told to us indirectly. It is told by the 
children’s governess (now deceased) but comes to us via her papers; she wrote the 
story after the events related occurred. We have, therefore, only the governess’ 
word for any of the events that make up the story as no other witness to those 
events is introduced. We may choose to treat the governess as a reliable narrator 
or we may decide not to do so.
When we read a story, or anything else, we tend to believe what we are told. Our 
friends tell us something and we take it at face value. Usually we believe what we 
are told but, occasionally, we do not do that; we may not trust the teller or what 
we are told may seem wrong or not consistent. There are many reasons not to 
believe what we are told. Similarly, when we read a story, we are inclined to take 
the text at face value. This is usually reasonable. But we must always decide 
whether to believe what we are told. So, our first inclination may be to take the 
Turn of the Screw story as read, treating the governess, who is effectively, the
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narrator, as reliable. It is not wrong to do that. But, we may decide not to believe 
what she says and consider her words with great care (such a decision may arise 
from our reading). That would not be wrong either but a decision to do that could 
not be arbitrarily taken. As I have just said, we believe what we are told, unless 
we have (good) reason not to.
This leads directly to the two broad interpretive schemes that have been applied to 
this story: in one the governess is taken to be reliable, and in the other she is taken 
to be deranged. Most interpreters and casual readers take the story to be a ghost 
story. The ghosts are the (real) ghosts of Peter Quint and Miss Jessel. Many 
interpretations take it that the ghosts of Quint and Jessel have come to take the 
children away, drag them down to perdition. Quint and Miss Jessel had, when 
alive, some awful hold over the children and are now attempting to drag them 
down (presumably, in order to possess them again, as they did when they were 
alive). If the governess is believed, the ghosts are real; such interpretations are 
classified as apparitionist.
Eli Siegel73 takes an apparitionist approach, considering the governess’ 
description of events as, more or less, accurate. On Siegel’s account, the story is a 
“ghost” story. It is a tale of possession but, for him, it is the children who do the 
possessing: they possess Quint and Jessel and will not let them go, even after they 
have died. The children are, he argues, the source of evil. James describes the 
children as sweet and beautiful precisely because we do not expect sweet, 
beautiful, innocent children to be the source of such evil. Their evil is that they 
see other people as contemptible. The universe exists to be held in contempt. The 
children have conjured up the ghosts of their former companions because their
72 There are other views. For example, E. A. Sheppard, in Henry James and 
The Turn of the Screw, Aukland: Aukland University Press, 1974, suggests 
that the governess is telling it as she saw it, but that the ghosts are a result 
of her reading of the children’s minds.
73 Eli Siegel, James and the Children: A Consideration of Henry James's The 
Turn of the Screw, New York: Definition Press, 1968.
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contempt will allow no surcease. Even when dead, Quint and Jessel “exist” to be 
contemptible (to the children).
On the other hand, Cranfill and Clark74 present a nonapparitionist view. There are 
no ghosts, they say. They characterise the apparitionist view as “lazy”. For 
them, the governess is in the grip of a neurotic obsession or worse. They 
characterise her as insane. Her discussions with Mrs. Grose are carefully analysed 
and seen in a quite different light from the way the governess, herself, seems to 
understand them. Mrs. Grose never sees the ghosts. The children never admit to 
seeing them, but the governess asseverates that they must do so and are lying 
when they say they do not. That claim will not be conclusive if we think the 
governess is deranged.
The worlds presented by these two commentators are very different and both 
horrifying. Siegel’s world where the children are evil is a terrible prospect. 
Cranfill’s sick and claustrophobic world where the governess cloisters and 
terrifies the children, ultimately, in Miles’ case, to death, is equally horrible. Both 
commentators weave their cases with great ingenuity. Cranfill’s case sounds 
convincing, until one reads Siegel, and vice versa. There are, as I have suggested, 
other readings possible also.
So who is correct? One of these commentators or someone else with a variant on 
one of these schemes? Or some other scheme altogether? Perhaps something 
straight forward? But what is “straight forward”? Are we to say that Cranfield’s 
interpretation is, in some way, not “straight forward” where Siegel’s is? Or is the 
reverse the case? If we attempt to make either of those claims, how are we to
Thomas Mabry Cranfill and Robert Lanier Clark Jr., An Anatomy of The 
Turn of the Screw, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1965.
Ibid., p5, quoting Edna Kenton.
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justify the claim? And, how are we to decide? There seems to be no definitive 
warrant, either in the story or external to it. Had James indicated that he wrote 
against one intention77 would that be sufficient to close the case? Hirsch would 
say “yes” while Wimsatt would say “no”. We can already see that we compound 
difficulties if we attempt to say, from the text alone, that one interpretive scheme 
is “correct” and the other “wrong.”
We want, as I have said, to restrict our discussion to interpretations, which are 
sentential. We have conducted this brief investigation using sentences. But let us 
take a simplified approach to our question. We will consider the sentences:
r: "the ghosts in The Turn of the Screw are real (that is, real in the story-
world).” This sentence would be affirmed by Siegel but denied by Cranfill.
n: “the ghosts in The Turn of the Screw are not real.” This sentence would be
affirmed by Cranfill but denied by Siegel.
T: (we will take to be) the text.
Statements r and n are not compatible and few people would wish to assert 
T & r & n. Cranfill would assert T & n while Siegel would assert T & r. But 
James wrote T. If he wanted to write T & r (say) he did not do so. This is an 
important observation.
Many statements could be made about the story-world (infinitely many). Some of 
these can be dismissed as not compatible with the text. To say, for example, that 
“the governess was a haggard old crone” would be to make an error, for the text 
explicitly denies this. It suggests that she was “young and pretty” and flatly states
It will become apparent that I think both interpretations can be called 
“correct” (a term I would prefer not to use), for both are reasonable 
interpretations of the text.
He did not. In fact both commentator’s attempt, unsuccessfully, to enlist 
James in support of their case.
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that she was about twenty. The text may seem to say that there were ghosts. Yet 
Cranfill constructs a T-world (namely, in part at least, T & n) where there are no 
ghosts but an insane governess. He puts great effort into making that world 
consistent, and consistent within itself and with the text.
Interpreting T
When I read Cranfill or Siegel, I am, of course, not reading T but something else 
(which bears some relation to T). If I read T & r, that is not reading T. Now, as I 
have said, James could have written T & r, but he did not do so. He wrote T.
Let us suppose that James would affirm T & r and deny T & n and that we know 
this. Does that knowledge give us a warrant for saying that T & n is a wrong 
interpretation of T? That knowledge may cause us to gloss T as T & r rather than 
just T. We may do that without even realising it, for we have come to read T 
against expectations. But the question is: must we do that? Since James wrote T, 
there seems to be no reason why we cannot make the story world as the T & n 
story-world. My argument is as simple as that. We must always come to a text 
with some expectations and those expectations will, necessarily, prejudice how we 
read that text. Those expectations may arise from a reading of the introduction or 
a commentary or the author’s correspondence or what we know of other works by 
that author or what we think about the world in general.
It is possible that James did not have an intention either way. Then, there would 
be two radically different interpretations both consistent with the author’s (non) 
intention. I suspect that situation is quite common, and I further suspect that is, in 
fact, the situation with James’ story. I know of nothing James has said that sheds 
specific light on this particular work. It is quite possible that I may know, or think
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I know, the author’s general intention but choose to make a very different reading 
(one that I could be confident that the author would repudiate). There does not 
seem to be anything illegitimate in that. Why should we privilege the author’s 
supposed intentions when they do not form (but could have formed) part of the 
text? If we take such additional material into account we are working with 
something wider than (just) the story-text and interpreting something which is not 
the story-text. It is hardly possible that I could interpret something such as The 
Epic of Gilgamesh according to the author’s intention.
I am arguing that we have a text and if we read just that text, we can make of it 
what we will, consistently with the text. Texts do not come without baggage. 
This is true of all sentential messages. My argument is simply this. To read a text 
against something (be it the author’s known intention or some commentary) is to 
read the text plus something else. James wrote T. To read T is to read T and not, 
say T & r. The appeals that Siegel and Cranfill make to other texts of James or to 
his correspondence, are appeals that go beyond the text and, thus, add something 
to it; although, in this particular case, that material is hardly definitive. Doing this 
might be likened to taking a painting and outlining parts of it in order to highlight 
or to clarify something that the painter has left obscure; in James’ case obscure or 
indeterminate seems to be a significant feature of this work.
Thus, there can be no right answer to the question which asks “which (one) is the 
correct interpretation?” The different worlds that Siegel and Cranfill make from 
this particular text are both possible and validly made from that text.79 It is even
78 To look forward to the argument of chapter 3, we might, here, note that to 
appeal to the author as to the meaning of the text, is like appealing to the 
author about the meaning of our experience of the world. In other words, 
it has the metaphysical quality of asking how God perceives the world. On 
the basis of this analogy, God’s perception or intentions would be 
definitive.
79 This is a version of Quine’s famous argument about the problem of radical 
translation. See W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1960.
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possible to argue that one of the characteristics of a good text is that it opens up 
many possibilities for the creation of worlds. I have much sympathy with such an 
argument but that possibility is beyond the scope of this thesis and must be left 
aside.
We must always bring something to a text; we always do outline the painting. We 
are not a tabula rasa waiting for the text to inscribe its message. The something 
we bring to the text is necessary if we are to interpret that text at all. We must be 
able to build the world of the text. If we could not understand madness and 
obsession, if we did not ourselves exhibit petty petulancies and follies, we could 
never understand Cranfield’s interpretation. If we could not understand that 
children might be anything but angelic, we could not understand Siegel’s. How 
our (individual) world is and how our experience has made that world, may lead 
us to reject a particular interpretation (even the author’s) and make the world 
differently.
Some writers argue that a text must be fully consistent. Of course, we try to make 
the story-world so that the world so made is consistent; we make it to be 
consistent with how we read the text and also consistent, within the framework of 
the story, with how things generally are. But we cannot know if we have 
succeeded completely. Probably, no author has sufficient capacity to succeed 
completely either (unless the story is very simple). We simply roll with 
inconsistencies. That, as we will see, presents this thesis with no serious 
difficulty. It is quite likely that many texts (and particularly very complex texts) 
are not internally fully consistent; it is hardly conceivable that they could be. At 
this stage of our work, we will set this issue aside and return to the whole question 
of consistency when we consider the “real” world in chapter 3. We will then 
revisit the question of consistency in a story-world in chapter 4.
We have argued on the basis that both r and n are compatible with the text, T. But 
this may not be so. It may be that r is incompatible with some things in T and n is
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incompatible with others. This could lead to a situation where no single 
completely compatible interpretation is possible. The thesis, as discussed above, 
admits that interpretations might be incompatible with each other but requires any 
acceptable interpretation to be compatible with the text. This last requirement 
must now be weakened to, at least, accommodate this problem.
An interpretation which is more compatible with a text may have, prima facie, a 
greater claim to acceptance than one which is less compatible. But even this sort 
of claim presents new difficulties. How are we to say what is “more compatible”? 
Most of us would hold that some inconsistencies are such as to invalidate a 
complete interpretive scheme, while other inconsistencies are not sufficient to 
produce such a result. If this is so, determining a level of compatibility is not 
simply a matter of counting differences (as if that were possible). In any case, a 
more complex (and comprehensive) interpretation may have greater “power”, 
despite being less consistent with the text than an interpretation which may seem 
to be more compatible in the sense suggested. An interpretation may not be the 
worse for being less consistent.
Nevertheless, we usually demand that an interpretation of a work be (reasonably) 
consistent and most readers would not countenance an erratic interpretation.80 
Even in the most banal situations, our utterances must form a reasonably 
consistent system. If we were not consistent, it would not be possible to interpret 
our sayings and ordinary communication would become impossible; the sounds 
we make would be just babblings and the marks just random scribblings. But it is 
possible that we would prefer an interpretation with (some) inconsistencies to one 
that has none at all (supposing that were even possible).
The n-version of T has, at least, one serious difficulty. The prologue (which most 
interpreters take it is to be believed) where the governess’ story is introduced, says
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that the governess was “the most agreeable person ... in her position; she would 
have been worthy of any whatever.”81 There are, on the other hand, suggestions 
that the reader should be discerning. Jeff Williams suggests that we should pay
O T
more attention than is common to the framing story. This story is about a group 
of characters trying to outdo each other with a scary story. In that context, it is 
easy to suggest that Douglas would exaggerate such things to give his turn in the 
game of telling scary stories, more impact. Thus, the prologue, itself, may 
introduce new problems into our understanding of the story-world. But, we must 
leave this specific question here; it is not necessary for us to come to a conclusion 
as to the best interpretive strategy for this story. That was not the purpose of the 
above discussion. It is likely that there is no way of resolving such conflicting 
interpretations and the reader must make a choice (or decide not to settle for any 
single interpretation). We will have a little more to say about this prologue in a 
later chapter, but we will not shed any more light on this particular interpretive 
question.
Such as the American Woman’s interpretation of Macbeth in James 
Thurber, “The Macbeth Murder Mystery”, in James Thurber, The Thurber 
Carnival, New York: Harper and Row, 1945, pp. 60-63.
Henry James, “The Turn of the Screw” in The Turn of the Screw and Other 
Short Novels, New York: Signet, 1995, p. 293.
Jeff Williams, “Narrative Games: The Frame of The Turn of the Screw”, 




Wimsatt and Beardsley in a well-known essay argued that the text stands alone 
and that the author’s intentions are not relevant to the interpretation of a work. 
“[T]he judgement of poems is”, they say, “different from the art of producing 
them.”84 The work is an icon because it stands apart and is to be judged on its 
own merits and not on the basis of some imputed authorial intention. Of course, 
they point to the enormous and sometimes insuperable difficulties in determining 
just what the intentions of an author might have been. Most commentators agree 
that the plays of Aeschylus are very great works with meaning for us today. If 
their meaning were restricted to an arcane intention of their author, they would not 
be what they are. At best, they would be of interest to scholars of antiquities. If 
we go back further, say to The Bible or The Epic of Gilgamesh, what then of 
authorial intention?
Opposed to this approach, a modem school has arisen arguing that the author’s 
intentions must be (part of) the meaning of any work. Gregory Currie says that, at 
least, an author must have some communicative intention in writing a story.
o r
“Fiction is”, he says, “essentially connected with the idea of communication.” 
Currie continues by presenting a Gricean account of communication. Noel Carroll 
puts a stronger position and claims that “[wjhen we read a literary text... we enter
o r
a relationship with its creator that is roughly analogous to a conversation.” He 
then goes on to argue that the purpose of a conversation is for the parties to
W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy”, in W. 
K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning of Poetry, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1954.
Ibid., p. 9.
Currie, The Nature of Fiction, p. 24.
Noel Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation”, in Gary Iseminger, 
Intention and Interpretation, 1992, p. 117.
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understand the intentions of the other parties to that conversation. This being so, 
we should adopt the same approach to literature, for there is no reason to say that
87“artworks ... should be interpreted differently from ordinary words or actions.”
This thesis certainly agrees that there is no special usage of language in art works 
(even poems use language in fairly normal ways). Currie’s claim that a story is an 
act of communication is also reasonable; an author communicates a story to her 
readers. We have previously noted that Currie’s theory is author-oriented where 
ours is reader-oriented. However, there are differences between a story and a 
conversation. The communicative act carried out in a novel (or a university 
lecture), is very different from that conducted in a conversation. The detailed 
Gricean account of meaning, even if appropriate to a normal conversation (and I 
am not saying that it is) is not compatible with the claims we are making. We 
communicate many things in many ways, not all of them intended. I can 
communicate my anger or disappointment, against my desire to do so. All we can 
really say is that the communicative act of the author is to tell a story. 
Communication is a very general idea. If we want to communicate something 
specific we need to choose our words with care. Politicians and diplomats know 
this to their cost.
In fact we often do consider our words with some care. I say something and you 
seem to have misunderstood, so I rephrase what I have said. I may say something 
and, on brief reflection, realise that what I have said may not convey my intentions 
accurately. I then resay it but phrasing my sentences differently so as to ensure a 
greater likelihood of having my words understood in the manner in which I 
intended that they be understood. As a general rule, you can only understand my 
intentions from what I say. The onus is on me to make those clear.
If we consider Carroll’s paradigm and take a conversation of the sort he envisages, 
we immediately see a difference between such a conversation and a literary work.
87 Ibid., 102.
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A conversation is a form of dialectic where the parties enter into a to and fro, in 
order to reach some kind of understanding. We misunderstand and rephrase 
sentences so that our hearer will divine our intentions. We may well hope to 
convey those intentions by the sentences we utter, but our hearer is not wrong to 
misunderstand. In a conversation where matters are important to the parties to 
that conversation, the interchange of discourse (usually) continues until those 
parties conclude that they have interpreted the sentences alike, or think they have, 
for we can never be certain that is the case. But we do not always continue until a 
common understanding is arrived at. Therefore, we must reject Carroll’s 
paradigm
A literary work stands alone and must be understood on its own terms; this is why 
Wimsatt and Beardsley call it an “icon”. A conversation may be a dialogue but a 
story is a soliloquy. A story is produced and, thereafter, has an existence, 
independent of its author. This is true of many situations; it is not unique to 
stories. Road signs and sermons have to fend for themselves in the same way. 
The author of the Oresteia is not engaged in a conversation; his voice is stopped 
and we must get on as well as we can, overhearing his soliloquy. Since we see the 
world somewhat differently from the way he saw it, we might expect that our 
understanding and his intentions would not coincide precisely. How accurately do 
we have to understand the author’s intentions before we are considered to have a 
“correct” interpretation?
In a conversation, if we think our hearer does not understand, or we feel that we 
have not adequately conveyed our intentions, we will say more; repeat or rephrase 
and so on, as I have suggested. We may, on reflection, feel that we have not 
accurately conveyed our intentions but have said enough for our purpose. We 
allow the matter to lapse. Henry James has left us with a lot more that could be 
said, for he seems to have deliberately left much unsaid. We may imagine what 
we might ask if we were engaged in a conversation with him. We would probably 
ask about Miles’ activities at school. Perhaps he would not answer our questions.
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Perhaps he could not answer our questions. The claim that the “true” meaning is 
that which the author intended depends upon the author’s having some sort of 
intention, and, furthermore, an intention that he wanted to fully convey in the 
written work. He or she may not have had such an intention at all. I suspect that 
this is a quite common situation. If the author had no (particular) intention, would 
that imply that the story has no (particular) meaning? Perhaps there must be, at 
least, a rudimentary intention on the part of the author? Suppose that James 
intended us to guess what Miles did at school, but we guess wrongly. Suppose, 
further, that we have otherwise understood the story as he intended. Would we 
then have a “correct” interpretation or would we still be “wrong?” There is 
always going to be such a credibility gap.
The protagonists of the anti-intentionalist camp point out that it is difficult (and 
sometimes impossible) to know what the author intended. They also point out that 
intentions alone cannot determine the case. If a sculptor creates a blue sculpture 
and declares that he intended it to be pink, it does not thereby become pink. 
Carroll’s answer to this is to say that “with cases where the authorial 
pronouncement is so arbitrary, we may discount it ... because we think the report
o o
is insincere.” To decide that the author is insincere is already to interpret the 
object and to back one’s own interpretation against the stated intention of the 
author. The only basis on which one could decide that the author is insincere is 
the work itself. If we judge it to be blue and the author says it is pink, we are 
backing our interpretation against his. His stated intention seems unreasonable; in 
this example, we say it is bizarre. But this is merely an extreme. Even this 
example may not be so extreme as at first it seems. Most works require some 
technical machinery and that may fail the artist. A painter may have intended a 
colour mix to come out green but it is blue. In the ceramic arts, failure can arise 
from conditions in the kiln. It is, indeed, possible to create a blue sculpture when 
one intended that work to be pink! The sculpture is, notwithstanding the sincere
88 Carroll, “Art, Intention, and Conversation”, p. 99.
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intentions of the creator, blue. Language is a sophisticated tool and its machinery 
may, in like manner, fail.
We read a work and interpret it. If we have access to other material (perhaps, in 
the case of a novel, the introduction to the work or some scholarly, or not-so- 
scholarly, commentary or the author’s stated intentions) it may be that we take that 
material into account when interpreting the work. A case in point is Bernard 
Shaw’s Saint Joan\ Shaw provides quite a long preface to this play. He argues, in 
this preface, that Saint Joan was, effectively, the first Protestant, that she received 
a fair trial at the hands of Bishop Peter Cauchon, and that she was condemned for 
putting her own opinion above that of the Church (this is why Shaw calls her a 
Protestant). There is much more in Shaw’s preface and it was written to be 
published with the play. Therefore, the preface forms part of the text. It would be 
difficult not to be influenced by this material. One could argue that a preface, 
while part of the published work, is not part of the story-text, and ignore it. One 
probably would not take that course, but many readers do not read prefatory 
material.
As we say, the reader may take such material into account, but he is not obliged to 
do so. Neither is it wrong to be influenced by such material. If James says that 
The Turn of the Screw is a polemic against the British class system (a position that 
has, at least in part, been adopted by some critics) we are not, thereby, obliged to 
read it that way. If he says it is about transport in early nineteenth century 
England, we may just dismiss his claim by considering the text. If he says it is 
about intergalactic travel, we would consider that he was joking.
We must also recognise that the author (may have) made a careful judgment not to 
include certain material into the text. The question of Miles’ activities is 
tantalising but James never tells. We must suppose that the suppression of this 
information was a deliberate matter on James’ part (or else, that he did not know 
the answer) or just gave it no thought. The way the question is handled in the text
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leads one to suppose that its omission is, in fact, deliberate. James is a very 
careful writer and he almost certainly chose his method of presenting the story 
with great care. It is, in this example, the very method of presentation which 
opens the story up to opposing interpretations. It is, thus, possible, even probable, 
that James’ intention was to leave the text open. That would not mean that James 
did not have his own interpretation. It would mean that James did not intend the 
reader to, necessarily, see the story-world in the same way. In that case, to insist 
on just one (family of) interpretation would be to do violence to James’s artistic 
intent. James chose to present the text as he did and we can only read and 
interpret what we have.
We have already seen that we can suppress details in any conversation. Indeed, in 
some commonsense manner, we must do that, for we could never tell all about 
anything. One of the tasks of the critic is to draw our attention to factors and 
connections among and between texts; to point to intertextualities in order to aid 
our understanding and deepen our appreciation. We must always bring something 
to any text or any conversation. We have our experience to bring and we 
necessarily bring that. If we were not able to share our common humanity with 
the author, the text would be opaque and could have no meaning for us. In a 
similar manner, conversation can fail because the conversants have no point of 
contact.
But, let us suppose that the author has left a commentary on a work. A scholar 
studying that work, would certainly want to read that commentary. But the 
commentary would, let us suppose, be in writing. The commentary itself would 
now need interpretation. Perhaps the author has left a commentary on the 
commentary, and so forth. Of course more writing on a work would probably 
allow us to approach ever closer to the author’s supposed intention. As a general 
rule, the more said (unless it is said to deliberately mislead) the greater the 
likelihood of an accurate understanding of the author’s intention on the part of the
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reader. It remains true that we cannot escape interpretation; we must always 
interpret.
Knapp and Michaels claim to have a knock-down argument to say that, at least, 
intention is required if a saying is to have any meaning at all. They then proceed 
to identify meaning with intention claiming that the meaning a saying has is 
precisely its author’s intention. Their argument is as follows (roughly): Suppose 
that, walking along the seashore, one noticed that the waves wrote, upon the sand, 
a stanza from Wordsworth. One would either ascribe intention to some agent 
(perhaps the sea itself, or the spirit of Wordsworth operating through the sea’s 
tides and waves) or attribute the phenomenon to an amazing coincidence. In the 
latter case, they say, one would sadly conclude that, after all, the words were 
meaningless. But why would one have to conclude that the words were 
meaningless?
This “knock-down” argument assumes what it sets out to prove: namely, that 
intention is required for meaning. If we take it that the reader may supply the 
meaning, the problem disappears (the probability of such an unlikely event is, of 
course, unaffected by this; such an event would truly be an amazing occurrence). 
We do not normally search through random notations for meaning; experience 
suggests that it is not worth our while. It is usually more productive to look in a 
library. Gadamer observes, in a different context, that we look for meaning when 
and where we expect to find it.90
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “The Impossibility of 
Intentionless Meaning”, in Gary Iseminger, Intention and Interpretation, 
1992, pp. 51-64.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 2nd rev. edn. (transl. and rev. 
Joel Weinsheimer and Donald C. Marshall), New York: Continuum 
Publishing, 1999, p. 167, p. 294.
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There is a counter example to Knapp and Michaels argument. The Em Malley 
hoax is well known. Late in 1942 “two mediocre traditionalist poets”91 James 
McAuley and Harold Stewart cobbled together a patchwork of words from a 
variety of sources and submitted it to a journal called Angry Penguins, which 
specialised in publishing “modemist” work. Their purpose was mischievous and 
aimed to debunk a style of writing of which they disapproved. The pastiche works 
were, on their reckoning, meaningless rubbish. Knapp and Michaels would, 
surely, agree. The works were published and the publisher embarrassed when the 
hoax was revealed. The point of interest to us is not the ensuing public scandal 
but, rather, the current status of these poems. They are, admittedly, difficult to 
understand but are frequently recognised as having considerable literary merit. 
Harris and Kerr observe that “Em Malley lives. He has been read, studied and 
discussed in schools and universities throughout the years ... because it is believed 
that the poetry stands alone.” People, even knowing the genesis of these works, 
are still prepared and able to argue that they have meaning and are worthwhile 
works of art.
This thesis is concerned with the reader and his reaction to the story. Ultimately 
the source of the meaning of a story must lie with the reader; the reader 
understands the story and gives the work a meaning (by making a story-world). 
But it is the story-text the reader reads, as we have said. It is from the text that the 
reader understands the story qua story. Of course there are many other activities 
that the reader can carry out with a text. He can subject the work to an aesthetic 
evaluation taking into account many diverse sources and making many 
sophisticated comparisons. He can use it to cast light on events or people (such as 
the author). There is no suggestion that such activities are, in some sense, illicit. 
They are quite legitimate. But they go beyond the activities we are concerned with
Samela Harris and Sheryl Lee Kerr, “Em Malley Official Website”, 
http://www.emmalley.com/index.html, 3/11/2003. Details about this 
incident are drawn from this source.
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because they go beyond the text and beyond the understanding of the story. An 
aesthetic evaluation of a text almost certainly requires that the critic unravel the 
story and make a story-world. But this sort of critical activity goes beyond the 
making of a story-world. The comparative evaluation of story alternatives has 
already gone well beyond the text. Usually we do none of those things; we just 
enjoy the story.
Gregory Currie observes that we do, at least, amend a text when it contains an 
“obvious mistake.” He suggests that an “obvious mistake” is something not in 
conformity with the author’s intentions; that is to say, an authorial error where the 
author intended to write some other word or spell a word some other way. He 
points out that we do not amend the capitalisation of e. e. cummings. But, of 
course, he is right, editors do amend (that is to say correct) texts. They do it in 
order to provide an authentic text. An authentic text is not what the author 
intended to write — that is unrecoverable — but one which can be understood by 
the modem reader, or is believed to be as the author first wrote it, or finalised it.94 
In the case of an old text, or a text which has undergone many revisions, this can 
require considerable research and sophisticated decision making on the part of 
editors. Increasingly, we note a reluctance to alter the text.95 to bring it into line 
with the author’s supposed intentions in writing that text. Modem editorial 
practice is to limit such corrections to obvious errors (grammar or spelling). 
When the text is difficult (or impossible) to understand, editors do alter word 
order or replace apparently aberrant words, to provide a text that can be (easily)
Gregory Currie, An Ontology of Art, London: Macmillan Press, 1989, 
p. 91. '
After all, even the process of converting a manuscript text to a 
typographical one, involves a form of editing. The typographical text 
looks very different from the manuscript.
Although modem Biblical criticism may be a case where extensive 
changes are made. They are made, not to reflect an intention, but to return 
to a text which is believed to be closer to the originally inscribed text.
Interpreting Worlds -74-
understood. This is done, not so much as to reflect the author’s intentions as to 
ensure that the text is consistent and understandable. Most editors are careful to 
note such alterations. Currie continues by observing that, if we want to appraise 
the extent of the author’s success, we must do so against the author’s intentions.96 
That is incontrovertible; however, to gauge the extent of the author’s success is a 
critical activity.97 The critical question of asking if, for example, Aescylus 
succeeded in his intentions with The Oresteia, would be very difficult and, 
probably, impossible to answer.
As we have been arguing, since there are many readers, a text can have many 
meanings. The intentionalist school is seeking the one definitive meaning for any 
text (or saying). As we have already observed, this is to take a Gricean stance on 
meaning.98 Currie acknowledges that. Yet we often say what we do not mean. 
The author, in the end, may not even be the best interpreter of his text; this is a 
commonplace, but, if the authorial meaning argument were right, this could not be 
so. Hermann Hesse concedes: “Poetic writing can be understood and 
misunderstood in many ways. In most cases the author is not the right authority to 
decide ... Many an author has found readers to whom his work seemed more lucid 
than it was to himself.”99 Michael Worton attributes similar sentiments to Samuel 
Beckett, although he goes on to suggest that Beckett’s adherence to this principle 
was ambivalent. He quotes Beckett as suggesting that “‘[t]he key word in my 
plays is “perhaps”.”’100
Currie, An Ontology of Art, p. 92.
Currie’s concern with this aspect of a work arises from his approach to 
stories as speech acts. Then the question of success (was the speech act 
successful) arises.
Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989.
Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf (transl. Basil Creighton, rev. Walter Sorell), 
London: Penguin Books, 1988, author’s Note, p. 5.
Michael Worton, “ Waiting for Godot and Endgame: Theatre as Text”, in 
John Pilling, The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, 1994, p. 67.
Interpreting Worlds -75-
The modem intentionalist argument owes its origins to E. D. Hirsch and his book, 
Validity in Interpretation,101 In this book, Hirsch distinguishes meaning from 
significance (or application). A work can have, for Hirsch, only one meaning, but 
it can have many applications. It can be significant, for different readers, in many 
ways that the author could not have expected. We will look at what I take to be 
Hirsch’s idea of application towards the end of this work. He is suggesting that 
Hamlet can have only one meaning; the story of the Danish Prince etc. Yet we 
might apply this story in various ways to our own lives or to politics (as well as 
many other areas of life). We might see the play as about prevarication and then 
apply the story to political life arguing that it shows that decisive action is required 
on the political front. On the other hand, we might say the play is about a young 
man who is unsure of himself. Not that he prevaricates, knowing what to do but 
deferring action; rather this young man knows what to do but lacks the courage 
and resources to actually carry out his plan. We might then apply the story by 
claiming that only the tough should get involved in politics. We might say that we 
all need to have goals and behave decisively.
But these two readings are inconsistent: prevarication versus uncertainty. To 
interpret the work one way is to make the Hamlet story-world one way: namely, 
with a prince who prevaricates. To interpret the story the other way is to make the 
Hamlet story-world with a prince who is unsure. These worlds are different, so 
only, at most, one of these meanings can be correct, which is to say, in accord with 
the intentions of the author. Since one application flows from one meaning and the 
other application from the other meaning, only one of the applications suggested 
above could be acceptable; the other would be invalid.
To make matters even more difficult, it is possible that Shakespeare had no 
particular intention in this matter. If there is no intention on the part of the author, 
does this leave the play without meaning or with large holes in its meaning? If we
101 E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1967.
Interpreting Worlds -76-
need to know the author’s intention to judge the meaning of a work, we must be 
forever uncertain and unable to specify any meaning, for we can never know. It 
seems clear that, in the case of this example, either application is a legitimate way 
of “reading” the play, that is, of making the Hamlet story-world. Of course, when 
a play is performed, the director has already made her own interpretation and this 
becomes part of the play-as-performed. When we see it performed, we must still 
interpret what we see and hear but that is not the same as interpreting the play 
from the text alone.
Hirsch found that he had to modify his account of intention. When a poet 
(Shakespeare is Hirsch’s example) writes a sonnet in Elizabethan England about 
his lover and we read that sonnet today it has lost any meaning because the lover 
to whom it is addressed is irrelevant (dead) or unknown. Hirsch had to allow a 
work like that to retain some sort of meaning (or to modify its meaning as time 
elapses) so that, when we read it, it still has some sort of meaning. We might 
construe the words in (slightly) different ways from the way that Shakespeare 
intended. He comments that “when I apply Shakespeare’s sonnet to my own lover 
rather than to his, I do not change his meaning-intention but rather instantiate and 
fulfil it.”102 Hirsch also admits “unconscious” intentions as part of the meaning of 
a work and implications of a text. There we have it; the cat is out of the bag and 
intentions start to rise up everywhere.
In summary, I am arguing that we read a story-text and we make a story-world as a 
result of our encounter with that text. How we “see” the story, will depend upon 
our previous experience and general understanding and the text itself. We must 
make a world that is generally compatible with the text (for to do otherwise would 
be to “read” a different story). We do not have, and do not need, access to the 
author’s intentions to make a legitimate story-world and legitimate story-worlds
102 E. D. Hirsch Jr., “Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted”, in Critical 
Inquiry, 11, (1984), p. 210.
Interpreting Worlds -77-
are not necessarily unique. This position is well summarised by Nelson Goodman 
and Katherine Elgin in some of Goodman’s final writing:
That a text has a single right interpretation that is determined by 
the author’s intentions has been, and perhaps still is, ... the most 
popular view. But, ... it is untenable. ... [T]he significance of a 
work often diverges from, and may transcend or fall short of, 
what the author had in mind. Where information about the 
author’s intentions is available, it may suggest interpretations of 
his work. ... Understanding a work may be quite different from
103understanding what the author intended by it.
A Question of Style
It is sometimes argued that a text or a painting exhibits “aesthetic” properties that 
are not supervenient upon the collection of words which is the text or the dabs of 
paint which are the painting, but upon extraneous (perhaps historical) facts about 
its creation or other matters.104 This chapter is not arguing a case for or against 
that position, since we are not concerned with aesthetic properties.
This chapter does not argue a case for, or against, the position that certain 
“aesthetic” properties of a work arise from aspects of the text (or painting) not to
Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy 
and Other Arts and Sciences, London: Routledge, London, 1988, p. 55.
See, for example, Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, or Kendall L. Walton, “Categories of Art”, in Peter 
Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, 
2004. Walton argues that certain aesthetic properties might well depend 
upon the circumstances of a work’s creation. But, Walton concedes that 
“whether an artist intended his work to be coherent or serene has nothing 
essential to do with whether it is coherent or serene.” (p. 154). It is simply 
that some intentional or historic aspects of a work or its creation might 
have some aesthetic affects. This study does not dispute that.
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be found just in the text itself. The story-world to be made from a plagiarised text 
(or a forged painting) may be the same as that to be made from the “original” 
work, while the aesthetic status of the plagiarised or forged work may be inferior. 
That is not a question that has been considered here. Aspects of the story-world, 
of course, will depend upon how the reader makes that world. If I find a story sad, 
it is because of the way I make the story-world. That is all; there may well be 
other properties of the work: aesthetic, as well as others to do with art history, the 
psychology of the author and so forth, that arise from extraneous matters. This 
thesis is silent on this question.
What is incontrovertible is that the style in which a work is written will, in many 
ways, determine our reaction to it. That is to say that we will react to the story- 
world (or make it) in different ways depending on the style in which the story is 
told. The poet does, as Plato said, manipulate our feelings and he does that by the 
way the material is presented. Every thing must be presented from some 
perspective. That includes a story. There can be no bare recitation of facts or of 
plot. This was, partly, the complaint of Plato. The poets write their stories in a 
seductive manner. They do not merely tell the story. They tell it in such a way as 
to evoke our sympathy or support for the actions or the characters described. Plato 
would prefer “poets who are severe rather than amusing”.105 He would prefer a 
simple narrative style.106
But, of course, there can be no neutral telling. The author must choose to tell the 
story this way rather than that using these words rather than those. The author 
may (by choice or default) use a certain style of language — prose rather than 
poetry. The author may write in an easy, flowing style or may labour over the 
stylistic details. Such choices will, rightly, influence how we understand the work 
for, they are in the work as presented to us. We prefigured the need to raise this 
question in our early discussion of Sohrab and Rustum. Nevertheless, style, as a
105 Plato, The Republic, 398b.
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largely aesthetic question is not a major issue in our discussion, yet it is not 
possible to ignore it completely. Here, I want to briefly consider this issue. Does 
the style of a work affect our making of the story-world? It is necessary to say 
something on this matter before we leave the question of interpretation.
We may detect two questions here. The first question relates to the way the author 
uses language. This question relates to the way the author chooses words and puts 
them together: Nabakov’s brilliant and flamboyant style as opposed to 
Hemingway’s sparse prose; the style of works written centuries ago as opposed to 
a more modem style of writing.
The second question relates to the choices the author makes in presenting the 
work: telling the story from this point of view, rather than that; choosing to tell the 
story in diary form; choosing to tell the story from the perspective of one of the 
characters or from the perspective of the omniscient narrator and so forth. In 
considering these two aspects, we are giving the term “style” a very wide meaning. 
On this definition, the narrative is the plot and, perhaps, the characterisation; 
everything else relates to the way the author tells the story and comes under the 
heading of “style”.
We expect that some aspects of style will affect the way we make the story-world. 
Our aim here is to examine this question briefly.
There is no question that style is an important part of our enjoyment of reading. 
Style may be what attracts us to a work or it may be a factor contributing to our 
dislike of a work. A poorly written work may be unacceptable to some readers; 
other readers will not read a work written in a flamboyant style preferring a simple 
prose style (Hemingway over Nabakov). We read Shakespeare, partly, because of 
his writing style. We select a novel because we like the author (which is, at least 
in part, to say we like her writing style).
106 Ibid., 394a.
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There are many books written on the question of style in literature. I do not want 
to conduct an extensive investigation of the matter and will base my few 
comments upon a work by James Phelan.107 Phelan claims that “language is never 
all-important in fiction, but the degree of importance it has may vary a great deal 
from novel to novel, or, indeed, from one passage in a novel to another.” Let us 
consider the way the author presents the story before the question of language use. 
The author presents certain information. We may be given (parts of) 
conversations, or be told what certain characters are thinking. The author presents 
the story in a certain manner. We are given the story from the point of view of 
one (or more) character. We are given the story in a diary form.
Henry James chooses to tell The Turn of the Screw, as a story within a story. The 
outer story relates to the papers that are presented as being written by the 
governess. The inner (main) story is the contents of those papers. We, therefore, 
have the story from the point of view of the main protagonist, the governess. It is 
a set of papers, left by her, on her death; these tell her story. She is the main 
protagonist, in part at least, from James’ choice in telling the story this way. But 
that choice leaves open the possibility of our interpreting the story in the ways we 
have encountered. We are able to see the governess as deranged and say that there 
were no ghosts. That sort of interpretation would be very difficult to sustain if the 
story were presented by an omniscient narrator or by Mrs. Grose (assuming she 
admits to seeing the ghosts in her “version” of the story). The papers come to us 
after the governess has died and with no independent (within the story-world) 
attestation as to their veracity. Thus, we are able to see them as the product of a 
deranged mind in Cranfield's manner, if we choose.
So, in this case, the manner of writing the story opens the work to different 
interpretations. Some of these would not be valid if the (same) story were told
James Phelan, Worlds from Words: A Theory of Language in Fiction, 
Chicago, EL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Ibid., p. 7.108
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differently. But, then it would not be the same story. The text would probably not 
allow the making of the same (set of) story-worlds.
When we read a story we make the story-world. And we react to that world; we 
feel fear and sorrow. I will say much more about our reactions to stories in a later 
chapter. For now, we simply recognise that we do react in these ways. Now, it is 
clear that one of the devices the author uses to manipulate our reactions to the 
story-world is the way the story is presented. Tolstoy tells us a lot about Anna 
Karenina and what we are told evokes our sympathy; we cry for her at the end of 
her story. A story can be presented in many ways. We might laugh at a tragic 
event if the story is presented in a suitable manner. The play Romeo and Juliet is 
a tragedy; the “Pyramus and Thisbe” play within A Midsummer Nights Dream is a 
farce, yet the two stories are very similar.
It is clear that the way the story is presented contributes to how we make the story- 
world and, greatly, to how we react to that world. Phelan follows a methodology 
similar to that adopted here, discussing a selection of novels and analysing the 
style in which they are written. We need not pursue the question into those 
details; our purpose is simply to recognise the effect style has on our perception of 
characters and situations in a story-world. We should distinguish between the 
making of story-worlds and the analysis of how different readers do that. Phelan, 
for example, rejects deconstructive approaches. I merely note that such 
approaches concentrate more on the author and the writing than on the story- 
world. Where deconstructionists do consider the story-world, they are often more 
interested in what is omitted. That is fine; it is simply a different activity from the 
making of story-worlds and, therefore, relates to the work (that is the text) in a 
non-mimetic manner.
Let us now turn to the other aspect of style: the language used.
Nabakov’s Lolita is a linguistic tour de force by one of literature’s greatest word 
magicians and it is difficult to see this story succeeding with a lesser craftsman. It
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is essential, if the work is to succeed, that we make Humbert Humbert’s world 
sympathetically, yet not so sympathetically as to agree with his evaluation of 
nymphets. That many readers do successfully make the Lolita story-world is due 
to Nabakov’s style. There is a clear plot in the work and the story is written in a 
particular style. We make the story-world the way we do as a result of the plot 
presented in Nabakov’s style. Some works, of course, do not seem to depend 
upon style but succeed almost entirely on the strength of their narrative. Examples 
of such works are detective thrillers, murder mysteries and the like. That is not to 
say that such works lack style; everything must be written in some style. 
However, in some works style is a more significant part of the work. Lolita 
depends very much on its language. A poem such as Sohrab and Rustum or The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner, also depend heavily on the language used and the 
manner of its use (they are narrative poems with a strong story line, after all).
Phelan introduces us to a novel by Gass, Willie Masters' Lonesome Wife. 109 Gass’ 
novel has a weak story line. The “story” is no more than a device to hold together 
the work. The real purpose of the work110 seems to be its discussion of language; 
much of the work is self-referential and “plays” with language. To the extent that 
it is doing this, it is not a story. There is a story-world; this world concerns Babs 
Masters, the eponymous lonesome wife, and a sexual exploit with a travelling 
salesman. But that theme is barely elaborated (as it might be in, say, Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary). The work itself is printed so that the page layout is also a work. 
One of the work’s pages, for example, is filled with asterisks and footnotes. The 
cover proclaims that the book is a “homage to the pleasures of language.” The 
limited content is, however, a homage to the pleasures of sex and the story-world 




Gass, Willie Masters' Lonesome Wife. 
That is, the author’s intention.
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If we consider a work like Jabberwocky, we find the same approach. Carroll 
presents a linguistic tour de force but that does not make an interesting story- 
world. However, when we read Jabberwocky, we try very hard to make sense of 
it; that is, to make its story-world and we almost succeed. Were the poem just a 
little more difficult to do this with, we would find it uninteresting. The interest in 
Willie Masters' Lonesome Wife is, at best, an interest in the way it plays with 
language and in the total layout of the printed book.
Such works are designed (I think this is the author’s intention) to draw attention to 
themselves — that is to say to the writing and to the manner of its production. To 
attend to such considerations is to be distracted from the task of story-world 
making and to draw attention to the task of considering the printed work, in the 
case of the Gass, qua printed work. Gadamer notes that we can do much the same 
if we go to the opera to listen to the singer (Callas is his example) rather than to 
the music; we are distracted from the art work to the technical aspects — however 
fine — of its presentation. To do that is like going to the art gallery to admire the 
way the curator has presented the work. Gadamer suggests that this attitude is 
“incapable of mediating an experience of art in any real sense.”111 Perhaps what is 
happening is that, rather than concentrating on the novel as the producer of its 
story-world, we concentrate on its production as a work of art. For the total work 
to succeed, this production must succeed. The singer acts as a distraction from the 
work being performed. In the case of Jabberwocky, we notice the words and the 
way they are strung together (the poetry) rather than the world being made. To 
make the Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife story-world is difficult and the method 
of presenting the material (the text) that we use to do that is distracting from that 
task. To make the Jabberwocky story-world is close to impossible. But then, such 
an activity is not to treat the work as a representation at all; it is, rather, to treat it
in Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays 
(transl. Nicholas Walker), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 
p. 52.
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as a technical activity and that is a different activity from the one we are 
considering.
Lamarque observes that “[w]hat we discover about a fictional world derives from 
both what is said [the story] and ... how it is said [the style]”112. That is what we 
have found; the style of the work must contribute to the making of the story- 
world. In this sense, whatever its brilliance, Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife is not 
a completely successful novel, for its style (deliberately) distracts us from our 
world-making task. This is not to impugn the work (many good things are not 
novels). Lolita, on the other hand, is a successful novel (most critics seem to 
agree on that).
Phelan concludes, and this seems to follow from our own brief discussion, that 
style is not, usually, what contributes most to the making of a story-world (he talks 
about narratives), for a story-world is made up of its inhabitants and geography 
together with the events that unfold there. These things depend upon the plot, 
geography and characterisation of the work. Yet, how we make them will depend 
upon what we are told (or shown) of that world; this depends upon the perspective 
from which we see the world. But further, our reaction to the story-world (which 
arises, in part at least, from how we make it) depends upon the style of the work.
This is all we need to say about style here. Our purpose has been to recognise that 
this is a factor that is important. To digress further into this question would 
extend the length of this thesis unacceptably. We have considered story-worlds 
and their making. I now wish to turn our attention to the “real” world.
112 Lamarque, Fictional Points of View, p. 60.
CHAPTER 3
Actual Worlds
I will, in this chapter, lay out a theory of how we come to see the (“real”) world 
the way we do. My major argument will be that we make the world in which we 
live (which I will call an actual world) and that we make it in potentially many 
different ways. The world is not a given; it is a lifelong, hard labour to make and 
maintain our actual world. The making of this world we do by the activity of 
symbolising. This implies that the making of actual worlds and the making of 
story-worlds are very similar activities. I will take up that issue in the next 
chapter.
I want to base the discussion in this chapter around a critical (but generally 
favourable) consideration of Nelson Goodman’s philosophy of worldmaking. I 
will then propose some modifications to that philosophy. This will lead to a 
revised approach to (as I will call it) Goodmanian worldmaking. Finally, I will 
distinguish my approach to worldmaking from some other approaches in order 
both to illustrate and illuminate what I am proposing and what I am not proposing, 
and also to fend off criticism of the thesis I am arguing. I will also need to 
consider briefly, before I conclude the chapter, the question of relativism and 
absolutism.
Goodman readily acknowledged a significant debt to both C. I. Lewis and Ernst 
Cassirer. It is not, however, my purpose here to trace the genesis of Goodman’s
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ideas in these, or other, philosophers. I will quote from these writers on occasion 
to illustrate what Goodman is saying. Neither is it my purpose to trace the 
development of Goodman’s ideas in his own work. Suffice it to say that, even in 
his earliest published book, The Structure of Appearance, we may see the germ
of his finished philosophy. The aspects of his philosophy, however, that will 
concern us most are spelled out very clearly in Ways of Worldmaking.114
Goodmanian Worldmaking
It is hardly controversial to suggest that there is no particular way that we must see 
the world (this world in which we live). That is not to say, simply, that the world 
could have been otherwise (obviously it could have been) but to note that we 
could see the world, as it is, in, potentially, many different ways. This is simply 
evidenced by the recognition that not all societies have had a worldview that is 
like our own. Before Copernicus, it was unthinkable that the earth was anything 
but at the centre of the universe; most of us no longer think that way.
We come to see the world the way we do from our experience (where the term 
“experience” should be taken to have the widest meaning). I will talk of coming 
to see the world in a particular fashion as “making” a world, and the world so 
made I will call an “actual world”. This is Goodman’s usage; the terms “reality” 
and “real world” I prefer to avoid. Sometimes it is not possible to do that without 
resorting to convoluted verbal excesses; where these, and similar, terms are used, 
they are intended to mean simply the totality of what there is (but without
113 Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance 3rd ed., Dordrecht: D 
Reidel, 1977.
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implying any recognised form to that totality). Often I will simply refer to the 
“world” to mean that totality.
I see and experience the world. Perhaps I receive instruction from my elders. I 
come to see the world a particular way. I learn to see things and categorise them 
as birds and animals and mammals and so forth. Depending on how I am taught 
and what my social group takes as fact, I will learn to see the world in some way. 
We know that different societies classify things differently.
I am claiming that there are no pre-ordained categories and there is no Platonic 
heaven. There are no facts (until we make the world a particular way); it is we 
who make the facts (but, of course, we do not form the world in the way it is). But 
the way we make the facts determines the way the world is (for us). C. I. Lewis 
put it this way: “[t]he world of experience is not given in experience: it is 
constructed by thought from the data of sense.”115 It is mental activity that makes 
an actual world, a world of objects and things; so “[f]or the merely receptive and 
passive mind, there could be no objects and no world.”110 The making of an 
(actual) world is a strenuous mental task. Since “facts” depend upon a way of 
seeing things and a way of saying things, facts are made, not found.
Further, it is possible to use the “raw” data of experience to make actual worlds in 
different, and even incompatible, ways. Thus, Goodman says, there are many 
worlds. He means many ways of making actual worlds from the same experiences
Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 
1978.
Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of 
Knowledge, New York: Dover, 1929, p. 29.
Ibid., p. 137.116
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and these different actual worlds may not be compatible. Goodman’s (almost 
hackneyed) example is this.117 There is an actual world in which
(1) The world (he means the Earth) moves; and an actual world in which
(2) The world does not move.
Thus, we have (at least two) incompatible ways of making an actual world and, for 
Goodman, the two actual worlds described by these statements are different 
worlds. This, we will see, creates a problem to which we will return.
The particulars that populate an actual world are what they are because we invest 
them with their (separate) existences. It is we who pick out of the night sky 
certain (bright) areas and call them stars. But, Goodman says, it is not just that we 
give them a name; it is the process of selecting them out for special consideration 
that makes them what they are. We then select certain conglomerates of these 
stars and call them constellations, such as the Big Dipper (or Orion). Goodman is 
prepared to say that we make the stars.118
The making of actual worlds occurs in a dialectic (not a word that Goodman uses) 
between how we experience the world and how we make those actual worlds. We 
cannot decree, however, that things will be any way we wish. We can decree them 
to be a certain way, but the way we decree them to be must be consistent with how 
we experience things (or, if you prefer, how things are). Goodman, therefore, 
prefers a concept of rightness to one of truth and a concept of understanding to 
one of knowledge.119 Rightness applies to a system. A detail is right within a 
system but not necessarily across systems; rightness has a limited life. Something
117 Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, Cambridge, MA: Harvester 
University Press, 1984, pp. 30-31. See also Ways of Worldmaking, pp. 
111-115.
118 Nelson Goodman, “On Starmaking”, in Peter J. McCormick, Starmaking, 
1996, p. 144.
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can be right without being true; we can sacrifice (what we take to be) truth for a 
good, convenient and easy approximation both in the world of science and in 
everyday life (and it is right to do so). For many commentators, something is true 
or false and, once true, must, if suitably qualified, always be true. Rightness does 
not have that quality.
If the world we make (our actual world) does not fit the world (the way things 
are), it is not a right actual world (that is a right way of seeing things or a right 
way of making that actual world). Rightness is, therefore, not simply a measure of 
how well things describe a pre-made world but, rather, a matter of the fit between 
how things are and how we make them to be. “ Rightness is a demanding 
requirement for an actual world, more demanding than, say, coherence or even 
consistency alone; a right world is not just any old salad tossed together, for “a 
false or otherwise wrong version can hold together as well as a right one.” If 
our description does not fit the world, we must modify that description (or worse) 
to achieve a fit. Goodman suggests that standards of right and wrong, become 
more, not less, important in determining what worlds fit.
The manner in which scientific theory is developed illustrates the general way we 
make worlds. A theory must fit (what scientists call) the facts. But, as has often 
been observed,123 what are considered to be the facts develop with the theory. 
This is not to say that the theory and the facts will always fit, for obviously there 
come times when the theory must be modified, perhaps radically. Making a world 
is a matter of making facts and fitting them together to make a comprehensive and 
complex pattern which is an actual world. This is a process of trial and error.
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, p. 132.
Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, p. 37.
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, p. 107.
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As I have said, there are many possible ways that things could be that would be 
consistent with our experience. Further, there cannot be one correct version (a 
sort of super version) of which all the others are approximations, for there can be 
no unconceptualised reality against which any given conceptualisation can be 
measured. There can be many different, right worlds. A right world for 
mediaeval Europe and a right world for Australia today are different. Failure to 
make a right actual world could have disastrous (even fatal) consequences.
Further, it could be argued that any given actual world is unique to an individual. 
It is, roughly, the sum of what that individual believes about the world (although 
beliefs are not quite the same as facts about the actual world). Since my 
experience differs from yours, what I know will differ from what you know in 
matters of detail and, possibly, even in the way we see broader questions. Our 
actual worlds will be, as a consequence of this, different. However, my actual 
world, while differing in detail from yours, is broadly similar to yours. If it were 
not, it would be impossible for us to have a meaningful conversation. The 
members of any particular social group have, therefore, sufficiently similar actual 
worlds. Of course, such worlds will differ (perhaps significantly) in some 
respects. That may be where communication will break down. One person may 
construct an actual world containing a deity while another may omit such a 
construct.
Symbolising Worlds
Actual worlds are made by the act of symbolising them. Worlds are made, 
Goodman says, with “words, numerals, pictures, sounds, or other symbols of any
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kind in any medium.”124 Symbols allow us to, inter alia, represent things. In 
saying “represent”, I mean represent in the widest sense of the term. Worlds can 
be made with any symbols (pictures, words, plans and so forth) but we will 
concentrate our attention on symbolisation using words. We can, Goodman says,
??125“have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols.” 
Until we have symbolised the world we make we do not have a world at all, for 
the very act of making requires that we symbolise what we have made. The 
making is the symbolising and the symbolising is the making.
Cassirer observed that:
Before the intellectual work of conceiving and understanding of 
phenomena can set in, the work of naming must have preceded 
it, and have reached a certain point of elaboration. For it is this 
process which transforms the world of sense impression ... into a
I ' j / r
mental world, a world of ideas and meanings.
We are, of course, constantly receiving sense impressions of one kind or another. 
Many (probably most) of these we ignore. Psychologists and physiologists tell us 
that much of our “sensual experience” is “manufactured”. Nelson Goodman refers 
to examples of this activity in Ways of Worldmaking. When we teach children 
to speak (and, therefore, to think), we draw their attention to (what we call) things 
(objects such as a block) and to (what we call) the properties of those objects 
(colours such as red) and we say the relevant words to them. We get children to 
notice in certain ways and we seem to succeed with enough repetition. What is 
noticed is given a “special linguistic accent, a name.”128 Further, what we get
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, p. 94.
Ibid., p. 6.
Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (transl. Susanne K. Langer), Dover, 
1946, p. 28.
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the mind manufactures apparent motion when spots and shapes of different 
colours and sizes are flashed in different locations onto a screen.
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them to notice is what we already think it is relevant or important for them to 
notice. That, of course, is part of our social conditioning and that, in turn, reflects 
the community in which we live. It is the use of symbols that makes community 
possible. It is important to us to teach our children to see the world in ways that 
make sense to us. This provides a human continuity of interpreted experience and, 
thus, actual worlds, from one generation to the next.
As we develop and grow, so does our experience and that experience becomes 
more sophisticated. It is seen through the lens of our existing symbolisations. We 
extend the range, depth and detail of those symbolisations. We give more things 
names and the names divide the world more finely; we create abstractions. We 
use the symbols we already command to generate new symbols. These symbols 
may be abstract, encompassing systems of religion, mathematics and science. We 
may also use the symbols we already command to make new objects, such as 
unicorns. These objects may, or may not, exist in our actual world (and, even if 
they do not exist in my actual world, they may in someone else’s). These objects 
may be objects we have not seen or experienced directly. Our experience 
encompasses what we are told (for the being told is, itself, an experience); we are 
told about things such as unicorns, skunks and Bourke. In this way, we also use 
the symbols we already command to extend our description of our actual world 
and populate it with places (such as Bourke) to which we have never been and 
people (such as the queen) whom we have never met. Even if the world does not 
contain unicorns (and I am neither saying that it does or that it does not) we take it 
that there are sorts of things like skunks, of which we may have no more than 
hearsay experience. We take it that these things exist and we may include them in 
our symbolisation of the world. We may, on further experience, modify our actual 
world by deleting, or adding, such objects to it. We may meet the queen or see a 
skunk or go to Bourke. We may change our actual world as a result (or we may 
not).
129 Ibid., p. 61.
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As our experience grows, so does the way we understand and use our symbols; the 
dialectic operates between that symbolising activity and the world being 
symbolised to strengthen, deepen and extend our symbolisation. It is our symbols 
that we use to make the world. We should not, therefore, be surprised to 
recognise the power that the ancients attributed to words, magic formulae or the 
words of the deity. Christianity recognised in the Christ an incarnation of the 
divine logos. God speaks and worlds come into being. Adam names the animals. 
Names harbour a (possibly malicious) magic; incantations and curses are 
irresistible in their power. The creative power of words is such that Goodman is 
prepared to go so far as to say that in symbolising them, we make the stars.
Israel Scheffler is a sympathetic commentator on Goodman and his work. Yet 
Scheffler takes exception to the claim that we make the stars. Scheffler points 
out that the stars were there before we even existed. He says that “the claim that 
we made the stars by making the word ‘star’ ... [is] absurd.”131 Of course, 
Scheffler recognises that we made the word “star” and that they were not called 
“stars” before that; Goodman acknowledges that much. But this is a very different 
claim from Goodman’s claim that we make the stars.132
Goodman replies by saying that we make the stars “by making a space and time 
that contains those stars.”1 j3 “We make a star as we make a constellation, by 
putting its parts together and marking off its boundaries.”134 Seeing the stars as 
stars and seeing them as holes in the bowl of night through which the light comes 
is to see different worlds. Yet, clearly, Scheffler is right; we didn’t put the stars in 
the sky. Paul Feyerabend draws our attention to the question of defining stars
Israel Scheffler, “The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman”, in Peter J. 
McCormick, Starmaking, 1996, pp. 133-141.
Ibid., p. 138.
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also. He comments that the number of stars in our galaxy “depends upon the 
spectral range in which you examine the matter: what looks like two stars in one 
range turn into a single blob in another.”135 He goes on to say that there is no 
definite number of stars for that would depend upon how we define things, 
theoretical assumptions and so forth.
Scheffler’s debate with Goodman boils down, I think, to a debate about 
Goodman’s term “make”. Goodman says that there are many ways of making 
things; we make worlds “not with hands but with minds, or rather with languages 
or other symbol systems.”116 We do not make the stars, he says, as we make 
bricks from mud, but by our decision to pick them out and symbolise them. 
Scheffler says that he does not like the term “make” or the term “world”. He 
prefers to talk of “versions” of the world, but provides no alternative to 
Goodman’s “make”.
I will follow Goodman’s usage, but it is important to clearly understand what the 
term “make” implies. Scheffler’s preference (for calling worlds “versions”) is too 
weak for Goodman’s intention. Goodman talks of the symbolising as the making 
of worlds. We might distinguish between the activity of making in the sense of 
forming, or creating, and making in the sense of defining. We did not form the 
stars, but it is we who define them as stars. This is what Goodman means by 
making. He is not saying that the symbolising forms, or creates, what it names; of 
course it doesn’t (usually) do that. He is saying that the symbolising transforms 
experience into (actual) worlds. Goodman seems to talk more of worlds than of 
actual worlds but the term actual world implies that the work of sorting experience 
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It might be fair to draw an analogy between this kind of making and the kind of 
making that occurs when an artist transforms an objet trouve into a work of art. 
The object is the same, but it is also transformed. It is still, say, a stone but it is 
now also a work of art, or, to choose a well known and notorious example, 
Duchamp’s Fountain is still a urinal but it is now a work of art. There is a radical 
difference between a urinal and a work of art, just as there is a radical difference 
between reality, as the basic state-of-affairs of the universe and an actual world. 
The state-of-affairs that we call a “star” existed (in general terms) before we 
existed and would exist unchanged even if we did not exist. That much is clear. 
Yet those stars would remain simply states of the universe. It is (in human terms) 
by noting them and giving them a name that we classify them and make them into 
particular objects. I think Goodman would agree with the claim that the state of 
affairs that we describe as stars would be the same whatever we did about it (or if 
we did not exist), but he goes on to say that, in describing and clarifying that state 
of affairs, we make the stars. He claims no more for our feeble powers than that.
We identify certain animals as “birds”. Further, we identify certain birds within 
the aforementioned group as “Kookaburras”. It is not that we created 
Kookaburras or birds but that we, in classifying them that way, put them into those 
groupings. We could have classified these animals differently. This is what it 
means to make an actual world. It is to carve up the “raw” material into humanly 
understandable pieces and to sort reality and, therefore, experience.
Worldmaking is a hard and difficult business. It is a matter that occupies our 
entire lives from the time we are bom. We are always refining our understanding 
of the world. We add to our actual world as we learn new things. We delete 
things and modify things. We also continually modify our understanding of how 
things are. When we, sadly, leam that there is no Santa Claus, not only do we 
delete him from the denizens of the world but we are forced to make other 
rearrangements of our actual world to account for the phenomena (the appearance 
of gifts, fat men in red suits on street comers and so forth) that were previously
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accounted for by the idea of Santa Claus. We add objects to our actual world; we 
delete objects from it; we connect objects in new ways and we make new 
classifications. This process continues all our lives as we make and remake our 
world. Usually that process is gradual. We could define each small change as a 
new actual world. It is probably better to recognise that possibility, but also to 
recognise that to do so would, generally speaking, be unhelpful. We will talk of 
actual worlds as if they were static.
Many Actual Worlds
Goodman tells us that we make not just one, but many, actual worlds.138 His 
claim goes further than the claim that we all make (slightly) different actual 
worlds, or the claim that different societies make worlds quite different from each 
other or even the claim that we change our minds about things and so remake our 
world to cater for new experiences and new decisions. These claims are, I think, 
relatively uncontroversial and Goodman would certainly recognise them. 
Goodman is claiming more than this.
We operate within our actual world. We believe that the world is constituted in a 
certain manner, so we operate according to that belief. We must do this (even if 
we behave prudently in the face of doubt or the possibility of horrific 
consequences). We believe that, if we step out a window, we will fall. So we 
don’t do it. Goodman, however, wants to go much further than just 
acknowledging that our actual world evolves and changes over time. He argues 
that each individual operates in many different actual worlds at any given time.
138 Goodman, Ways o f Worldmaking, p. 93.
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The individual invokes a suitable world for any particular situation. His argument 
runs thus.
We believe many things. Suppose a person uses statements (1) and (2), on 
different occasions:
(1) The world moves; and
(2) The world does not move.
Goodman says that each of these is right in some situations and that we operate 
using (1) sometimes (for example when we are thinking astronomically) and (2) 
sometimes (for example when we see the sunrise, or, his example, drive along the 
highway). Each statement reflects some truth about the world and is a right 
symbolisation in some situations (but not in others). This should not surprise us, 
for, almost certainly, there is no single all encompassing and absolutely right 
symbolisation.
Yet, Goodman says, these two statements cannot be true together (that is, in the 
same world), for they are contradictory and a contradiction of this type implies, in 
the classical logic to which Goodman subscribes, (logically) any statement 
whatsoever.140 Therefore, Goodman says, we cannot allow these statements to 
coexist in a single world. Since an actual world is made by symbolisation, 
Goodman argues that that symbolisation must be without internal contradictions. 
What we must have, therefore, is two different actual worlds where each world is 
described by one, and only one, of these statements.
We must, Goodman tells us, operate within one world or the other. In one world, 
the earth does not move. When the policeman books us for speeding because we 






the policeman has made an error and is operating in the wrong world. When the 
guard was told to shoot the prisoners if they moved, and promptly shot them for 
the same reason, he made a similar error. These are Goodman’s examples. The 
policeman and the guard should have been operating in the world (2) but were, to 
the loss of the driver and the prisoners, operating in world (l).141
So, how do we make the two different actual worlds? Goodman is unclear on this, 
or, if he knows, he does not tell us how. Presumably each world is described by 
selecting one of these two statements and other statements such that none of the 
statements selected for inclusion in the description of an actual world contradicts 
any of the others used to make that actual world. But which statements are we to 
select for which description? Goodman never tells us how to do that. Do we have 
to include the negations of all the statements we would affirm and put them into a 
world where their affirmation would make a contradiction? All we know is that 
we may not select statements that would create a contradiction of the type we are 
trying to eliminate. Are we free to reuse statements (other than (1) and (2))? 
Must we use each other statement only once and on what basis do we use them? 
After all, we could, I take it, combine the statements which we say are right in 
very many different combinations. That would allow us to make very many 
different actual worlds to avoid just one contradiction.
Suppose that we do the following. Make a complete list of all the statements that 
we would include in our belief system (this may take some time). Take statement 
(1) and add to it, from the list, statements so that we create a maximal non­
contradictory set. Do the same with statement (2). This process will work if 
statements (1) and (2) are the only contradictions in our complete symbolisation. 
But suppose, as is almost certain, that there is more than one such pair of 
contradictions. In that case, there would be statements left over that could not be 
included in either set without making a new contradiction. We would need to 
introduce a new world (set of non-contradictory statements) to resolve this
141 Ibid., p. 121.
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problem. And so forth. It is quite certain that the total belief system of any given 
person contains a great many contradictions (for human beings are very contrary 
animals).
Now, it becomes almost impossible to carve up (what we thought was) a single 
actual world into many separate actual worlds, for the order in which we select 
statements for inclusion in any given actual world would limit which statements 
are included in any given actual world.
Further, we would find, on Goodman’s analysis, that we have carved up what 
most of us consider to be a single actual world into many very separate actual 
worlds without knowing that we have done so! Our problem compounds out of 
control. I will propose a solution to this problem shortly. Before I do, I want to 
say a little more about the problem.
One common answer to Goodman’s problem is to claim that we do not accept 
either statement (1) or statement (2) “raw” but that they are always taken in a 
frame in which a third statement
(3) The earth and the sun are in relative motion
is accepted. Statements (1) and (2), it is claimed, then occur within a single world 
but glossed against statement (3). We say that the truth of statements (1) and (2) 
depends upon the frame of reference against which the statements are measured. 
If we take the sun to be stationary, then the earth moves. If we take the earth to be 
stationary then the sun moves; we see it rise in the morning, cross the sky and set 
in the west. And we speak about the daily events of life in just those terms.
But, for Goodman, this is no reconciliation.142 Moves relative to what? There is 
no fixed point. The sun, itself, can be considered to be stationary or to move for 
different purposes. Goodman says that statement (3) is not a reconciliation of
142 Ibid., p. 116.
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statements (1) and (2) but a different world from that represented by either of 
those earlier statements. This “solution” does not solve the difficulty but, rather, 
for Goodman, compounds it by introducing a third actual world. But this need not 
be so. We may, surely, have statements (1), (2) and (3) all as part of our actual 
world. But we always operate with a subset of our actual world at any given time. 
I look at the sunset and I do not worry about relative motion. But statement (3) is 
available to back up our total set of beliefs, if required. And I think we use it that 
way.
It is certainly true that statement (3) produces a different world from statements 
(1) or (2) solus. Ptolemy (it seems) included statement (1) in his actual world (but 
not statements (2) or (3)); Copernicus included (2) (but not (1) or (3)) and Einstein 
included (3) (possibly, with statements (1) and (2) glossed against it). And so do 
most educated Australians today. That is all.
We use, Goodman says, the different worlds for different purposes and the world 
we use must fit the particular purpose we have. If we always think of movement 
relative to the sun, our lives would become very complicated; most ordinary 
movement is based on the assumption that the world doesn’t move. So we travel 
at a certain speed along the highway.14'1 As we have noted, error arises, Goodman 
says, when we use the wrong world for our purposes. The guard who was told to 
shoot all the prisoners if they moved and promptly did so, made such an error.144 
The policeman who charged citizens with speeding along the highway because of 
the rotational velocity of the earth made a similar error. Any sentence needs to be 
interpreted. We usually do this without carefully paying attention to the words 
uttered. We know that the instructing officer means his subordinate to shoot the 
prisoners if they move (significantly — we take it he is excluding those natural 
movements associated with breathing and so forth) from the place on the Earth
Goodman in Goodman and Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other 
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where they are, at the time of his issuing the instruction, unless subsequently 
instructed otherwise. Many of the things we say, if carefully and strictly analysed 
against the rules (are there such things?) of grammar, do not stand up.
Or, Perhaps, Just One Actual World?
However we understand the term “world” or “actual world,” Goodman’s claim 
that we make multiple such worlds at any given time, defies commonsense. If we 
do that, we do not know that we are doing it! I wish to argue that we do not have 
to see the world as a series of separate (different) actual worlds. We think of our 
actual world as one thing and we symbolise it as one thing. Most of us would be 
prepared to affirm a fourth statement:
(4) There is only one (actual) world.
We do not carve our world up into (self-consistent) pieces.
Sometimes we do make different worlds and we, knowingly, use them for 
different purposes. The physicist who treats light in different ways at different 
times for different purposes does this knowingly (and accepts the apparent 
contradiction in doing so). But, this is a very special sort of activity and the 
physicist does not, as a consequence of her using different worlds thus, affirm any 
proposition whatsoever, as Goodman suggests she must. The physicist is careful 
only to apply the physical theory to those cases where she believes it is 
appropriate. The person who knowingly lives two different lives or switches from 
role to role may do this too (although such people are probably able to offer a 
rationalisation of their behaviour). Perhaps actors or children at play, who get 
“lost” in their acting or playing, do this. My argument is with Goodman’s claim
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that we must make many different worlds at the one time (even though we think 
we make only one). Remember that Goodman says this because, and only 
because, of his problem with logic.
Let us, then, finish briefly with Goodman’s own example, which I will start by 
confessing that I do not find compelling. Goodman merely dismisses the power of 
statement (3) by saying that it makes a new world, separate and different from that 
made by (1) or (2). I do not see why statement (3) cannot be used as a way of 
resolving the dilemma produced by statements (1) and (2). Certainly, (3) makes a 
different world from (1) and/or (2) as we have already observed. Seeing motion as 
relative is different from seeing it in terms of a fixed point (whatever that fixed 
point). If we accept statement (3), however, we do not solve the guard’s problem. 
The requirement (that the prisoners be shot if they move) still must be interpreted. 
The guard has simply misunderstood the command of his superior. He need not 
live in a different world to do that.
We use (1) when we drive along the road and calculate how long it will take to 
arrive at our destination. We treat the earth as stationary and the road as 
stationary. The car moves. That is, merely, a convenient simplification. We 
teach a version of astronomy at school which is based on (2). If we wish to send a 
rocket to the moon or to Mars, we will base our work on (2) but if we wish to go 
to a further galaxy, we will use (3). Most of us cannot do the necessary 
calculations based on (3), or even (2). We know all this. But most of us do not 
need to do those calculations; we are rarely involved in rocket launches. We can 
live our lives without worrying too much about the mathematics of anything 
except a trip by road from Sydney to Melbourne.
However, I do not wish to press this particular example because I am convinced 
that, even if we resolve our difficulty with statements (1) and (2) by use of 
statement (3), there will be other examples of inconsistency in our actual world
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that we have not dealt with so easily. It is almost certain, as I have already 
claimed, that our beliefs are inconsistent (and, I suspect, in many ways).
It is right to say that the world moves; it is also right to say that the world does not 
move. Goodman’s argument is, let me repeat, that inconsistent propositions imply 
the truth of any proposition whatsoever. We might note that Goodman has moved 
from a concept of rightness to one of truth and he frames the whole discussion 
about consistency in terms of truth, rather than terms of rightness. Goodman 
makes it clear, elsewhere, that rightness does not imply truth. We have already 
observed that, where truth claims an eternal aspect, rightness need make no such 
claim. Truth is absolute, but rightness already has a relativistic character. In his 
later writings, Goodman seems to be moving towards a recognition of this when 
he says that “[d]efeat and confusion are built into the notions of truth and certainty 
and knowledge.”145 Does the rightness of incompatible beliefs imply the rightness 
of any belief whatsoever? There seems to be no obvious reason to suppose so. In 
fact, symbolisations of an actual world stand or fall (often) as a whole. If we 
make deductions from right statements, I do not see why the deduction itself must 
be right; conclusions of that sort are still required to fit the world. This is my first 
argument against Goodman’s problem.
The problem arises, as I have said, from Goodman’s commitment to classical 
logical models, which include the laws of the excluded middle and of non­
contradiction. Joseph Margolis talks about the “extraordinary lengths to which 
theorists will go — witness Goodman and Quine — to avoid giving up excluded 
middle.”146 He says that Goodman and Quine “do not wish to have any truck with 
weakening our adherence to a bipolar logic.”147 Graham Priest describes
Goodman and Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy, p. 153.




arguments such as Goodman’s as “superficial”.148 This is my second argument 
against Goodman’s problem.
It just might be better to give up some of our classical logical convictions, rather 
than to live in a schizoid world. This will be my second line of attack on this part 
of Goodman’s theory. If we weaken the classical laws of logic, the difficulty goes 
away. To desert these logical requirements is not, however, to throw everything 
away as Goodman seemed to think. The demand that a world be right, that it fit 
our lives and circumstances, is a powerful demand, which rules out the “anything 
goes” criticism so often levelled at Goodman and people who argue positions such 
as that being put here. Neither do we just accept a mish-mash of inconsistent 
beliefs and claim to have a world. The requirement of rightness demands more 
respect than that. Logic and rationality cannot be simply and ruthlessly jettisoned. 
These are valuable qualities worth striving for.
Consistency is one of the criteria we use to judge our beliefs and some of us spend 
a considerable part of our lives attempting to attain consistency of belief. We do 
judge actual worlds on their consistency; and it is right to do so. In general terms, 
we do not expect the world to be inconsistent and, therefore, we do not expect our 
beliefs about the world to be inconsistent and, therefore, we do not deliberately 
make inconsistent actual worlds. It is accepted by all (so-called rational) people 
that statements should not contradict and, ordinarily, they do not. This is why we 
resolve our dilemma with statements (1) and (2) by the use of (3) and why we 
select which paradigm to use in a particular situation.
The physicist who uses different models for different types of (optical) problems 
may exemplify that. She knows that certain sorts of problem are more likely to 
yield to one form of treatment than the other. Most physicists would like to 
resolve their difficulties by creating a single theory to cover both situations. Until
148 Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study in the Trans consistent, 
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that can be done, they live with the inconsistency; the only alternative is to have 
no theory and no solution to their problems at all.
However, some logicians now think that consistency has been overrated. Graham 
Priest seems to think so. 149 It is possible to provide non-classical systems of 
logic. For example, we can create systems where (P.~P) can be so; systems where 
propositions can have multiple truth-values and so forth. It is not my purpose to 
discuss such logics in any detail here, or even to argue in their support. I merely 
observe that the possibility removes Goodman’s worry from classical logic. 
Dialetheism is the philosophy which holds that logic does fail (at least, at the 
limits of thought). We know that it is possible to formulate sentences that have 
inherent paradoxicality. The following:
(5) This sentence is false.
is an example.
We can allow the sentence to be both true and false, or neither true nor false as 
one way of resolving the apparent paradox. We may note that many an Escher 
print exhibits the same kinds of paradoxicality. Such paraconsistent logics were 
not available to Nelson Goodman.
We have already noted that the discussion of logics is conducted using the terms 
“true” and “false” and “proposition”. But, as we have observed, our world making 
is carried out using concepts of rightness and we make worlds with sentences, 
rather than propositions. Before leaving this very brief survey it is appropriate to 
note that propositions are always expressed by language and, in a working 
situation (stripped of theory) we must live within that limitation. It may be that 
the world is not able to be consistently symbolised. That may be because the
149 See Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, for a good overview of some 
alternatives to classical models of logic.
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world is, in some way, inconsistent. It may just be a limitation of our language 
systems. It would, surely, be a requirement of a consistent propositional language 
that it could not be used to express sentences such as (5) above.
I am not saying that we can (as a matter of course) blithely assert (P.~P); to do that 
would be to bring the contradictions into stark relief. We prefer to avoid the 
difficulties inherent in seeing our actual world as contradictory. We attempt to 
resolve such contradictions, often using subtle and sophistical arguments. There 
are some situations where we do accept contradictions. Such situations are often 
at the limits of thought. For example, theologians accept (apparently) 
contradictory claims about God and the nature of Christ. Infinite numbers seem to 
present contradictions and, at the level of quanta, we encounter physicists who 
also live with contradictions. Graham Priest discusses a number of such 
situations. His examples are things such as infinity and death. These situations 
represent cusps in our experience.150 Language, that is to say, our symbolisations, 
fail at such places. It has been suggested, by Armour-Garb and Beal, that it is not 
possible to restrict language so as to render truth non-paradoxical. If they are 
right, we must always live with dialetheism.151 My second argument, thus, points 
to limitations in our logical systems.
My third argument goes to human psychology. Problems such as those suggested 
above are, as I have just said, extremes. Most of the contradictions that we live 
with are simpler than that. We all have one set of (universal) rules, some of which 
do not apply to ourselves. We can spend a lot of care keeping such contradictions 
apart, especially when the separated matters are dear to us. We try to avoid 
allowing contradictory views of the world to come together so that we can remain 
unaware of the contradiction. This could be, almost certainly is, a defensive
150 Graham Priest has discussed these and other examples in Beyond the 
Limits of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1995.
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function of our subconscious. It has often been observed (for example, by 
Nietzsche) how amenable we are to believing what we wish. If the 
inconsistency is forced upon our view, then we usually feel forced to modify our 
actual world or, somehow, rationalise our beliefs so that the contradiction 
disappears (or seems to disappear). When we say (3) we are doing just that (but in 
a more rational manner than may always be the case). We can change our 
understanding of the world (that is, we can change the way we symbolise the 
world). Often, this means that we subtly change the manner in which we 
understand the symbolisation or we produce a rationalisation (for example, we 
define movement as relative, and accept both that the world moves and that it does 
not move). This is, of course, to make a new world to replace the former one. 
Occasionally, we radically change our world (for example, in a religious 
conversion — or unconversion). This may be a painful and difficult thing to do, 
and the process of remaking may extend over a lengthy period of time. Goodman 
says that a world is slowly and painfully made, over a lifetime; he tells us that it is 
hard intellectual work. It is usually with great reluctance that we discard a 
world and start remaking. We can never, of course, completely cast off a world 
and recommence making from nothing. That would be to become a baby again.
The claim I am making is just that we keep contradictory beliefs (which is to say, 
sentential symbolisations) apart or separated (in our minds).154
Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beal, “Minimalism and the Dialethic 
Challenge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, (2003), pp. 383-401.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of 
the Future (transl. R. J. Hollingdale), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1973, No. 68, p. 72, for example.
Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, p. 35.
It is interesting, in this context, to note that Freud argued that the 
unconscious does not feel bound by the law of non-contradiction. He 
claimed that “the nucleus of the Ucs. [that is the unconscious] consists of 
instinctual representatives ... that is to say, instinctual impulses ... [which] 
are exempt from mutual contradiction.” Sigmund Freud, “The 
Unconscious”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Actual Worlds -108-
To conclude this brief discussion, I would like to suggest that it may not be 
possible, using human language, to make a world which is both rich enough for us 
to express ourselves and also fully consistent. The theological and physical 
problems alluded to above, stretch our thinking beyond the limits of our ability to 
symbolise and paradox arises. Priest and Routley suggest that it may not be 
possible to develop a fully consistent philosophy.155
If this is so, it will never be possible to develop a complete and complex 
symbolisation of the world, which is both rich and completely consistent. These 
sorts of philosophical difficulties will always occur in our worldmaking enterprise. 
We know, thanks to Gödel, that it is not possible to create a complete arithmetic. 
That is no reason to give up the endeavour (indeed we have no choice but to 
pursue it). Neither is it a reason to give up the search for consistency, but it may 
be a reason to suspect that the effort will exhaust us before it exhausts the 
possibilities. It may be, however, that the price we would have to pay for 
consistency would be unacceptable as it may well lead to a grotesque 
simplification of how things are. A rich conception may just be better, which is to 
say, more fruitful for human beings. The physicist would have a poorer 
theoretical world if she were to reject both the wave and the particulate theory of 
light because of inconsistency. Physicists agree that it is better to have the 
(inconsistent) rich theory than a more limited, but consistent, one. If our 
languages and descriptions of the world are not, or cannot be made to be, 
consistent, that does not necessarily imply that the world itself is not consistent. 
Perhaps it is; perhaps it is not.
I have put three arguments as to why we need not carve up our actual world into 
pieces the way Goodman did. We can live within one actual world and that is a
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol XIV (ed. James Strachey), London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 186.
G. Priest and R. Routley, “The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability 
of Paraconsistency”, in Graham Priest, Richard Routley and Jean Norman 
eds) Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, 1989, p. 486.
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mental or psychological thing. In order to thrive human being need a rich actual 
world and not a pared down one, even if there is a cost in achieving this. The 
making of actual worlds is an important human activity and one which opens up 
the beauty and wonder of nature and art. Consistency and rationality are important 
values; we cannot live in a deeply divided and radically inconsistent world. We 
need not do so.
I have argued neither for nor against dialetheism. It remains on the table as one 
solution to Goodman’s problem, but it is not the only solution. I have also argued, 
that there is no one way in which we must see the world; we can see it in many 
different ways. We make actual worlds (in which we must live) by symbolising 
those worlds from our experience. Without the ability to symbolise, we would be 
passive recipients of stimuli and could not make sense of what is coming in, 
where worldmaking is active; we interact and engage with our world in order to 
make it. Our world making symbolisations cannot be just any way; they must be 
right, that is to say, compatible with how things are. It is possible (indeed 
probable) that many different (and incompatible) symbolisations are right (that is 
to say, compatible with how things are), even if they are not compatible with each 
other. Further, our symbolisations are almost certainly inconsistent in some ways. 
Within limits this need not be fatal.
Before concluding this discussion, I wish to consider the question of relativism in 
general. Just how relativist is this thesis? and how relativist must it be? I will 
also discuss the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. My purpose in doing so is to refine and 
to carefully and clearly delineate the boundaries of what is being argued here. In 
the next chapter I wish to consider the question of actual worlds and story worlds. 
I will, there, also discuss the questions of modal realism and of counterfactuals. 
That will further clarify what is being argued here.
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Varieties of Relativism
Is relativism a legitimate philosophy? In particular, is the kind of relativism 
espoused in the foregoing a legitimate philosophy? It is often claimed that 
relativism is discredited and has been from the time of Plato and Aristotle. If 
relativism, in some form, is not a viable philosophy, then absolutism, in some 
form, remains the only possibility. If so, this thesis is untenable and fails. But, I 
do not think that the arguments put by Plato and Aristotle disprove just any 
relativist thesis, and, in particular, they do not disprove the form of relativism 
proposed in this thesis. Secondly, it would be helpful to understand just how 
relativist our thesis is. Certainly this thesis is a form of relativism and is 
incompatible with absolutism. However, our thesis imposes strict limits on our 
worldmaking and the rightness of claims about the world and, so, it is not 
compatible with extreme forms of relativism either. Neither does it go so far as to 
refute itself.
Let us, firstly, consider Aristotle’s case against relativism. His supposed 
refutation of relativism goes back to his quarrel with Protagoras. Plato and 
Aristotle put arguments that, they said, disproved Protagoras’ theory. One of the 
difficulties is that we know little of the detail of Protagoras’ thesis, and that little 
is gleaned from the arguments put by Aristotle and Plato — hardly a sympathetic 
source. Protagoras claim is usually be summed up by the motto “man is the 
measure”.156 Our purpose here is not so much to vindicate Protagoras or to 
attempt to reconstruct his beliefs, as it is to examine the arguments put by Plato 
and Aristotle to see if they refute the claims made in this thesis. We will find that 
they do not.
156 Plato, Theaetetus (transl. Robin A. H. Waterfield), London: Penguin 
Books, 1987, 170a.
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Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, argued that a proposition (sentence) cannot be both 
true and false at the one time. Further, he argued that a proposition must be 
either true or false. That is the principle of the excluded middle —  namely, that 
there is no third value (such as indeterminate or it depends). From this principle, 
Aristotle argued that relativism is a self-refuting philosophy. Aristotle and Plato
1 SRput similar arguments. The argument that they put is, essentially, as follows.
Everything is either true or false and nothing is both true and false. We have 
already discussed this claim. It is the claim that caused Goodman’s problems. We 
will, for our refutation of Aristotle’s argument, accept his claim on the matter. 
The argument continues. I take it that my beliefs are true. But other people have 
different beliefs and some would affirm that my beliefs are false. Since, 
relativism says, their beliefs are true (for them), my beliefs are false. So, if my 
beliefs are true, they are false. If they are false, they are false. So, relativism 
cannot stand. Protagoras’ famous dictum “man is the measure” was, thus, 
considered to have been refuted.
But, the thesis put here never claimed that just any belief is right and certainly not 
that any belief is true. A belief is only right within an actual world. If we have 
similar actual worlds, we can discuss beliefs (and we do). As a result of such a 
discussion, one (or both) of us may change our beliefs and, thus, our actual world. 
But I am not obliged to accept that my belief is wrong just because someone says 
it is. If I classify bats as mammals and you classify them as birds, while I classify 
cassowaries as birds and you do not, that does not mean that cassowaries are both 
birds and not birds or that bats are both mammals and not mammals. It simply 
means that in your actual world cassowaries are not birds and bats are, but in mine 
this is not so.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1007b.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1009a and Plato, Theaetetus, 170a.
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An actual world is a self-contained construct. Judgments, thus, are only valid 
within such a world. I am at liberty to assert that an absolutist thesis is wrong 
without compromising my own position, for I do not allow that any thesis 
whatsoever is acceptable. In particular, I must disallow absolutist theses. 
Nevertheless, absolutist theses have been popular for over two thousand years and, 
therefore, in some social circumstances, they must have something going for them. 
If you follow an absolutist thesis your judgments are enclosed within the world 
that you make and my beliefs are not (necessarily) in your construction; you will 
disagree with them. There is no failure if I assert a different thesis even if it is 
incompatible with yours. If our beliefs are too disparate, there may be a failure of 
communication. That is all.
But I may convince you to adopt my system. You may decide to classify 
cassowaries as birds and bats as mammals. That would change your actual world. 
Wittgenstein said that would happen by “persuasion”.159 This is because we do 
not believe isolated facts but “a whole system of propositions.”160 This is an 
important corollary of the thesis put here. A change in a system of beliefs is what 
Thomas Kuhn called a paradigm shift.161 Of course, we do not normally use these 
terms for small changes such as this example; we reserve such terms for big 
conceptual changes.
Aristotle’s argument is, therefore, not valid. It elides the idea of true (in a world) 
with true simpliciter. True and false can only have meaning within a world and 
not (necessarily) across worlds and are not, as has been argued, eternal or 
universal values. That is why the concept of rightness has been emphasised. The 
professor who asks students about atomic theory is, however, right to mark
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (transl. Denis Paul and G. E. M. 
Anscombe), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, no. 262, p. 264 and also no.
612, p. 616.
Ibid., no. 141, p. 145.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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students wrong, for the examination is being conducted against a certain 
perception of the world. That perception is that used and circulating among 
physicists (and many others) in which everything is made from elementary 
particles and so forth; the students, by enrolling in that subject, and the professor 
are all playing the same language game. This is also why, within a language 
game, we use the same classifications for bats and birds. It would be 
inconvenient, even silly, for us not to. We have already noted that we teach 
children to see the world the way we see it. Therefore, such details are not usually 
a difficulty.
All that the argument of Plato and Aristotle shows is that some of the most radical 
relativisms are not valid. I accept that, but the thesis put forward here is not one 
of those very radical theses (and neither can I know if Protagoras’ thesis was). 
Joseph Margolis describes the longevity of their argument, what he calls “the 
persistent myth ... [that] it is impossible to formulate a [relativist] ... thesis 
consistently or coherently”, as “extraordinary!”162
The second question that we need to consider here is: how relativist is the thesis I 
am putting forward? It is certainly not absolutist in that it allows many 
possibilities and denies that there is just one way the world must be. The term 
“relativism” covers a wide spectrum of possibilities. Anything that is not 
absolutist can be classified as relativist. Plato’s theory is an absolutist one. The 
Forms dictate whether a bat is to be classified with the mammals or with the birds. 
Unfortunately, I have never met a Form so, even if there are Forms, I can never 
know anything about them. This is the endemic problem with absolutisms of all 
kinds. We must note that absolutisms claim to be correct to the exclusion of other 
ways of seeing the world; that is what it is to be absolutist. All absolutist theories 
claim to be the one true church. If one accepts Forms theory, for example, one 
cannot accept or allow others to think that some other absolutism is acceptable. In
162 Margolis, The Truth About Relativism, p. 1.
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a like manner, there might be a god who dictates how things are, leaving us to 
guess as to his thinking.
Adherents of absolute theses can never know that they have hit upon the correct 
absolutism. One could take a Peircean view of truth, but even this view of truth 
is simply an article of faith, namely faith that science is getting ever nearer, ever 
nearer, to the Truth. All we can ever do is to construct theories on the basis of the 
(limited) knowledge (which is to say, our experience) that we have. An 
absolutism must demonstrate that it is the truth and every absolutist system is, 
surely, fallible. A relativism is not committed to that enterprise. All it must do is 
demonstrate that the system proposed is reasonable. I think that has been done 
above and that a form of relativism such as ours has become the only tenable 
approach.
The thesis that I have proposed is certainly consistent with most relativisms 
(including the most radical forms of relativism). But it is quite compatible with a 
mild version such as that suggested here. It is possible that there is an 
(unknowable) eternal truth, but we can never know that we have found it. All our 
worldmaking efforts would then be attempts to hit the right theory. Only when 
every detail dovetailed into perfect fit, could we even suspect that we have the 
right theory (but we could not be sure). That is certainly not the case yet. All our 
approaches to the world have “holes” in them. So we are still making worlds and 
looking. Personally, I do not expect that we will ever be in a position to cease this 
activity.
As we have said, the approach to the world outlined in this chapter is a mild form 
of relativism and represents a sensible position for a human being in our 
circumstances to take. At worst, this approach is pragmatic, in the terms that
163 See Christopher Hookway, Peirce, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1985 for an introduction to Peirce’s theories.
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William James described.164 Margolis seems to agree that relativist theses are the 
only candidates for being acceptable theories, while Harre and Krausz, in Varieties 
of Relativism,165 argue that it is not possible (probably not ever) to decide between 
the two broad schools of relativism and absolutism. Perhaps we do not need to.
Neither, of course, need this thesis imply any kind of Lockean epistemology.166 
The thesis is quite compatible with the notion that the mind is a tabula rasa, but it 
is also compatible with a wider range of possibilities than just that. In fact, as has 
been suggested, this thesis argues that worldmaking is a dialectic activity requiring 
the worldmaker to engage actively with the world, rather than simply waiting for 
the world to inscribe its message. It is certainly compatible with Kantian 
approaches to knowledge and also with modem approaches which, for example, 
argue that the mind is predisposed, perhaps by the human species’ evolutionary 
past, to see the world in certain ways. It is consistent with theories, such as those 
of Mark Bickhard, which describe our manner of learning and acquiring 
knowledge as interactive. We have not put forward any detailed programme for 
such matters and many alternatives fall within the limits outlined here.
William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking 
together with Four Related Essays Selected from The Meaning of Truth, 
New York: Longmans, Green, 1946.
Rom Harre and Michael Krausz, Varieties of Relativism. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. Roger 
Woolhouse), London: Penguin, 1997.
Mark H. Bickhard, “How Does the Environment Affect the Person?”, in 
L. T. Winegar and J. Valsiner, Childrens Development within Social 




I want to conclude this discussion of worldmaking by briefly considering the 
views of Benjamin Lee Whorf.
Whorf put forward a view of the role of language in formulating thought, 
commonly known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The hypothesis is that language 
determines the way we think. At first blush, this is exactly what has been argued. 
Sapir and Whorf were linguists and their hypothesis is based upon linguistic 
considerations. It is not always clear just what Whorf means. He quotes his 
teacher, Edward Sapir, at the head of one of his essays; we will take this to 
summarise his position. So, I will quote this item in full:
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone 
in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but very 
much at the mercy of the particular language which has become 
the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion 
to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use 
of language and that language is merely an incidental means of 
solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The 
fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent 
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. ...
We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do 
because the language habits of our community predispose
1 /TO
certain choices of interpretation.
Certainly, Whorf is suggesting that the language we use significantly affects how 
we see the world; that is to say, how we see our actual world. Further, he talks of 
the world that we inhabit as a result of using language, what he calls “habitual 
thought worlds”.169 This much we must accept. However, our thesis recognises 
the dialectical nature of this process. I have argued that the language we use is
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings 
of Benjamin Lee Whorf (ed. John B. Carroll), Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1956, quoting Edward Sapir, p. 134.
Ibid., p. 147.169
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developed along with our understanding of the world and that we then use our 
language to symbolise that world. I have further recognised that we are taught 
language as infants and, in the process, we are taught to see the world in particular 
ways. It seems that Whorf is claiming more than this.
We should note that Whorf’s argument proceeds mainly from a comparison of 
European languages such as English, French, German, which he labels SAE 
(Standard Average European) with the American Indian Hopi language. He 
maintains that the concepts which undergird these different languages (the 
European languages on the one hand and the Hopi language on the other) are very 
different, so different that their speakers inhabit different “thought worlds”.
Of course, different vocabularies segment the world in different ways. But we 
know we are not totally restricted by them. We see a beautiful colour. Perhaps it 
has no name (in our vocabulary). We say, “it is part way between blue and green”. 
If we see it often, we will give that hue a name, perhaps “aqua” or “turquoise”. 
This is how vocabularies expand. We need a new word so we coin one. But 
Whorf claims more than just a vocabulary related issue. He claims that the whole 
structure of a language predisposes one to see the world in a way that underlies the 
structure of the language. I agree. However, a careful consideration of the 
hypothesis and what it (may) entail, will repay us a dividend as it will allow us 
here to clarify exactly what is being claimed for language and what interpretations 
of Sapir-Whorf are consistent with the current thesis and what are not.
I want to take issue with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, not so much as to argue with 
or even to clarify Whorf’s claims but, rather, to clarify the claims made by this 
thesis. Many commentators have taken issue with Whorf and, rather than argue 
with Whorf directly, I will take up their discussion of the matter as being clearer 
and more lucid. If they have misunderstood Whorf, that will not affect this 
discussion.
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Max Black170 claimed that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis entails a number (ten) of 
consequences. Black does not adduce reasons for suggesting that these 
consequences flow from the hypothesis but merely states them. We will take 
Black’s claim at face value and examine his “summary” of Sapir-Whorf. The ten 
“consequences” are:
(1) A language embodies an integrated way of speaking, “covert categories” or 
ways of talking about, for example, time, that provides a metaphysic.
(2) and (3) A language embodies a distinctive conceptual system and that it
imposes a world view on the speaker.
(4) and (5) The background linguistic system (partly) determines the associated 
conceptual system and the associated world view.
(6) Experience consists of a flux of impressions. Black comments that this
171flux is roughly equivalent to “‘James’ stream of thought.’”
(7) and (8) “Facts” are a function of the language.
(9) and (10) Grammar and logic do not reflect reality but vary arbitrarily.
Our concern is to consider how far we need to take this line of thinking. 
According to Black, Whorf is making very strong claims indeed and we need not 
go as far as that. Let us, now, consider Black’s summary:
(1) It is obvious that it is the case that a language prescribes categories. Black 
agrees that language functions to do this, but questions that it prescribes a 
metaphysic. Apart from the question of a metaphysic, which is 
independent of this work, this claim accords with our findings.
Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962, pp. 245-246.
Ibid., p. 255.171
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(2) and (3) Again, this thesis argues that a language does, indeed, entail a 
conceptual system. That conceptual system can always be modified as the 
user of the schema becomes more discerning. To break free of that schema 
would usually require the language user to provide a new (linguistic) 
schema to replace, or modify, the earlier one. With that caveat, this work 
also supports this claim.
(4) and (5) This thesis also entails this consequence but also with the caveat put 
above.
(6) Black accepts that experience does consist of such a flux and this thesis is, 
as we have noted, independent of this epistemological consideration. It is 
consistent with what seems to be, at one level, at least, an acceptable 
position.
(7) and (8) I have argued that the facts must be presented in the language we use
and, so, are constrained by what can be said. Further, I have argued that 
facts are made not discovered. In one system it is a fact that a cassowary is 
a bird; in another it is a fact that a cassowary is not a bird.
(9) and (10) These consequences are self-evidently ridiculous and this thesis has 
consistently argued against any notion of arbitrariness in making worlds, 
either actual worlds or story-worlds. Worlds must fit experience and, so, 
cannot vary arbitrarily.
Devitt and Sterelny argue that Whorf is wrong because languages can be 
translated. They cite Whorf’s own “translations” of Hopi against him. They 
argue that, since the languages (Hopi and SAE) are intertranslatable, they cannot 
be incommensurable and, therefore, it is not true to say that they support different
172 Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, Language and Reality: An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Language 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1999. See especially chapters 10 and 12.
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world views. Whorf himself provides “translations” of concepts. But such 
translations may only be approximations (which Whorf also claims). Quine, we 
will remember suggests that languages are not (necessarily) intertranslatable.173
Of course, it may be the case that all (human) languages are, in fact, 
commensurate. This does not imply that all must be. Further, even if it is the case 
that human beings are, in some sense, all equipped to see things similarly, that 
does not, as we have already noted, demonstrate that the thesis is wrong. I have 
argued that we see the world differently; this is trivially true at a suitable level of 
detail but also that there can be large differences in how we see things. Such 
differences may be illustrated by the differences between the Hopi language and 
SAE (I think Whorf makes out a good case on that issue, if I take, as I must, his 
claims about Hopi to be accurate). But of course, that human beings can and do 
have different thought worlds is also illustrated by, for example, the differences in 
thought patterns between the Middle Ages and today. This difference is not 
dictated (solely) by the language used — for the language used then is basically 
the same as that used now. The difference in thought patterns is dictated by how 
the language is used, that is to say, by what sentences we would utter or be 
prepared to affirm.
We have rejected Black’s items (9) and (10) and, if Whorf affirms them (which I 
doubt), I disagree with him. I have certainly not argued that our actual worlds are 
arbitrary but that they are, or may be, different. The differences arise from 
different ways of assembling experience (and from the different experiences we 
have). We interact with the world and we make our actual world accordingly. 
There is no arbitrariness in that. Our actual world must be (reasonably) consistent 
with that experience. The making of actual worlds is a dialectical activity.
173 Quine, Word and Object.
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Conclusion
I will, in the next chapter draw out further the implications of the approach I have 
outlined here, for the making of both fictional and actual worlds. It should be 
obvious that this thesis endows each of us with an active creativity. 
Understanding the world is a creative thing. Art and science, of course, but also 
our basic understanding of things, enter into a grand human creative capacity. I 
will close this chapter with a final quote from Goodman:
[Effective representation and description require invention.
They are creative. They inform each other; and they form, 
relate, and distinguish objects. That nature imitates art is too 
timid a dictum. Nature is a product of art and discourse.174
174 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, 
Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968, p. 33.
CHAPTER 4
Being There
In the preceding three chapters, we have followed two major strands of thought: 
one relating to the way we interpret a story-text and the other relating to the way 
we interpret our experience of the world. It is now time to put those two strands 
together. I want, in this chapter, to consider some of the similarities and 
differences between a story-world and an actual world and the ways these things 
are made. Many of the similarities will be obvious and I have already noted that 
there are a great many of both. A clear understanding of some of these similarities 
and some of the differences between story-worlds and actual worlds will be 
important to an understanding of our reactions to stories, so these differences will 
need to be clearly spelled out. There is no need for a comprehensive review of all 
the similarities and differences between story-worlds and actual worlds. Such a 
review would probably be impossible; the more one considers them, the more 
similarities one keeps finding. Even if it were possible, it would certainly be 
tedious to catalogue them. We will, therefore, concentrate our attention upon 
those distinctions and similarities that are important to our problem. However, 
before we do that, it would be best to briefly summarise where we now stand.
In the first chapter we considered the idea of a story-world as the subject of 
mimetic representation. This idea provided us with a renewed way of 
understanding Aristotle’s Poetics and reviving the notion that a story is mimetic in 
some important way. In the case of a story, the mimesis is presented to us as a
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text (a term we have been using inclusively). A text is, of course, itself presented 
in a symbolic form. We read that text and we make a story-world from it; that is 
what it is to interpret the text. The story-world is the locus of the action and it is 
the story-world which the text represents. But story-worlds are not uniquely 
derived from the text, because some texts are capable of sustaining more than one 
interpretation. The text may not represent a unique story-world because different 
readers may make different story-worlds from the same text. The story-world is, 
therefore, an interpretation of a text by a reader. In trivial ways, readers will make 
different story-worlds from the same text, but we also discovered that readers can, 
and do, make very different story-worlds from the same text. To the extent that 
such different interpretations of a text do no undue violence to the text, they must 
be counted as legitimate interpretations. The making of the story-world and the 
reading of a text operate as a dialectic, often called a hermeneutic circle. 
Gadamer, quoting Heidegger, says that the circle is not, however, “vicious” but is, 
rather, an aid and an indispensable part of understanding.175 We read the text and 
start making the story-world. But as we make the story-world, we start to read the 
text in a particular way. On the other hand, we must make the story-world in 
terms dictated by the text. To make the story-world in ways not supported by the 
text would be to treat the text violently.
In the third chapter we considered the way we make actual worlds by interpreting 
our experience of the world. The world is presented to us through experience. 
Just as we must make sense of a text, so we must make sense of that experience. 
We symbolise that experience (often into language, but, perhaps, into some other 
symbolic form). When we do this, we come to see the world in a particular way. 
That is to say, we make an actual world. An actual world is, thus, an 
interpretation of our experience into a description of the world. We describe that 
world in a manner that also operates as a dialectic. As we describe the world a 
certain way, we come to see it that way. Thus, in very general terms, an actual
175 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 266.
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world represents the world. Similar experiences may be capable of supporting 
more than one actual world. This is trivially so, in the sense that we each 
experience different things. This may be true in a deeper sense, in that even the 
same experience could lead to the making of (radically) different actual worlds.
These parallel world making activities are illustrated in the following 
diagrammatic manner:
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The text may or may not have an author (we have already discussed the unlikely 
texts written by the sea on the sand). This thesis is about reading rather than 
writing so, for our purposes, the text is given. Similarly, the world may or may 
not have a creator (God). But, again, the thesis is not about creating the world but 
about experiencing it and interpreting that experience. These two aspects of the 
diagram are shown greyed out.
But, we can clearly see the parallels between reading the text and making a story- 
world on the one hand, and experiencing the world and making an actual world on 
the other. The making of an actual world is the activity of symbolising 
experience. This is also true of a story-world. A story-world is given in symbolic 
form and an actual world comes into being (because it is a description of the 
world) by being put into a symbolic form. Hence, the line between these two in 
the diagram is shown as permeable, or dotted. To make a world, actual or non­
actual, is to symbolise that world.
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The text is given to us as a symbolic thing (it is written) but it is in making a story- 
world that we bring the text to life. The text, qua text, is inert, and if we read it 
without comprehension (because it is written in a language we do not understand 
or because it is complex or because we are tired and the words pass straight 
through) we do not read any story, merely a collection of words. It is brought to 
life when we read with comprehension.
When we read a novel, we make the objects that it depicts (places such as Rosings 
and characters such as Elizabeth Bennet) as inhabitants of the story-world. We 
make the events that are described (events such as Lady Catherine’s visit to the 
Bennets) as events taking place in the story-world. Again, there is a dialectic in 
operation. As we make the things in the story, we refer to the things that we have 
made. This is also what we do with the population of the actual world. The 
objects in a story, the characters, places and events, are real in the story-world. 
The objects in an actual world are not real in the story-world (Elizabeth cannot 
know about me or you, for example)
We make the denizens of the story-world from the experience of reading the text. 
We may make things that we would not expect to meet in our actual world. Story- 
worlds can contain ghosts, unicorns, hobbits, fairies, damsels in distress, knights, 
astronauts and people such as you and me. Some of these things are the sorts of 
things that populate our actual worlds, while others, so far as we are aware, are 
not. Many people believe there are things in the actual world that others do not 
accept are there at all: ghosts, fairies and the Loch Ness Monster are possible 
examples.
The things in the story-world are real in the story-world. The ghost in the Hamlet 
story-world (assuming that the reader has made the world such that there is a ghost 
in it) is real in the Hamlet story-world. But, with a simple proviso noted below, is 
not real in most actual worlds. The things in my actual world are real (for me). 
They may not be in your actual world. I might believe in Santa Claus; he is real
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(for me) in my actual world: he delivers gifts and so forth. But you may have 
made your actual world differently; your actual world may be one that excludes 
Santa Claus (for whatever reason). I act in my actual world. That acting may 
have significant consequences. Any ghosts that populate my actual world are real 
in my actual world (they may not be in yours).
Reference is a dialectical activity. We start to single things out in order to make a 
world. We do this in the actual world as we learn to talk. As we experience more 
and more, we make more and more subtle things. But, as we make things, we talk 
about those things and build up a more and more sophisticated picture. We do the 
same when we read a text.
“My dear Mr. Bennet,” said his lady to him one day, “have you
heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?”176
This conversation is almost the first thing we read in Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice. But, straight away, we start to make the denizens of the story-world. 
As we read more, we increase the precision of our making. We learn more and 
more about the characters (Mr. and Mrs. Bennet) and we learn more about the 
residence, Netherfield Park. But as soon as we encounter Mr. and Mrs. Bennet we 
start making, and we do this dialectically also. Even from the first we start to 
make with some care. Netherfield Park, just from its name, we take to be a 
residence of some significance in the district (and we will turn out, as we learn 
more, to have been correct). We will also start to make Mr. and Mrs. Bennet in 
certain ways. By the time we have finished reading the novel, we will have had all 
the experience of Mr. and Mrs. Bennet and also of Netherfield Park that the novel 
can afford (for that is all that is written). We may finish making the Pride and 
Prejudice story-world at that point. But we may continue to work on the story- 
world, and mull over it, over a lengthy period of time. Usually, we are able, with 
a story, to reread the text (repeat the experience) should we wish to.
176 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (ed. Vivien Jones), London: Penguin 
Books, 1996, p. 5.
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However, in no case can we ever (quite) repeat the experience the same as our first 
experience. If we reread the text, we come to it with different expectations and 
preconceptions; we may be reading for certain specific details and so on. By the 
same token, if we reexperience something in our actual world, that experience can 
never be quite the same as it was before; it can never be a simple repetition of our 
first experience. A second ride on the roller coaster is different from a first.
In both cases we make things on “hearsay”. We make the story-world from what 
the text tells us. But much of our experience of our actual world is “hearsay”. 
People tell us things, we read information in the newspaper or a book; we see 
pictures or television broadcasts and so forth. We take it to be so, and make our 
actual world accordingly. Much of what we make, as existing in our actual world, 
places such as Bourke, people such as the queen, we make on this sort of indirect 
evidence.
Ontological]y, this makes story-worlds and actual worlds to be very similar. They 
are both intentional objects, objects made from, in the broadest meaning of the 
term, ideas. We will see that this implies that we will talk of stories and react to 
them in natural ways.
Being There
What, then, is the difference between an actual world and a story-world?
The difference is this. We inhabit our actual world; we live there and die there; 
we do things (including reading stories) there. Events and things in our actual 
world can affect us and we can alter our actual world and be altered by it. We can 
trip over a stone we hadn’t noticed. We can move a stone. If we move a stone,
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we alter the world and, therefore, our actual world, perhaps only slightly; if we trip 
over the stone, we also alter the world, for the world is different as a result of our 
tripping. Some actions we take and some actions that happen (without our being 
the cause) can alter our world significantly (for us). An event happening 
somewhere else in the world can affect us. There may be a cyclone in Queensland 
which causes high seas in Sydney. We may drown in the rough surf. But we, 
ourselves, may be able to alter our actual world significantly (for us) by, for 
example, moving to a new town, getting married, having children and so forth. 
An alteration in our actual world leads to the having of experiences different from 
those we would have had if the world had not been altered. These alterations to 
our experiences may be extensive or trivial. That is what it means to describe 
some event as insignificant. Getting married leads to a great number of different 
experiences and is usually considered significant. Kicking a stone leads to only 
minor experiential differences. Falling over a stone (perhaps a stone we had failed 
to notice) and breaking a leg also leads to a series of different experiences. It may 
even lead to death. Of course, there are practical limits to the ways in which we 
can alter the world. We cannot remove a star. We usually cannot remove a 
building that is spoiling our view.
We can reinterpret a text to make a different story-world, and we can reinterpret 
our experience to make a different actual world. We do both these things 
constantly; we must always appraise and reappraise our experience and we must 
always be open to something in a text that forces us to reconsider the story-world. 
But reinterpreting the text does not alter the text, although it does alter the story- 
world. Neither does reinterpreting our experience change the (raw) experience; 
but if I reinterpret my experience to change my actual world, then I am changed. 
Since I am a denizen of my actual world, technically, any change in me (including 
a change in my beliefs or how I see things) is a change in the world itself. So to 
reinterpret our experience does change our actual world, perhaps only in a small 
way. But such a change to my actual world may lead to significant consequences 
(at least for me, and, possibly, for other people also).
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Simply put, we can change the world but not the text.
In an actual world, we can conduct experiments to obtain additional information. 
An experiment may be an elaborate scientific activity involving huge expense and 
many hours of work on the part of many people. Or it may be very simple. If we 
deliberately take steps to obtain additional information (that is to say, have certain 
sorts of experiences), then we are conducting an experiment in this sense. 
Looking behind the door is an experiment. So is sending a rocket to Mars. We 
can then use this additional information to assist us in making our actual world. In 
a story-world, this is not possible for us. The characters can look behind the door, 
but we cannot unless they do it for us. Further, we cannot even ask them to look.
We can never find out how many children Lady Macbeth had, because we cannot 
ask her. The story tells us what it tells us, and that is all. There is no experiment 
that we can run. But, we may be able to find out how many children our 
neighbour has. We may observe the family, the comings and goings to and from 
their house, who is there frequently, their ages and so forth (we can hardly not do 
those things) and we can talk to them. If we really want to know and do not 
obtain a satisfactory answer, we may be able to conduct further experiments. But 
there are strict limits to what we can find out even about our actual world. We can 
almost certainly never find out what Caesar had for breakfast on the day he 
crossed the Rubicon. We can probably not find out what our neighbour had for 
breakfast two weeks ago. There is no experiment that we can conduct to obtain 
the information about Caesar. Possibly, we could ask our neighbour about his 
morning habits, but he may not remember what he ate and when, himself. We 
suppose that information was once available but it is not any longer.
The incompleteness of story-worlds is a problem to some commentators. Currie, 
for example, argues that fictional worlds are incomplete (or, at least, incompletely 
described) and, possibly, inconsistent. Therefore, he argues, they (may not be) 
possible worlds. This thesis agrees on both counts. He then goes on to say that,
Being There -130-
because of their indeterminacy, fictional worlds (or story-worlds, in our terms) are 
an unacceptable construct.177 As outlined above, we do not agree that follows and 
it does not present the kind of difficulty that Currie seems to think. We have seen 
that this incompleteness is an incompleteness of information and need not be 
understood as implying that any story-world is, itself, incomplete. A newspaper 
report of an incident is, as we have already noted, incomplete, but that is not to say 
that the world of the incident about which the article is written is incomplete or 
that we can (readily) obtain just any piece of information we desire. Ruth 
Lorand argues, similarly, that story-worlds are the material about which the 
story is written, but the inscription (that is to say, the text) cannot tell everything. 
But then, neither can the newspaper article.
There is a strict parallel here. The world may be determinate. It may even be 
consistent. But I have argued that even if this is so, actual worlds are not 
determinate; we cannot know everything about anything. Even consistency may 
not reign supreme for, as we have seen, our formulation of the world to make an 
actual world may be, and almost certainly will be, inconsistent. A story-world 
may not be consistent either. Inconsitency may be irremedial.
Following this, we might argue that we have no warrant for asserting as “facts” 
things about the incident that the newspaper fails to report. This is clearly so. We 
might argue that, in a like manner, we have no warrant for asserting as “facts” 
about the story-world things that are not identifiable from the text. So we could 
suggest or speculate that Lady Macbeth had, say, three children; but we could not 
assert that as a fact. We often do speculate about newspaper reports (probably 
drunk, we say when we read about an accident).
177
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Currie, The Nature of Fiction, pp. 54-55.
Ruth Lorand, “Telling a Story or Telling a World?” in British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 41, (2001), pp. 425-443.
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Our act of reading takes place in our actual world. We cannot influence a story 
but the story, or rather the experience of reading that story, may influence us. We 
cannot “reach into” the story, so to speak, to influence events or to obtain 
information beyond what we are given in the text (by the author). The characters 
in the story are oblivious of us and our existence, whereas we are not oblivious to 
them. Their activities can affect us and the story can affect us, for the act of 
reading takes place, as we have said, in our actual world. We could describe the 
story as existing, in isolation, within our actual world.
We have discussed consistency. We expect both a story-world and an actual 
world to be consistent. If they are not, we usually attempt to reinterpret the text to 
make a consistent story-world and we usually attempt to reinterpret our experience 
to make a consistent actual world. But we may not succeed in doing that. Then 
we may simply live with the problem. We can throw away the book if we find it 
becomes too inconsistent (and who wants to bother to read a story that is an 
inconsistent mish-mash?) but we can hardly discard our actual world (we can by 
dying). We have a very great capacity to both extend what we perceive and to 
overlook difficulties in our understanding of things. And, as already stated, we 
cannot always know what is possible or contradictory. Suspension of belief is not 
usually difficult.
However, most of us can happily live with fictional worlds that are strange; a 
strange world need not, of course, be inconsistent. A strange world is a world that 
seems to be unlike our actual world in certain ways. It is not possible to say in 
exactly what ways. Many people like story-worlds to be strange (science fiction 
and fantasy stories are popular). Usually we take it that the story-world is like our 
actual world (at least on a first reading of an unfamiliar work). We may know 
something about the story and already have some expectations before 
commencing to read. For example, we know that Pride and Prejudice was written 
two hundred years ago and we expect it to go certain ways. So, before we start 
reading, the conversation between Mr. and Mrs. Bennet has a certain
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“background”. We may be forced, as we read, to alter our understanding. The 
story-world may turn out to be quite strange. Often we can know that the story- 
world is strange as soon as the story commences. We do not need to get far into 
Samuel Beckett’s Endgame to know that the story-world is strange.
As we read we fill out our (skimpy) knowledge with details from the story. The 
creation of a world from a story is a microcosmic activity paralleling the 
worldmaking that we bring to our lives as a totality. If unexpected events (such as 
men awakening to find that they are insects) or odd characters (such as moles 
spring cleaning) appear in the story-world, we quickly modify the story-world as 
we make it, to take account of such things. We must do this to make the story- 
world fit the text, that is, to make a right world from the text.
Sometimes we know that a story-world will be unlike our actual world because of 
the genre of the work. We expect a certain kind of world, or we stand ready to 
make a certain kind of story-world, when we read a science fiction story, for 
example. We might accept time travel as a (conventional) possibility within the 
science fiction genre world, but we do not expect it in a Gothic romance. Unless 
we are told otherwise, we take it that the fictional world matches our experience of 
our actual world. Stories come in many different genres: science fiction, fantasy, 
surreal, realistic and so forth. We have taken little account of these differences. 
There is much that could be said but little that needs to be said here. The claim I 
am making is that the thesis being argued will cover all these genres.
There is not one right way that an actual world must be. Neither is there one right 
way that the world of the text must be. But we must always make the story-world 
from the text and, therefore, it must fit the text. Since we start from an 
understanding of our actual world it is not unusual for our expectations of the 
actual world to reflect on our interpretation of a text and, as I will argue in a later 
chapter, vice versa.
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We will investigate the impact (if any) of an unsatisfactory story-world later. 
However, if we make our actual world badly, the impact may be disastrous. If we 
do not construct an actual world where gravity (however we understand that term) 
operates, we will fall (out of trees, down steps). We probably would not survive 
very long. Most of us, we have already noted, have gaps and errors in our actual 
world. As a consequence we may not operate optimally.
What is a Fiction?
We are now in a position to say something about the categories of fiction and non­
fiction. This question could not be considered earlier because we lacked the 
machinery to discuss it. We now have that machinery.
Earlier we defined a story as something with a plot; something where events occur 
and occur in a sequence. That definition is very general and covers stories of all 
kinds including “true” stories, such as history, gossip, newspaper reports and so 
forth (to the extent that any of these is "true"). Librarians, however, divide stories 
into two sorts: fiction and non-fiction. My discussion to date has ignored this kind 
of distinction, although the discussion has tended to concentrate its attention on 
stories as if they were fictions, by implication if not overtly. Many philosophers 
start their philosophising with a consideration of fictionality. We certainly started 
by asking questions about fictions, but the analysis that we have been making has 
not depended upon any definition of fiction.
There are two commonsense requirements for something to be a fiction: most 
people will say that fiction must be "not true" and that the story be, generally, 
understood to be a fictional story (there is an intentional requirement). A lie is not 
(an innocent) fiction because it is intended to deceive the person being lied to in
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some manner. I might be selling something and lie about its quality, or I might lie 
to protect myself. Such lies are not fiction in that the reader of the lies is not 
intended to make a story-world, separate from this world, but to believe that the 
facts are about this world; the lie is intended to cause the reader to make an error 
of judgment: buy the object or exonerate the guilty, for example. Many people 
argue that something written as a fiction, but gratuitously factual, would still be a 
fiction because of this intentional requirement.
In the terms of this thesis, we can see that the difference between fiction and non­
fiction is one of the relationship between actual and story worlds. In the case of a 
fiction, the story-world is separate from any actual world, where, in the case of a 
non-fiction, the story-world is (or claims to be) a spatio-temporal part of an actual 
world. Sometimes, the story-world seems to be about actual world entities, such 
as Napoleon; we will visit that question later in this thesis. A lie, of course, 
claims to be about an actual world. A fiction that was, accidentally, true, is 
written about (and interpreted to be about) a story-world and not an actual world 
(as we have just said).
Most writers recognise that there is nothing special about the language of a fiction. 
Curry points out that “it is not any linguistic or semantic feature of the text that 
determines its fictionality.”179 Many writers define fictionality as arising from an 
action of the author. Thus a fiction is defined in terms of authorial intent. In the 
passage just quoted Curry continues to observe that “nor is it anything to do with 
the reader’s response.” It is, he continues, “to do with the kind of action the 
author performs in producing the text.”181
Currie holds that a fiction is a kind of speech act. In this he is in agreement, one 








a stance. To produce a text which represents a story-world is a kind of act; that act 
is different from the kind of act which produces a text about this world. To 
perform an act of fiction making places different obligations on the author from 
the kind of act which produces, say, a history story-text. But this thesis argues 
that it is the world that the text represents which makes the difference. Thus, an 
act of fiction writing is an act where the author represents a certain sort of world.
It is equally clear that one can read a work as fiction even if it is intended to be 
true. This is almost universally acknowledged. Currie says that “[j]ust about 
anything can be read as fiction”,182 although he continues by asserting that that 
does not make it fiction. Lamarque, similarly, points out that “the attitude that a 
reader takes to a work need not coincide with that of the writer”;183 he also 
continues to argue that it is the writer who determines fictionality.
Any story is, when interpreted by a reader, used to make a story-world. Any story 
is about events either in the past or, in some other way, beyond change. This 
statement is true of anything that is in the past or anything classified as fiction 
(even if set in the future). It may not be true of predictions (about which I will say 
a little later). Neither might it be true of a story which is current (in the sense that 
it is happening right now) but we do not tend to think of an adventure in which we 
are at this moment participating, as a story. I could hardly be telling it as it 
happens, and, so, we can exclude such possibilities.184
I may criticise a fictional story on the grounds that it is silly, poorly written, 
unrealistic and so forth. I may not criticise it on the grounds that it is made up or 
“not true”. I can, however, criticise a history on that latter ground. So this is the 
difference. A story-world is self-enclosed and complete, be it a history or a fiction
Ibid., p. 36.
Lamarque, Fictional Points of View, p. 25.
Although we may, of course, think that our current adventure will make a 
good story (our holiday account when we get home, for example).
184
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(for it is unalterable). An historical account of something does allow more 
information to be obtained; I have already called activities intended to obtain 
additional information, experiments. We can conduct historical experiments by, 
for example, perusing relevant documents, possibly questioning witnesses. We 
can read more “stories” about the times and events in an effort, through more 
comprehensive information, to make judgments about the veracity of matters as 
presented by any one author. To the extent to which we do that, we are not 
treating the work as a story. When we read a work as a story, we make the story- 
world as an interpretive act. If we evaluate that world against other sources of 
information, we are not treating it as a story but as something to be investigated. 
Similarly, if we conduct some sort of comparative investigation of the novels of a 
particular author, say D. H. Lawrence, we are carrying out a critical analysis. To 
do any of these things requires, inter alia, the making of the story-world, but the 
historical investigation or the literary critique, goes beyond that (and beyond the 
scope of this thesis).
So, if we treat a text as a story (and that is where our interest lies — making sense 
of stories) we make a story-world. The distinction between fact and fiction is not 
greatly important to us. What we read depends upon our attitude to its story-world 
and our actual world. Thus, the difference lies, not with the librarian, but with the 
reader. If I read a story as fiction then, for the purposes of that reading, it is 
fiction. Certain texts are very powerful as stories. I will discuss that matter in a 
later chapter. Other stories are powerful because they tell us about how things are 
(or were thought to be). An excellent example is a religious text like The Bible. 
This text can be read as a factual account of how things were and how they came 
to be the way they are. In the process, it may give us spiritual guidance. But the 
text can also be read as a fiction. In that case, the story may still operate as a 
powerful story and give us spiritual guidance. We will see how this might be, in a 
later chapter.
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The question of fact versus fiction will recur throughout this chapter. We have 
now laid out the theory and we are in a position to continue our discussion.
Emotion and Stories
We arc now in a position to begin to answer one of the important questions with 
which we set out. Why do we get involved with the characters in a story? Why 
do we scream at a horror film? Why do we cry for Anna Karenina? If we are 
genuinely frightened by the green slime on the cinema screen, why do we not run 
from the cinema? We will give an answer to this question now, but it will be 
necessary to elaborate that answer further, near the end of this thesis.
Why does not the hick in the audience run onto the stage and save the heroine 
from the wheels of the train, asks Kendall Walton. 185 Since the play is 
representing the story-world, but the performance takes place in this world, that 
would merely be to disrupt the performance. The story-world would not be 
affected. Perhaps the performance would be brought to a premature end; that 
might result in the audience’s not seeing the whole play and being deprived of the 
opportunity to complete their making of the story-world. The performance is an 
event in the world; as such, it can be interrupted or fail. An actor might have an 
accident. At the end, the audience applauds. The applause is for the performers 
and others associated with the production; the applause takes place in this world. 
But the performance represents the story-world and, in the story-world, the 
heroine is at serious risk of death from the wheels of the train. The actress in the 
performance is, we know, at no such risk. Sometimes an author or a director
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attempts to draw the audience into the action of the play. Then the audience 
would have to incorporate the whole performance, including their own role, into 
their interpretation of the play and that action would become part of the story- 
world (for them). There is no intrinsic reason why we cannot make a story-world 
from a production in which we play a part. However, we usually try to keep the 
story-world and our actual world from becoming mixed up in this manner.
We make a story-world. We “look into” that world and we see the characters and 
their situations. We see the lives of those characters develop and we see what 
happens in that world. We experience emotions as we would in any similar 
situation. We scream with fear, we gasp with surprise, we glow with an inner 
warmth, we cry for Anna Karenina. This is not illogical. There is no need to see 
such behaviour as peculiar. These are, I claim, real emotions, just like those we 
feel in response to situations that arise in our actual world. Sometimes these 
emotions are more strongly felt than emotions we feel in response to situations in 
our actual world and sometimes less strongly felt. This is our commonsense 
reaction to our feelings about stories.
As a rough rule (and it is very rough), the strength of our reaction to an emotional 
situation is partly, at least, dependent on our “distance” from that situation. If we 
are far away and do not know those involved, we do not react as strongly as if we 
are close or if we know those involved. If we know them well, we react more 
strongly. So, for example, we react most strongly to situations involving those we 
know and love: our family and friends. The deaths of these people are most likely 
to evoke very strong emotions. We hardly spare a thought for those killed in an 
earthquake on the other side of the world in a country where we do not know the 
people. The “distance” is even greater where the people are members of a social
185 Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the 
Representational Arts, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990, 
p.192.
Being There - 139-
grouping with whom we have had no contact. Any journalist setting up news 
headlines knows this.
We read Anna Karenina. We become intimate with Anna. We know her thoughts 
and her problems. We become close to her. When she commits suicide, of course 
we are sorry. We have come to know her well, much better than we know the 
people we read about in the newspaper.
Why, then, do we take no steps to try and save her? The answer is simple: we are 
unable to assist her because, however strongly we feel, we do not live in her 
world. We are unable to alter that world. Walton asks why, if we are afraid of the 
green slime on the cinema screen, do we take no action? The answer is just that 
we do not need to take any action. This is not to say that we do not feel real fear. 
There is an implication in much of the writing on emotional responses to stories 
that we must run if we are afraid. But this is based on an erroneous suggestion: 
that we must always react to real fear with flight. It is, quite simply, not so.
If we are afraid of something we usually do take some action to allay our fear. If 
we walk through a gate and are attacked by a savage dog, it is natural to quickly 
retreat and bang the gate shut. But flight might not always be the most appropriate 
action; many animals freeze when confronted with danger. We may sit very still 
and hope that we will not be detected. If we have a big stick handy we may use it 
or we may grab such a stick. In broad terms, it is the rational instinct that decides 
what reaction will be most appropriate in any given circumstance. Emotions are 
not themselves actions but may give rise to actions. Yet, very often, we take no 
specific action in response to our emotions. Our rational reaction to the emotion 
provoking situation may go some way towards allaying our emotion. I equip 
myself with a big stick; I still fear the savage dog but not as much as before I was 
holding tight to the stick. When the dog rushes at me I still feel the grip of fear, 
but not as much as if I were defenceless. I may not, now, run.
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Eddy Zemach says this: “for rational adults, emotion is never a cause of action;
1 O/T
rather it gives one a reason to act in a certain way.” We think before we act; to 
run onto the stage in the melodrama would not be rational. To run from the 
cinema in fear of the green slime would not be rational. We cannot always control 
ourselves; tears may well up as we read Anna Karenina, but we remain rational 
enough not to run to the railway station. The tragedy gives us a reason to act that 
way (namely, to cry) but the sorrow does not cause us to rush to the railway 
station. If we can do nothing, then there is nothing we can do. This is the case for 
Anna; our pity would be a reason to assist her, if we could. But we cannot, so we 
do what we can: nothing. Again, Zemach says that the “fact that Stalin can cause 
no more harm — he is dead — is a reason against trying to stop him but not a 
good reason against hating him.”187 Neither, he says, is the fact that a person has 
died a reason to /Stop loving him. We are often in a position where we are unable 
to assist, however much we would like to be able to. We often hear news items 
that make us feel genuine pity (perhaps in response to some tragedy or disaster in 
an overseas country). Yet we do not take action (or, at least, not in every case — 
we could not do so). We pity Anna Karenina, yet our rationality counsels us to 
take no action. We are distressed by the plight of victims of a disaster, yet we take 
no action. In each case, it is real pity we feel; our inability to act does not imply 
that the pity is not genuine.
We attend a horror film at the cinema and see (on the screen) the green slime 
moving towards us. We feel fear; we decide what to do. We could run from the 
cinema, yet we do not do so, for we decide to sit there and “enjoy” our fear, for it 
is not unmixed. This does not make the fear any the less real fear. I allay my fear 
by saying to myself “the green slime is only in the world of the film — it can do 
me no harm” or perhaps I say, “everything will work out in the end — it always
Eddy Zemach, “Emotion and Fictional Beings”, in The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 54, (1996), p. 43.
Ibid., p. 44.187
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does.” If the fear becomes overpowering, I may decide to leave the cinema (and
miss the end of the film) in order to allay my fears. That might be rational.
Lamarque suggests that the person attending the film presentation might take
188certain actions; he "might close his eyes and try to bring other things to mind." 
Lamarque reports that such actions are, in fact, common among audiences at 
horror films. Colin Radford suggests that we might become “so appalled at the 
prospect of what we think is going to happen ... [that we] avert the impending 
tragedy in the only way we can, by closing the book or leaving the theatre.”190 
This may not be a common occurrence, but Radford states that it does happen. We 
do not usually take evasive action. This does not imply that those things and 
events do not arouse real emotions in us, but, on the contrary, suggests that the 
emotions aroused are as real as any others. It is a commonplace to observe that, 
often, people react with greater intensity of emotion about fictional characters than 
they do about those who inhabit the actual world.
We have a friend who has suffered a loss and we really feel sorry for him. What 
do we do? We may speak to him and offer our sympathy. Sometimes we judge 
that it is better to say nothing. Sometimes we do not quite know what to say or 
how to behave, so we do nothing. That is not to say that we do not feel real 
sympathy. Even if we have a friend who we know to be suicidal, we may not be 
able to do anything. That is the case with Anna. So we do nothing. In other 
words, it is simply not true that emotions must result in certain (predictable) 
actions. If I fall in love with Elizabeth Bennet, I shall have to endure the pangs, 
for she is unattainable!
Why do we cry for Anna, but pass over the plight of refugees, the starving and 
other people? We evince more sympathy for Anna than we do for someone
Lamarque, Fictional Points of View, p. 119.
Ibid.
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nearby in a similar plight. We have noted that. We know Anna; we do not know 
(except as statistics) most of the refugees, or the starving. We do not know the 
person on the next block. We have spent many hours with Anna; we have read 
about her and been privy to her thoughts. We know her circumstances well. It is 
only natural that we will have more sympathy for her than for the person with 
whom we have no contact. It is as simple as that!
My argument is, quite simply, that our emotional reactions to stories are real 
reactions and the emotions we feel in response to stories are real emotions.
Many writers consider that our reactions to stories must, in some way, be false, 
because the situations and characters are not real. But this does not follow and 
seems to defy commonsense; they are real tears we shed for Anna. Kendall 
Walton describes our reactions to stories as “quasi”.191 He describes our emotions 
in the face of a story as “quasi” because, he reasons, we know that the events in 
the story are not real. We know that Anna will not “really” be killed by the train. 
Walton says that when we read a story, the story acts as a prop in a game of make 
believe. We “play” the game. In make-believe, we do not experience real 
emotions (because it is only make-believe). Therefore, he reasons, our reactions 
to stories are not genuine but “quasi”.
According to Walton’s account it is essential that, for an emotion to be real, it 
must be directed towards a real entity, that is to say, in the terms we are using, 
towards an entity that is a denizen of my actual world and not an entity that is a 
denizen of a story-world. We experience quasi-fear because we are not really in 
danger from the green slime on the cinema screen. Of course, some reflection 
does allow us to moderate our fear, but, I am arguing that we experience real 
emotions when we are confronted by the situation in the story-world. It follows 
from the argument that I am putting that the events in the story are real (in the
191
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Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 244. 
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story-world). For the characters in the story-world, the events in my actual world 
are not "real". An event or a character or place can only be real in some, one 
world.
Zemach dismisses Walton's claims on two grounds. Firstly, he claims that 
Walton’s logic is flawed.193 Secondly, he argues that the fear experienced by the 
person attending the horror film at the cinema is accompanied by the normal signs 
(sweaty palms, an urge to escape, he clutches the chair tightly) of fear. Likewise, 
the pity is accompanied by the normal signs of pity (tears). These are genuine 
tears and genuine sweaty palms not “quasi tears” and “quasi sweaty palms”. 
Therefore, he says that it is real fear. So do I. Other writers question the claim 
that fear cannot be real just because it is directed towards objects that are not real. 
Säätelä, who does not seem to question Kendall’s use of the concept of make- 
believe, nevertheless, suggests that “we don’t have to say that an emotion isn’t 
fear just because its object is known to be fictional.”194 It is clear that we can feel 
fear for things that are not denizens of this world.
We will have more to say about imagination in the next chapter. But, it is 
convenient to note here that making story-worlds is an act of the imagination. 
That is hardly a contentious claim. In a recent book on imagination,195 Currie and 
Ravenscroft argue that imagination is transparent to emotion.196 They mean that 
imagined situations are productive of genuine emotions. They argue, as will we, 
that to decide between alternatives requires the imagining of those alternatives;
197therefore, a genuine emotional reaction to imagined situations is productive.
Zemach, “Emotion and Fictional Beings”, pp. 41-42.
Simo Säätelä, “Fiction, Make-Believe and Quasi Emotions”, in British 
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Peter Lamarque argues, in a similar vein, that we can be frightened by a thought. 
This is undoubtedly so. He says that the thought of being mauled by a lion 
inspires genuine fear, even if no danger is apparent. We will also be afraid if we 
think about being stranded on a distant planet. It is, effectively, impossible for 
that to actually happen to us.198 Lamarque sees fictional situations as akin to 
thoughts; the fear which responds to those thoughts is real fear and the pity which 
responds to those thoughts is real pity. “[W]hen we fear and pity fictional 
characters, our emotions are”, he says, “directed at real, albeit psychological 
objects.”199 The objects which fill the story-world are, as intentional objects, just 
of this sort. And they are certainly vivid. We visit the story-world and we think 
about what we see there, just as we do about situations in our actual world. Under 
the scheme put forward in this thesis, thoughts about story-worlds and thoughts 
about actual worlds are very much alike.
There are, of course, other, related, questions arising from our responses to stories. 
We find ourselves in a state of suspense over the outcome of a story. This seems 
right on a first reading, but we seem to encounter suspense even when we read a 
story a second time and know what will happen. We enjoy horror films and, for 
many readers, the more gruesome, the better. These stories are more popular in 
the medium of film, for film is more “realistic”. We attend the tragedy and we 
“enjoy” the experience. Why would we willingly put ourselves through the stress 
of, say King Lear. We will say more about the “benefits” of tragedy and this 
problem in a later chapter, but, here, I want to flag these as problems for stories 
and the theory put forward so far. These are merely some more of the perplexities 
of stories, but they are not greater problems for the thesis put forward here than for 
any other. Further, the answers to these problems may be psychological. We will 
restrict ourselves to showing how our thesis is compatible with some answers 
provided in the literature.
198
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The question of monsters has been discussed by Noel Carroll and Berys Gaut, who 
have different approaches to the problem. Carroll argues that monsters are 
fascinating, while also being fearsome and disgusting.200 “[F]ear and disgust are 
the price the audience pays for fascination.” Gaut argues that horror does not 
necessarily involve negative emotions and he suggests that there is a parallel with 
the kind of reaction we get in any “thrill” situation, such as mountain climbing or 
riding the roller coaster. Our reactions contain a cognitive and an emotive 
element. That discussion centres around the question of the psychology of the 
enjoyment of these works (and, partly, about the literary merit of this particular 
genre): whether we can legitimately enjoy the monstrous or whether there is a 
fascination inherent in the spectacle of the horror film. In either case, the answers 
given are quite consistent with the argument put here. In fact, the solution offered 
by Carroll, who argues that there is a fascination inherent in the monster, is 
heightened by the prospect of peeking into the monster’s world.
In like fashion there is a debate about suspense. Do w;e encounter real suspense on 
seeing the same film twice? Yanal, for example, argues that we do find that our 
first encounter with a story (that is, in our terms, our first visit to the story-world) 
engenders suspense. After that, when, in our terms, we revisit the story-world, 
and we all have favourite story-worlds and like to go there again and again, there 
is more a sense of anticipation than of genuine suspense.203 We anticipate, in a 
suspenseful manner, undergoing some familiar ritual or going to a familiar place.
Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, New York: Routledge, 1990.
“Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Reply to Gaut”, in British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 35, (1995), pp. 67-72.
Carroll, “Enjoying Horror Fictions”, p. 67.
Berys Gaut, “The Paradox of Horror”, in British Journal of Aesthetics, 33, 
(1993), pp. 333-345, Carroll, “Enjoying Horror Fictions”, p. 67.
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Statements about Stories
What is the truth value of sentences about fictions or fictional characters?
Any sentence must be said about some world. Usually we talk about our actual 
world. When we say something, our actual world is usually, but not always, the 
default. We do not usually say so but we assume that it is so (unless we have a 
reason for supposing otherwise). If I say “It is a sunny day” it is understood that I 
am referring to my actual world. You will concur if your world is close enough to 
mine (which in this simple case, it almost certainly will be) and in fact it is sunny. 
We will agree that this statement is right.
If I say “Elizabeth Bennet married Darcy” this is, surely, also right and it is right in 
the same way. Except, in this case, the claim that Elizabeth Bennet married 
Darcy, is not said about my actual world but about the Pride and Prejudice story- 
world. In that world, barring unusual interpretations of the text, it is right. If you 
are unfamiliar with the story, you might say “Who is Elizabeth Bennet?” When I 
explain, you may read the story to see for yourself, or you may take my assertion 
on trust.
Similarly, if I say, about a mutual acquaintance you have not seen for some time, 
“Elizabeth married Bill” you will probably take that on trust.
Suppose that I say “Isn’t this a beautiful day that God made.” Suppose, further, 
that you do not believe in God. You may respond with “It is a beautiful day but 
God didn’t make it.”204 You have a different actual world from me and, so, my 
claim is only partly commensurable with your actual world. If your actual world
203 Robert J. Yanal, “The Paradox of Suspense”, in British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 36, (1996), pp. 146-158.
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were sufficiently different from mine, then my statement would not make any 
sense at all. But, suppose I say “Miss Jessel and Peter Quint terrified Miles to 
death” your response will depend upon your interpretation of the text. You might 
agree but, if you accept Cranfill’s interpretation of the text, you might say “There 
were no ghosts and Miles was terrified to death by the governess.”
Statements are normally made about some world; we often omit the qualifier, 
which would indicate which world. We take it, often rightly, that the person with 
whom we are conversing understands to which world we are referring. Anything 
we say must be interpreted; deciding to which world a statement refers is part of 
our interpretive activity. There is, thus, no difficulty with statements about 
fictions. Such statements refer to a world. If they are right, they are right in some 
(mutually agreed) story-world. Of course, we might say things for which we have 
no warrant. You might say, “I think Elizabeth Bennet must have been a redhead.” 
That is a statement about you (and will, I take it be correct), but it is a statement 
about an object in this world. If you say, “Elizabeth Bennet was a redhead.” the 
most we can infer is that your statement is reasonable, but so would be many other 
incompatible statements. The text is silent on the matter and there can be no 
authoritative appeal on the question. Where we disagree over an interpretation of 
the story-text, we might dispute such statements. Even in this case, you might 
adduce reasons for your claim (for example, you might cite characteristics which 
are widely supposed to accompany red hair).
Now, it is also possible to make comparisons across worlds. I might say “I 
married someone just like Elizabeth Bennet.” Or, I could even say, “I married 
Elizabeth Bennet.” I would be saying that my wife is like Elizabeth Bennet. I 
would probably be saying more than that. You, knowing my wife, might say that 
is so or not so. If we can compare things within worlds, we can make 
comparisons across worlds. Of course, in general terms, the characters in a story- 
world are not in a position to do that as they have no knowledge of our world.
204 Or, being polite, you may just agree anyway.
Being There -148-
Occasionally, we come across characters in a story-world who are familiar with 
other story-worlds. This happens, for example, in Jane Austen's Northanger 
Abbey.
We can also say “Elizabeth Bennet is not like Emma” thus comparing characters 
across two story-worlds. We can do this because we can visit both those worlds. 
Neither Elizabeth Bennet nor Emma has that knowledge (although Jane Austen 
could have endowed, at least, one of them with that knowledge). We can compare 
things which are remotely located in this world. We can compare London with 
Sydney, Nixon with Churchill.
Currie suggests that what is true in the fiction is not what is true in the story- 
world, for he disputes the usefulness of such worlds. Currie says that what is true 
in the story is what the narrator of that story believes or, rather what we make- 
believe the narrator to believe or, in short, what we make believe to be so.205 In 
this, he is taking Walton’s make-believing approach to fiction. The difficulty with 
this approach is that, in our example of The Turn of the Screw, it is not clear what 
the governess believes. In the case of one interpretive scheme, she is telling the 
truth and, we take it, believes what she is saying. However, if she is deranged, as 
Cranfill argues, we cannot take it that she believes everything she says, but it is 
unlikely that she is aware of the extent of her misconceptions. She may well 
believe what she is saying, but be very wrong. If I make the story-world that way, 
then her beliefs cannot be definitive.
The attraction of the theory laid out here is that it is simple and straightforward. 
There is nothing special about stories or fictions, or the ways we talk about them. 
We may or may not trust the teller of the story or of the fiction or of something we 
are told about our actual world. There is, thus, a seamless quality about the ways 
we talk about different worlds.
205 Currie, The Nature o f Fiction, p. 75-76.
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Some works contain asides, and other comments, from the author. Jane Austen 
opens Pride and Prejudice by making the observation: “It is a truth universally 
acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want 
of a wife.”206 There is also the well known opening to Anna Karenina. Such 
sentences, while part of the text, are not part of the story-text. By that, I mean to 
say that they do not contribute (directly) to the textual detail that we use to make 
the story-world. As such they do not form part of the story. We might, of course, 
be influenced by such asides to interpret the story-text this way rather than that. 
Whatever rightness such sentences might have is to be judged by normal means. 
They are, therefore, to be taken at “face value”. Such sentiments may be 
attributed to the author, or they may not. We usually take Jane Austen’s sentence 
to be a bit tongue-in-cheek and Tolstoy's to reflect his own opinions.
Aristotle recognised this kind of interjection from the author. He preferred that 
the author keep authorial opinion to a minimum and felt, too, that such asides do 
not form part of the plot.207
Of course, many such statements are generalisations and, as such, one might have 
difficulty imputing much meaning to them at all. But that would also be true were 
they to be taken out of the work and simply stated at, say, a party. These sorts of 
statements often do introduce the work and the reader might well bear them in 
mind in making the story-world.208 There is no problem with that; such 
statements are part of the text and may be taken into account when making the 
story-world. But they are not part of the story. Some authors have the annoying 
habit of appealing to the reader during the course of the work and peppering their 
text with such asides. Charles Kingsley’s The Water-Babies, for example, keeps 
making (racist) asides. These point out morals to the reader. As such, they do not
Austen, Pride and Prejudice, p. 5.
Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a.
In a later chapter, I will talk of story-worlds as metaphors; such statements 
may be of relevance in the ways we take a text to be metaphoric.
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form part of the story (although they do form part of the text of The Water- 
Babies). This is a question of style.
As with so many questions, whether a comment is an authorial aside or 
contributes to the story is not always obvious. Many writers place great emphasis 
on Austen’s comment when they interpret the text. It is also true, that such 
comments are part of the author’s work and were intended to be taken as part of 
the text. In this case, Austen did not relegate the comment to her private papers or 
even, to a preface. It forms part of the text of the novel. Nevertheless, we can still 
ask if the generalisation enshrined in the text is a good generalisation, as suggested 
above
Other Combinations
We have drawn a number of important conclusions. I want now to tie off a couple 
of loose ends. We need to understand what happens when stories are nested one 
inside another, and we need to know how to treat the appearance of apparently real 
world personages in a story. It could be held that these two situations present the 
theory outlined here with a difficulty, so we need to resolve these questions.
Many stories are presented as a story within a story. The Turn of the Screw is a 
typical example. The story about the governess and the ghosts is enclosed within 
another story. The Turn of the Screw starts with a prologue (not so named) which 
talks about a house party and the telling of frightening stories. One of the party, 
named Douglas, obtains papers from town and presents them on a subsequent 
evening. The main story is the contents of these papers. Now, it seems clear that 
we have a story within a story. There is the (slight) story of the houseparty which 
encloses the major ghost story. We recognise that the houseparty is a literary
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device. That is part of the stylistic analysis of James’ writing and is not to the 
particular point at this time.209
Because we are unable to alter the story-text, we cannot alter this arrangement (or 
any other part of it), without, thereby, making a new story (and a new story- 
world). The whole of the novel is enclosed in a story-world. But this is true of 
the characters in the prologue. They are to be read a story which has been written 
down, years ago, by one of the chief protagonists but who is now dead. So they 
are in the same position with respect to the main story, as we are with respect to 
their story. The conclusion I draw from this is to see a story-world within a story- 
world. There is a trivial story about a house party where people are telling ghost 
stories and the main story about the governess, Miles and so forth. This is a 
common novelists ploy. Mary Shelley, for example, uses it in Frankenstein, 
where the story is recounted as a set of letters. In referring to it as a novelist’s 
ploy, I am moving from philosophy to literary criticism and analysis, a different 
exercise.
If we consider the play-within-a-play so beloved by Shakespeare, we find the same 
mechanism in use, for example, in Hamlet Act HI, Scene ii. Here we have the 
well known double reenactment of the murder of Hamlet’s father. Since the 
Dumb Show precedes the “play” we have two plays within the major play, 
Hamlet. The first of these is the Dumb Show and that is followed by the “play”. 
Were, as is commonly supposed, the Dumb Show to occur within the “play”, then 
we would have a story-world within a story-world within a story-world. I know of 
no examples, but, in principle, such a thing (to however many levels the patience 
of the audience would last) presents no theoretical difficulty.
The play in Hamlet does affect its audience, which is the court of the king of 
Denmark firstly, and only secondarily the audience watching Shakespeare’s play
209 Although we have already noted how the prologue can be used to 
strengthen or weaken interpretations of the main story.
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Hamlet. In fact the latter audience is not primarily interested in the Dumb Show 
or the “play” but in the reactions of Gertrude and the other main protagonists in 
the Hamlet story-world. Toward the end of the performance of the “play” the king 
rises and asks for a light to leave “Give me some light” he says. Polonius asks 
for lights and everyone leaves but Hamlet and Horatio. We are later told that the 
king has “choler” and the queen is “in most great affliction of spirit.” Most 
people interpret these events in Hamlet as indicating that the “play” is close to the 
bone and has, indeed, affected the viewers of Hamlet’s "play". They all leave and 
the "play" is abandoned or cut short.
We can see clearly the operation of the mechanics spelled out in this essay.
In the case of Hamlet, we can see that the “play” is a significant part of the action 
of the whole work. It has a significant impact upon the dramatis personae. The 
performance of the Pyramus and Thisbe episode in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
on the other hand, is an entertainment presented for the duke’s wedding. As such 
it is less significant to the action of the play. What is significant to the 
Midsummer Night’s Dream story-world is the preparation, in the woods around 
Athens, for the performance of the Pyramus and Thisbe play at the Duke's 
wedding. But those preparations take place in the Midsummer Night’s Dream 
story-world and they are part of the (main) action of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream.
This is all very fine and accounts for most such cases. There are, however, stories 
where the characters in each of the separate worlds interact. Le Poidevin cites 
several examples. Some of his examples are very like the example of A
Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act ID, scene ii, line 275.
211 Ibid., line 310.
212 Ibid., line 319.
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213
Being There -153-
Midsummer Night’s Dream, cited above, where we see and deal with the 
preparations for a play or a case where people are involved with the making of a 
film. In such cases there is no interaction between fictional worlds, for all the 
action takes place within one world or in a manner such that the worlds remain 
separate. Le Poidevin, however, raises the interesting case of Flann O’Brien’s 
novel At Swim-Two-Birds. In this novel, the main character writes a story about a 
beautiful woman who is to be ravished by the villain, but is, instead, ravished and 
made pregnant by the author of the outer story. Perhaps a more familiar example 
is Leoncavallo’s opera, 7 Pagliacci. In this opera a troupe of clowns (the clowns 
of the title) present a play for the villagers. In the play-within-the-opera, one 
character murders another. Due to jealousy between characters in the opera, the 
murder in the-play-within-the-opera actually takes place in the outer opera or, 
rather, in both the play and the opera.
Le Poidevin calls such stories “pathological”. We cannot maintain a strict barrier 
between the worlds in the story in cases such as these. That barrier has become 
permeable, in the case of At Swim-Two-Birds to the extent that a character in the 
outer world makes a character in the inner world pregnant. We can live with the 
permeability in this situation. Indeed we must. But, we can still note that the At 
Swim-Two-Birds story-world is still impermeably separate form the actual world 
of the reader. Le Poidevin suggests that the interest in such cases arises from their 
paradoxicality and the way the author manipulates our (logical) expectations. He 
suggests that pathological stories are like such [pathological] sentences as
This sentence is false.214
The second problem is that of the appearance of actual world personages and other 
entities in a story-world.
214 Ibid., p. 235.
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I have already mentioned place. Places are as described in the story. If the story 
says there is a tree in a certain place, then there is a tree in that place. If a story 
says there is a house in a certain location, then there is. Sometimes a place in a 
story is, or seems to be, a place in this world. A story may be set in a particular 
time and place (which we take to be a time and a place in this world). That 
provides no warrant for taking this world to be as described by the story. If the 
story describes events and locations that are not so in this world, too bad for this 
world. For example, it is well known that Sherlock Holmes lived in a house at 
221B Baker Street, London. In the “real” London, there has never been a house at 
that location. There is such a location but it is, so far as I am aware, occupied by a 
bank. However, in the Sherlock Holmes story-world, there is a house at that 
location and Sherlock Holmes lives there.
We have, thus, no warrant for taking the “real” world to be as described in the 
Sherlock Holmes stories. Similarly, we must be careful in attributing to the 
London in the story-world, the attributes of the London in this world. Sometimes 
the writer, of course, assumes and wants us to impute to the London of the story- 
world well-known geographical features of the “real” London. To the extent that 
the story does not override such matters it is, surely, legitimate to do that. But we 
must always be careful not to allow our understanding of how things are in the 
“real” world to override how the text tells us they are in the story-world. To use 
the name of a place in the “real” world, can be a sort of shorthand to describe the 
story-world place.
It would, of course, be an odd thing for a writer to use the name of a well-known 
location in the “real” world and give it attributes very unlike the “real” world 
location. That may be done as a parody, but we would not expect a city to be 
called London only to find that it had none of the topographical, climatic and other 
features of the London with which we are reasonably familiar. One would not 
normally make the story-world London to be a bright, sunny place surrounded by 
coral reefs. It would be absurd for an author to invite readers to do that.
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We may extend what we have said and suggest that the author may have set the 
story in the location she did, so that we would, in fact, attribute to the story-world 
place, the attributes of the actual world place. This is, as I have suggested, a 
legitimate practice as far as it goes. But we still have no warrant, apart from 
normal practise and commonsense, for doing so. Of course, we are also inclined 
to do the reverse (with unfamiliar places); so, we often take the “real” world to be 
like the story-world. An author describes London in the story. We take it that 
(also) the “real” London is like that. However, as I have said, we have no warrant 
for doing so. If the “real” London turns out to be different, we cannot blame the 
author or accuse her of misrepresentation (although we might agree that to do that 
would be silly). As we have observed, there is no house at 22IB Baker Street, and 
never has been. Nevertheless, it is common and appropriate to understand the 
story-world location and the “real” world location to be similar. A place called 
“London” appears in many different stories. There is also a place with that name 
in the “real” world. The story-world Londons share certain characteristics. It is 
usually a dirty, foggy, drizzly, cold and depressing city.215 It is understandable 
that I will take it that the place with the same name in the “real” world is also like 
that. I might complain if a travel guide gives me a false impression, I can hardly 
complain if Dickens does so.
We find a similar situation when historical characters are introduced into a story.
For example, “Napoleon” appears in War and Peace. Such appearances should be 
treated in the same way as places in the discussion above. The Napoleon in the 
War and Peace story-world is not the Napoleon who ran around the Europe of the 
“real” world in the early 1800s. He is a character in the War and Peace story- 
world and that is a very different world. We are intended, by Tolstoy, to 
understand that his Napoleon is, in certain ways, like the other Napoleon but that 
is all we can do. If the story-world Napoleon is not like the “real” world 
Napoleon, we cannot argue with Tolstoy. Certainly some of the things that the
215 At least if you read Dickens.
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War and Peace story-world Napoleon did may differ from those that the real world 
Napoleon did. Charles Crittenden argues that we must take it that the story-world 
character is that way ‘“in the story.’”216 He suggests, as I have above, that, at best, 
certain departures from the facts of this world might “offend ... the reader’s sense 
of verisimilitude”.217
Some think of worlds as overlapping in these circumstances. The story-world 
overlaps the “real” world to the extent that the activities, character and so forth of 
the story-world character or place and the ‘real” world character or place coincide. 
The difficulty here is that the story-world ceases to be a separate realm. There is a 
door between the “real” world and the story-world through which characters 
move. That would mean that sometimes Napoleon was himself but other times, 
he would be a story-world character. As characters moved through that door, they 
would cease to be themselves and then re-become themselves. Nothing could then 
be pinned down. Such a situation would create more problems than it solves. 
Further, that would not help us to know what was true of an actual world. To 
know that, we would have to know, independently, what is “true” of the world 
and, we could then conclude, everything else is fictional. That solves no problem 
and sets the reader great difficulties. Such questions are not to do with making 
sense of stories but to do with understanding history. It is better to seal the worlds 
off and only import into the actual world what one already knows.
Sometimes an author introduces a character who is supposed to be like a “real” 
world personage but is very unlike that person. For example, Offenbach’s 
operetta, Orpheus in the Underworld, provides a set of gods and a Eurydice who 
are very different from those commonly understood. We are intended to compare 
these gods and characters with (I can hardly say) the “real” ones to appreciate the 
parody he presents.
Charles Crittenden, Unreality: the Metaphysics of Fictional Objects, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 134.
217 Ibid.
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We have accounted for the appearance of “historical personages” in a story. But 
histories are, as we have said, also stories. An account of Caesar’s exploits in 
Gaul is a story. Its author has taken a stand on this as history and claims to be 
recounting history. On that basis, the history story-world just is this world. In 
other words, an uncritical acceptance of a history leads us to (rightly) assimilate 
that history story to this world. If I tell a story about a mutual acquaintance, the 
same basic rule applies. Now, what if the story is not right. Then I must decide 
how much of the story-world to assimilate to my actual world. Even here, I start 
with an assumption different from that with which I start when reading a fiction. 
If I read a fiction, I take it that the story-world is separate. It seems best to keep it 
that way. If I read a history (from a reputable source), I make the opposite 
assumption. Of course, most readers simply accept what the history story says.
If the history is in error or, which is the same thing, we believe part only of that 
history, then we have a problem. We need some sort of independent warrant to 
take an historical account as correct, unless we are prepared to defer to the author 
of that work. To the extent that we do take such material to accurately tell us 
about our actual world, we must decide how to assimilate it into our actual world. 
In other words, an informed person, who is treating history with that kind of care, 
does not take the history-story-world uncritically as part of an actual world, where 
the ordinary reader might. To do that is, of course, to do history.
There are some stories that are neither one nor the other. Historical novels are an 
example. A recent case is Peter Carey’s Booker Prize winning novel The True 
History of the Kelly Gang. How much of Carey’s story is “true” and how much 
“false”. Certainly the internal clues are designed to make it seem like a "straight" 
history. It is even printed on paper with rough-cut edges and a slightly yellowed 
look to, presumably, give it an air of authenticity. Yet, we know it is a novel. The 
novel is clearly biased in favour of Kelly. Each reader will have to decide what to 
accept and what not. Personally, I take it as basically factual but “fleshed out” as 
is an historical novel. But that is my assimilation of the True History of the Kelly
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Gang story-world to my actual world (of Victoria in the 1870s). If I wanted to be 
more careful, then I would need to know, independently, the “facts” of the matter.
Modal Realism, Combinatorialism and Goodmanian Worlds
Finally, I wish to briefly turn to modal realism in order to clearly identify several 
key differences between the approach of David Lewis and the approach being put 
forward here. I hope, by discussing what I am not saying, to clarify what I am 
saying. What I am calling actual worlds are a Goodmanian construct. Although 
they derive from and owe much to Nelson Goodman, it is clear that he would, at
21Rleast in part, disavow the kind of world I have called by his name.
David Lewis also advocates a system which recognises the existence of many 
worlds. This system, he calls modal realism. According to modal realism, every 
possible world exists but does so disconnected from every other world. This 
world is the actual world to us, its inhabitants. The other worlds are the actual 
worlds to their inhabitants. However, all possible worlds are real (that is to say, 
instantiated). Lewis argues that modal realism solves problems of modal logic 
and counterfactuals. It also solves questions about fictions. For Lewis, fictions 
actually occur, but in some other world where, he says, they are told as “known 
fact rather than fiction.”219 For Elizabeth Bennet, the world which is (partially) 
described by Pride and Prejudice, is her actual world. In fact, of course, all those
In fact, not only does Goodman demand that any world be consistent, he 
also denies that there are such things as story-worlds. For example, he 
says in Of Mind and Other Matters that “there are no fictive worlds”, 
p. 125.
David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction”, in Philosophical Papers vol. 1, 1983,
p. 266.
219
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possible worlds that are consistent with the novel (that is to say, the text) would be 
potential worlds of (and I take it, ways of interpreting) that story. Since each 
world must be complete, for it is actual, and the story is not complete, there must 
be, for Lewis, many worlds which are consistent with Pride and Prejudice. Each 
such world would be consistent with the story-text in different ways because the 
text is a subset of “facts” about such worlds.
In the form in which Lewis propounds it, modal realism says that every possible 
world is instantiated. I do not claim that story-worlds are instantiated. It is not 
necessary for them to be instantiated for the results we have discussed above to 
follow. Modal realism is, thus, an ontologically very generous system.
Some philosophers rebel at this generosity and prefer to define a possible world in 
a manner other than as existing. One such system is known as combinatorialism. 
In this system, possible worlds are maximal sets of consistent propositions. To 
generate all the possible worlds, all we need do is to combine all the possible 
propositions in all the consistent ways (it may take a while). Since each world is a 
maximal set, each world is complete (no new proposition could be added to the set 
without introducing a contradiction) and each world is internally consistent. If we 
took all the possible propositions in pairs, where each pair consists of a 
proposition and its negation, then we can construct each world by selecting one 
proposition from each pair, choosing in such a manner as to maintain consistency. 
Thus every possible proposition is true or false in every possible combinatory 
world. Note immediately, that combinatorialism returns to the concepts of true 
and false, rather than continuing to use the concepts of right and wrong.220 Modal 
realism is, thus, committed to classical logical concepts such as excluded middle. 
We have noted that there are potentially many Pride and Prejudice story-worlds in 
Lewis' system. This is because the novel is not a maximal set of propositions but
I leave aside questions of propositions which may conflict (light is a wave, 
light is particulate; God is three, God is one), since I do not accept 
combinatorialism anyway.
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a collection of sentences selected and arranged by Jane Austen; she omitted quite 
a few propositions.
But these combinatorial worlds are not Goodmanian worlds as I am using the 
term. There are a number of crucial differences. Goodmanian worlds are not 
simply mathematically generated sets of propositions. Stories are not created by 
random generation of possibilities. A writer writes by selecting from possibilities 
(but not from all possibilities). A story is a deliberately created thing and not a 
random selection.
Combinatorial worlds are constructed from propositions but stories are made from 
sentences (I have encountered many sentences, but never a proposition). 
Propositions do not occur in sequences but are unordered collections. Stories are 
ordered sequences of sentences where the storyteller (deliberately) puts the 
sentences into the order in which they appear. So the same combinatorial world 
could, conceivably, be created by many different story tellings (I will not discuss 
the question of whether the same story told differently is a different story — but it 
may well be a different literary work).
Propositions have an abstract purity which is not shared by things as messy and 
uncontrollable as sentences. The author uses words and sentences to manipulate 
our emotions and reactions. Sentences and words carry suggestions that the 
author uses to draw on our (human) experience and contribute to the overall 
meaning of a work. Words have aesthetic qualities. The author combines words 
to present a world from a prejudiced viewpoint. We come to see the fictional 
world, as we do our actual world, from a perspective already prejudiced. We do 
not “see” the world of the story from a neutral, “propositional” base. For 
example, Mr. Collins is not just accurately reported but he is described and 
reported in such a manner as to convey Austen’s dislike for his sycophantic
221 Neither do we see the actual world from a neutral propositional 
perspective.
Being There - 161-
nature; it would be an unusual reader who did not take a dislike to him. Stories, 
then, are not just combinations of propositions for they play upon our emotions 
and, partly, direct our responses to their content.
There are two systems here: modal realism says that all possible worlds are 
instantiated (and are the actual world for their inhabitants); combinatorialism 
asserts that all possible combinatorial worlds exist (but are not necessarily 
instantiated). There is no access to these worlds. Further, every statement is 
either true or false of such worlds and those worlds are consistent, for Lewis, like 
Goodman, supposes that a world must be consistent to be possible. But stories are 
not maximal sets of propositions. Stories are not (necessarily) consistent. So far 
as we can ever know, story-worlds do not exist independently of their makers 
(both the author and the reader); they are made when the story is created and 
remade by the reader.
Combinatorial worlds and the worlds of modal realism are sealed off hermetically 
from us. We can have no access to them; we can know nothing about them. We 
cannot “read” stories in them for we cannot access them. They are a philosopher’s 
postulate. As such they are far removed from the sorts of worlds we have been 
considering.
It is part of the definition of a combinatorial world that the proposition set be 
maximal and consistent. It is possible that this world is described by such a set of 
propositions. On certain metaphysical suppositions about the nature of time and 
the determinacy of the world, all possible propositions about this world have a 
predetermined truth-value.
We do not place a constraint of maximality or consistency on either the 
symbolisation of an actual world or a story-world. No story-world or actual world 
could ever be maximal. There are many things left unstated in a story. A good
222 I owe this observation to Brian Garrett.
Being There - 162-
writer includes what is essential to the purpose. There is no requirement that a 
story present a complete world. Different readers might fill in different parts of 
the world, and in different ways, when they read the work. That is a legitimate 
activity. It is legitimate for me to construct Elizabeth Bennet with red hair and 
someone else to give her brown hair and another person to make her blonde. That 
detail is one of the many things we are not told. We get a glimpse into the world 
of the story but we are never shown the whole world and we could never fill in all 
the gaps in a story and, fortunately, we have no need to. This is, of course, also 
true of the actual world. No one person could ever know everything about the 
actual world. Neither is it possible that everything could be known. A 
Goodmanian world is not maximal.
Neither need a story be consistent. Possible worlds must be just that: possible. 
Proponents of classical logic take that requirement to mean that the set of 
propositions which describe that world, must be consistent (just as such people 
assume that any symbolisation of this world must be consistent), for inconsistent 
worlds are, they believe, not possible. But stories need not be possible in this 
sense. Although we do not know what is impossible, it seems most unlikely that 
men can turn into giant beetles. In this world, I think, animals do not talk. It may 
be that in some world this is possible, but who is to say? If, in some world, men 
do turn into giant beetles, who can say in what ways that world would be different 
from this? It is most unlikely that it would be almost identical in other respects 
(as the story implies it is). Under some interpretative schemata, this is the point of 
the story. Lewis seems to suggest that such worlds are logically possible and that 
every logically possible world is instantiated. But how can we know what is 
logically possible? How can we know that a world where men turn into beetles is, 
in fact, possible. It may be that such a world is inherently contradictory.
When we read a story, we accept the conventions of that story. We accept, in 
Wind in the Willows, that animals do talk (and, some of them, intelligently). We 
accept, in Metamorphosis, that men can (and do) turn into beetles. We accept, in
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fictional worlds, that there are fairies in the woods outside Athens, and we accept 
that people travel through time, and travel through space at speeds greater than the 
speed of light. I think (but cannot prove) that none of these things can happen and 
suspect that none of them is possible. If this is so, H. G. Well’s The Time 
Machine, does not present a possible combinatorial world, although it does 
present a good fictional world.223
But possibility is not a requirement of a Goodmanian world (as we have now 
defined it). We accept the conventions of the world being described at face value, 
for we have more important things to do than to worry about the consistency of 
such a world. This is not to say that a story can be a tarradiddle. It must be 
reasonable within the limits set by its fictional genre. If the story were completely 
unpredictable so that we could not accept it as “reasonable”, at least in its own 
terms, it would, surely, cease to interest us.
Even our construction of the actual world is probably not consistent. We believe 
many things, as I have already suggested, that are contradictory. The same kinds 
of problems arise for modal realism. Lewis recognises that stories may contain 
inconsistencies and he attempts to solve this problem by carving the stories up. 
Lewis recognises that some stories are inconsistent. Yet, for Lewis, all worlds 
must be possible and, therefore so far as he is concerned, consistent. Where a
I must admit to being very sceptical that certain worlds, widely presumed 
to be possible, are, in fact, possible. How would the laws of gravity need 
to change in order for it to be possible for a beetle the size of a man to 
exist; if that were so, then how could other things in that world seem 
normal? I am inclined to think that the Metamorphosis story-world is not 
a possible world. In other words, I am inclined to think that, hidden away 
in the story-world, are serious logical inconsistencies.
Lewis is, of course, concerned with logical possibility. By that, he means 
without logical contradiction, but if a thing is only contingently 
impossible, then it can not be an actual world and, I think, Lewis’ system, 
depending as it does on actuality, must fail for such worlds as well as for 
logically impossible, by which I understand him to mean contradictory, 
worlds.
Being There -164-
story is inconsistent, he suggests that we can simply amend the story in some 
manner. If the story is inconsistent in small ways we could revise it 
“minimally”.224 Failing that, we could divide the story into two (or more) parts 
where each part is consistent within itself.225 If a fiction is impossible (by which 
he means, seriously inconsistent), then Lewis seems to think the case is hopeless. 
There could be no (possible) world where an impossible fiction is told as known 
fact and the truth (for Lewis is concerned with truth in fiction) of anything in it is 
“vacuous”. The techniques that Lewis is proposing to solve his problem with 
story-worlds match the techniques that Goodman used to try and solve his 
problems with actual worlds, but both attempts present similar difficulties. We do 
not want to violate the integrity of a story in this manner. And, if we work with 
the current thesis, we do not need to. If there are lessons to be learnt from 
fictional worlds, those lessons are not an accidental result of combinations such as 
these. Combinatorial worlds are dry and uninteresting when compared with the 
fecundity of Goodmanian worlds. So modal realism and combinatorialism fail to 
account for stories or the ways in which we make actual worlds.
A further benefit claimed for modal realism is that it makes sense of 
counterfactuals. To stray into a detailed consideration of counterfactuals here 
would be a large, and unnecessary, digression. I do, however, want to, very 
briefly, indicate how the system described in this thesis can meet that requirement 
at least as well as modal realism (and its variants). A counterfactual, I argue, 
describes a world where the counterf actual situation is so. We will spend only a 
few sentences examining this matter
“If the bough breaks, the baby will fall”, is a prediction and not a counterf actual. 
Either that prediction comes true (the bough breaks and the baby falls) or it fails
Lewis, “Truth in Fiction”, p. 275.
David Lewis, “Postscripts to Truth in Fiction’”, in Philosophical Papers 
vol. 1, 1983, p. 267.
Lewis, “Truth in Fiction”, p. 274.226
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(the bough does not break or it does, but the baby does not fall). We may, as a 
result of the prediction, take the cradle (and baby) out of the tree, to prevent such 
an occurrence. Then the prediction, presumably, fails (the bough does not break, 
or, no longer being in the tree, the baby does not fall). We can never know what 
would have happened had we not taken the baby down. We may say, when the 
baby has been safely rescued, if the bough had broken, the baby would have fallen 
and we would all now be at the hospital casualty department. This latter is a 
counterfactual and amounts to a story about how things might have been different.
So a counterfactual is, simply, a little story about how things might have been. It 
is a story, in this example, of a baby left in a tree (of certain characteristics). In 
the story, the bough breaks, the baby falls and is injured, and we all go to the 
hospital casualty department to obtain medical treatment. Many counterfactuals 
posit worlds that are taken to be almost identical to this world. The example just 
given is like that. But some counterfactual story-worlds may, in fact not even be 
possible. For example, if I had been Rockefeller’s son, I would have been rich, is 
a logical impossibility (I think) for, had I been Rockefeller’s son, I would not have 
been me and, so, the counterfactual would be nonsense if set in a possible world. 
Yet, seen as a story-world, such a counterfactual makes sense and this result 
conforms to commonsense. After all, we are able to give such a counterfactual 
sense or meaning. Many such counterfactuals are assumed to be reflected in some 
sort of possible world, but we can never know. If I say, had Nixon lost the 
election, the Nixon-lost-the-election counterfactual world would be different from 
this (actual) world in, who knows, how many different ways. For example, the 
electoral system may have been very different and those differences would have 
had to arise from a different history etc. A number of voters would have to be 
either dead or otherwise not have voted or additional voters would be required or 
voters would have to have different personalities to vote differently and so forth. 
These sorts of incommensurables disappear under the story-world scenario.
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An account of counterfactuals such as that given here, has a lot in common with 
Dudman’s semantic account.227 Dudman analyses conditionals under grammatical 
categories to describe them as “judgments” or “verdicts” based upon a possible set 
of circumstances. He says that the “speaker conducts a ‘fantasy’ which sets out 
the facts of [the counterfactual claim] and develops continuously”228 to make what 
I would call a counterfactual story.
We have now completed that major part of our investigation into why stories 
make sense. I want to move from this point to a consideration of imagination as 
the means by which we make worlds. I still need to consider the question of how 
stories tell us anything. Why should a visit to an interesting story-world be 
instructive? That question will have to await a further chapter.
The Ontology of Worlds
However, it is fitting, before moving on, to raise once again briefly the question of 
the ontology of worlds, both story and actual. This thesis is about stories and 
story-worlds, rather than ontology. What we need to recognise here is to what 
extent the thesis commits us to any given ontological position. This thesis does 
not argue for any ontology in particular. There are, potentially, two ontological 
questions surrounding our discussion. The first relates to the ontological status of 
art works and to the question: What is an art work? The second, of more 
importance here, is the question of the status of story-worlds.




In this thesis, we have not asked the question what is an art work or what sort of 
thing is an art work? And we will not do so now. It is, however, necessary to note 
that there have been many answers proposed to that question; most writers would,
229include, at least some, stories in the category “art work”. Richard Wollheim 
argues that some works of art, such as paintings and sculptures, are single objects 
(for example, The Hay Wain, is a particular canvass hanging in The National 
Gallery, London) and some, such as novels are not (there are many copies of Pride 
and Prejudice); Nelson Goodman agrees. Roman Ingarden, we will note 
towards the end of this thesis, locates the work with an intentional object of its 
author and not with any particular canvass which is the expression of that 
object. Croce and Collingwood both thought this way too. Gregory Currie 
disputes the necessity of Wollheim's distinction, of singular and plural works, 
often called, following Goodman, allographic and autographic.233 Currie argues 
that a work of art should be seen as an action of the artist. Writing a novel or a 
symphony or painting a picture, then become particular kinds of acts. The work 
results (or may result) from that act.
Our thesis is amenable, or neutral, to many such ideas. It is not necessary to agree 
with any or none of them in this thesis. There is one point that must, however, be 
clarified. This thesis has argued that, at least with a story, the reader makes a 
story-world from the story-text which represents the story-world. Whatever a 
work is, it must be such as to allow this. The authors cited above do allow that 
possibility and this thesis, is neutral to the various ideas proposed by them.
229 Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects 2nd ed. With Six Supplementary 
Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
230 jGoodman, Languages of Art.
231 Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the 
Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature, with an 
Appendix on the Functions of Language in the Theater (transl. George G. 
Grabowicz), Evanston, EL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Currie, An Ontology of Art.
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Ingarden, although favouring the idea that the art work is an intentional object, 
specifically argues, as we do, that the text is open to the interpretation of the 
reader.
What, then, is the ontological status of the story-world. It was to clarify this 
question that the topic of ontology has been raised. Nelson Goodman was, as is 
well known, a nominalist. This thesis is certainly consistent with a nominalist 
stance. It would be possible to argue that the overall state-of-affairs, is all that 
there is and that everything else is made by minds which are, themselves, part of 
that state-of-affairs.234 Such an approach can be ontologically very sparse. It is 
not necessary, however, to go to that ontological extreme; a much richer ontology 
is consistent with the worldmaking approach outlined earlier.
If any existent must be consistent, then story-worlds (and actual worlds as defined 
by any person) may not qualify, for, as we have already observed, story-worlds 
(and, almost certainly, actual worlds) may not be, and often are not, consistent. 
Therefore, we must reject an ontology which places a requirement of actuality, in 
a Lewisian sense, on story-worlds. We have already done this. This means that 
story-worlds must be seen to be objects in the mind of the reader (and/or the 
author) and, thus, to be intentional objects.235 It is a question of psychology as to 
how complete any given-story world must be at any given time. It is not essential 
to say that the whole of the story-world is in the mind (whatever that may mean) at 
one time. We have already observed that such objects have, as does any large 
idea, a wavering kind of existence. We have also referred to Iser’s observation 
that story-worlds are built up over time; we build, we forget, we rebuild, we 
encounter something in the text that reminds us of something we had (half)
Goodman, Languages of Art, p. 113.
That is my own preferred ontology.
We have already argued that these intentional objects are unique to minds 
and, so, the story-world, or actual world, in my mind will be, at least
235
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forgotten, and so forth. This thesis has argued that the story-world made by 
readers from the text will differ and, perhaps differ radically from each other and 
also from that in the mind of the author. If the work is an intentional object in 
someone’s mind, the mind of the author as argued by Wollheim, then the work is 
private because the reader will not recover it (exactly) from the text. I do not have 
a problem with that.
It also follows, similarly, that actual worlds are intentional objects, a point that 
was made earlier.




In this chapter, I will argue that making worlds is an imaginative, synthesising 
activity. To make worlds (either story-worlds or actual worlds) is to use our 
imagination to synthesise that world from the text or from our experience. My 
purpose, in discussing imagination is to establish that imagination is a much more 
pervasive thing than is often supposed and that we use mental techniques that 
(should) pass under this term all the time. My ultimate purpose is to demonstrate 
that the sorts of mental activities that lead to the making of story-worlds are also 
the sorts of mental activities on which we rely to make actual worlds. In both 
cases we synthesise the world in question.
Most people will readily accept that we use our imagination to make a story- 
world. They will certainly accept that the author of a work uses her imagination to 
create the text originally. What may not seem so clear is that imagination is also 
required to make an actual world and also, I will argue, with Kant, to recognise 
things. The level of similarity between the two activities is such that I am 
prepared to argue that we use a common sort of mental activity to carry it out; I 
am calling that sort of mental activity “imagination”. This is, of course, in line 
with the overarching thesis I am arguing: namely, that story-worlds and actual 
worlds are very similar sorts of things. The discussion in this chapter will, thus, 
build on our previous consideration of the similarities between story-worlds and
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actual worlds; the making of both requires the use of our imagination. With this 
discussion, I will consider the major demonstration of this thesis complete.
In his Defence of Poetry, Percy Shelley contrasts reason with imagination. 
Reason, he says, is what we use to break things down and to discover relations 
between things. Imagination, on the other hand, is what we use to synthesise 
things. “Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of 
things.” For Shelley, of course, imagination is, primarily, the poetical faculty. 
But, also for Shelley, poetry is so wide a category as to encompass much that we 
would not usually classify as poetry. Poetry is, says Shelley, “the expression of 
the imagination”237 and includes such imaginative creations as the writings of 
Plato.238
Shelley says that “there is a principle within us ... which harmonises” our 
experience; this harmonisation is what leads to the development of religion and 
art. When we harmonise our experience we, effectively, synthesise a world. To 
do that we use our imagination and it is this role, as the definer of what we are, 
that makes poetry, which is its flowering, and poets the “unacknowledged 
legislators of the world.”240
Shelley was not writing as a philosopher but, to cast Shelley’s Defence into the 
terms we are using, we may say that, for Shelley, we use our imagination to make 
worlds. To “legislate” is to decree what is; that is to say, to make a world. We 
synthesise a world (or part of a world) when we make our actual world and its 
contents. We harmonise that world when we try to make the whole thing “hang
Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1921, p. 23.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid., p. 29.
239 Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 59.240
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together”. We synthesise a world when we read a literary work (or look at a 
painting or listen to a symphony). We harmonise that world when we try to make 
the whole story-world “hang together”. This synthesising and harmonising is a 
function of the imagination. It is imagination that creates an actual world or a 
world of a work of art. I will argue that some philosophers (and, perhaps, 
common usage) limit the functioning of imagination by, for example, treating it as 
something that creates (only) fictions and “day dreams”. It will follow from the 
way we will treat imagination, that imagination is pervasive and that we must use 
our imagination to get through even the smallest daily task. Without imagination, 
we would have no world and no framework within which our experience could be 
gathered and understood. Without imagination we would be powerless to act 
purposively.
It is an act of imagination to make the Pride and Prejudice story-world. It is an act 
of imagination to see the picture, Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur U  Herbe, as a picture 
representing two men and a naked woman picnicking on the grass or to see 
Manet’s Olympia as a naked woman lying on a couch. It is a further act of 
imagination to see the Olympia as being like Titian’s The Venus of Urbino. We 
must use imagination to see a picture in a cloud. We must also use imagination to 
“see” the duck in the duck-rabbit and we must use imagination to see the rabbit in 
the duck-rabbit.241 But, it is also an act of imagination to see a bird in a tree, or 
this dog as the same as the dog we saw yesterday (or as different). For all these 
things require an act of synthesis.
To engage in any purposive activity of even the most trivial kind is an affair of the 
imagination. To purpose something, we must imagine the result we are trying to 
achieve. To make a decision we must consider alternatives before we can choose 
and act. The creation of counterfactual alternatives (worlds), as we discussed 
them at the end of the previous chapter is, clearly, an imaginative activity. To
241 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (transl. G. E. M. 
Anscombe), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997, p. 194.
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decide if a statement (for example, “it is raining”) is true, we must make the world 
implied by the statement (although we do not need to make an elaborate and 
detailed world) and compare that world with our actual world (by glancing out of 
the window, we check the state of our world). This also is an imaginative activity. 
To learn to use language (that is to learn to symbolise) and to learn to interpret 
language (or paintings) is to learn to use imagination.
The significant component in all imaginative acts is the act of synthesising. 
Considered as a synthesising activity, imagination is pervasive in all the activities 
of life. Its use cannot be restricted to just making story-worlds or to operating in 
worlds other than actual worlds. In a recent article Leslie Stevenson called 
imagination an “extremely flexible notion”.242 He identified, without necessarily 
endorsing as legitimate, twelve different concepts for which we use the term 
“imagination”. These concepts range from “[t]he ability to think of something 
that is not presently perceived, but is ... real”243 through “[t]he ability to think of 
whatever one acknowledges as possible”244 and “[t]he ability to form beliefs ... 
about public objects”245 to “the ability to create works of art”.246 One could argue 
that each of each of Stevenson’s twelve concepts is a different use of the term and 
merits a word of its own. Perhaps, but I am suggesting that the twelve all have 
something in common: synthesising. I want to argue that, basically, imagination is 
a synthesising activity and that we use it for making worlds. If someone uses a 
more restrictive definition (as, we will see, does Sartre), that does not invalidate 
the argument put here. What we call it, of course, is not important, what is 
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Imagination as Imaging
The word “imagination” itself derives from the word used for “image” and, for 
many people, the term “imagination” describes the ability to conjure up, or make, 
mental images. I am not saying what a “mental image” is; I am unable to do that. 
Despite this difficulty, “mental image” is a well understood term. “Imagine you 
are at the seaside,” we say. We conjure up an image of a beach with sand, the 
ocean and other concepts related to the beach. We might imagine sea shells and 
sea gulls. We might picture a windy day or brilliant sunshine. We might imagine 
ourselves surfing. We might smell the salty sea smell. In fact, as we start to 
imagine, if we allow our reverie sufficient time and space to develop, we can 
synthesise quite a considerable “scene”. Often this scene is a recreation of 
something we have seen or is a creation constructed from bits of experience 
synthesised into the “scene” we are imagining. We add some sea birds to the 
overall “picture”. They will be birds we have seen or they may be some sort of 
idealised birds; they may be clearly imaged or only vaguely imaged, but they may 
be added to the “picture” in any fashion that suits our fancy. We may picture them 
on the rocks picking at sea snails or wheeling in the sky. If we were a painter, we 
might decide to paint the scene. This is certainly an important and common use of 
the term “imagination”. But, as we have already noted, it is not the only way the 
term can be used.
If imagination is restricted to picturing then we would have to say that paintings 
may be imaginative, but poems are not. This is, most of us would agree, an 
unacceptable conclusion (although there are, of course, poems that we would 
happily describe as unimaginative). We can imagine more than pictures.
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“Imagine the smell of roast lamb for lunch on Sunday when we were kids,” we 
say. We can easily do that!
Much of our mental activity is language based. As the picture fades, we are still 
able to describe (in words) or speak about how it was, but have only a very 
indistinct image. Mental images are often vague (although thought can often 
sharpen them). White argues that imagination does more than imaging, since 
much of what we imagine is “non-sensory”.247 Singer reports experimental, 
psychological evidence as supporting this conclusion. The sea “scene” 
described above may be partly pictorial but it may consist of other sensual 
components: the smell of the sea, the tingle of the cold water, the exhilaration of 
riding the waves. It may consist of a purely verbal description encompassing the 
sorts of things we associate with such a location.
I do not want to suggest that imagination may not utilise our imaging capability. 
Of course, it often does. However, for many writers, this aspect of imagination 
exhausts the topic, thus limiting themselves to only one aspect of Stevenson’s list. 
Sartre talks as if imagination is solely a picture constructing mechanism. But, he 
goes even further and adds the requirement that the thing imagined be not-there 
(either because it does not exist and, so, could not be present, or because it 
happens to be somewhere else). For Sartre, imagination conjures up an image of 
an object which is not present. It is, for Sartre, the lack of the presence of the 
imagined scene or object that makes that scene or object imagined. If we actually 
look at Peter and recognise him as Peter, this is not, for Sartre, imagination. Even 
if we look at a tree when it is dusk and think: “Ah! Here is Peter” but are 
mistaken, this is not imagination at work. Sartre calls this a false judgment for, he
Alan R White, The Language of Imagination, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990, p. 89.
Jerome L Singer, Daydreaming and Fantasy, London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1976, p. 10.
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tells us (rightly, I think) that, “perceiving is judging.”249 But before we can make 
Sartre’s judgment, we must make the object about which we are to judge. We see 
the tree in the gloom; we make a “picture” of Peter, we see the shadows and the 
tree limbs in a certain manner; we then say “Ah! Here is Peter.” But, since we 
made the “picture” wrongly, it is not Peter, after all. But we have still made the 
picture, that is to say, we have still had to imagine Peter to recognise him, either 
truly or wrongly.
Sartre’s opinion seems, at first blush, to coincide with common usage. We do 
(often) imagine things as pictures and we often imagine things which are absent 
(daydreaming is a species of imagination). And we often use the term 
“imagination” with this implication. We say “you are only imagining it” to mean 
that something is not there or is not as we judged it to be. But we also commonly 
attribute what Sartre calls false judgment to imagination, for we say “you only 
imagined it was Peter,” when we mistake a tree for him. I agree that to make a 
“picture” of someone who is not there (either because he or it is absent from sight 
or because the thing does not exist) is an exercise (at least, in part) of the 
imagination (that is one of Stevenson’s twelve concepts).
But, as we have seen, we often use the term without limiting it in the way that 
Sartre does. Our “common” use of the term is more complex than Sartre’s simple 
formula will allow; his view is altogether too restricted. Imagination is required to 
recognise both what is absent and what is present. Imagination operates not only 
with images but also with language and other senses. The claim I am making is 
that we use imagination to carry out that activity, we have labelled worldmaking. 
Further, I will argue that we use imagination to make both story-worlds and actual 
worlds as described earlier in this thesis. Imagination is, thus, pervasive. To 
define imagination the way Sartre does is to gloss the similarities in favour of one
249 Jean-Paul Sartre, Imagination: A Psychological Critique (transl. Forest 
Williams), Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1962, p. 
120.
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characteristic that appertains to some (but not all) imaginative activity and to 
ignore the wide variety of activities that engage the imagination.
We hear a creak in the quiet of the night and imagine all sorts of possibilities: a 
burglar, a possum, just the house contracting in the cool evening. From this small 
sound, we can imagine whole (counterfactual) worlds. We can always synthesise 
(that is, imagine) many different worlds from any collection of sense experiences. 
We may consider the set of possibilities we have imagined, and make a judgment 
about what did cause the creak. One of these imagined possibilities may turn out 
to reflect the actual state of affairs (or none may). If it is, say, a possum causing 
the noise, have we imagined that? The mental (world making) process through 
which we worked to produce the world where the possum is making the noise is of 
just the same sort as that through which we worked to make the burglar-world. 
The only difference is that the possum is there (in Sartre’s terms) and the burglar 
is not-there.
We engage in these (imaginative) exercises in response to some external stimulus 
(namely, the sound). We could obtain additional information (for example, we 
could get up and investigate, hoping to have further, relevant perceptual 
experiences). Earlier, I called that kind of action an experiment. This might allow 
us to better build the worlds of the creak. Of course, we can never amass 
sufficient experiences to be certain of anything. Even if we get up and see a 
possum, it is still possible that the creak was caused by a burglar. We can never 
know, in Sartre's terms, if we have made a right or a false judgment.
Further, if it was a possum, there is no difference in the activity which imagined 
the burglar and the activity which heard the possum, for the mental processes are 
similar. Both are, I claim, exercises in imagination. We can take those exercises 
as far as we wish. I could say to myself or to a companion: “Hear that noise, let’s 
imagine it is a burglar. We shall be attacked, tied up and robbed.” This, also, 
would be an imaginative reaction to the creak, for the prior behaviour is the same
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in both the case where we imagine a possum and the case where we imagine the 
robber. If, post hoc, it is not a robber or it is a robber, that does not alter the 
earlier imaginative reaction. So, from some (limited) experience (namely, the 
hearing of a sound in the night) we spin out a series of (possible) worlds. One of 
these may be (or become) the actual state-of-affairs.
My claim is that all of these activities are exercises in imagination. There is no 
significant difference in the acts that create these different worlds. One of them 
may turn out to be the actual state-of-affairs (and that is, post hoc, a very different 
thing) from the other (counterfactual) possibilities.
I have already said that to act purposively entails an act of imagination. To act 
purposively, we must imagine a possibility (a counterfactual world) and then we 
must reason out a way of bringing that counterfactual world into actual existence. 
If our reasoning is correct and our actions sufficiently resolute (that is, in 
conformity with our reasoned “plan of action”) we should succeed. Worms do not 
have purposes for they have no imagination (or so I imagine).
There is the word again: I “imagine” worms have no imagination. Here I am not 
using the term for something that is absent but to suggest how things are. We 
often respond to a question “what did he mean?” with “I imagine ...” and present a 
rephrasing of the words to provide our understanding of what was said. Against 
this it could be argued that such locutions are merely fagons de parier. I think 
they represent ways of imagining and fall squarely into the continuum of activities 
that involves the synthesising of worlds (again, such uses are in Stevenson’s list). 
When we hear the creak, we synthesise alternative worlds or ways the actual world 
is or might be. We say “I imagine ...” to indicate a degree of uncertainty. But we 
can never be certain, for there is always the possibility (even if it is remote) that 
we are wrong. We take some things as known (that we will fall if we jump out a 
window, for example) but we cannot know that; we imagine it to be so. At some 
point on the continuum from doubt to certainty, we no longer admit to being
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uncertain and we cease to say “I imagine ... .” But it is clear that we are using the 
same synthesising ability in all cases.
Immanuel Kant saw imagination as a comprehensive synthesising capability; it is 
this synthesising ability which is the pre-eminent mark of imagination. Kant calls 
imagination a “faculty”, but we need not infer that it is, therefore, an organon of 
the mind and, if Kant thought so, we do not need to follow him in that. What is 
important to all the examples of imagination that we have singled out is the 
synthesising capability that we possess. We use this capability, Kant argues, to 
understand the most basic aspects of our lives.
For Kant, the imagination operates in, what he calls a productive mode to make 
the manifold of time and space a priori; it is in this spatio-temporal manifold
that we locate things. Imagination also operates reproductively to make (or 
remake familiar) objects. To do that the imagination must hold together concepts 
and appearances of things and bring them together to make the objects and the 
other products of our senses. Imagination allows us to recognise an object as, say, 
a dog, and furthermore, to recognise this dog as the same as the dog we saw 
yesterday. For Kant imagination is, effectively, the synthesising capability upon 
which his whole philosophy depends. “Synthesis ... is”, he says, “the mere result 
of the power of imagination.” and synthesis is “the act of putting different 
representations together”.253
Kant, as we have noticed, distinguishes different modes of operation of 
imagination. The productive mode spins out our view of the manifold as existing 
in space-time, and the reproductive mode, operates to make objects within that
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (transl. Norman Kemp Smith), 
London: Macmillan, 1990, A123.
Ibid., A ll .
Ibid., A78,B 103.
Ibid., A77,B 103.
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manifold. We need not be concerned with such questions. Neither need we 
concern ourselves with Kant’s distinctions of synthetic and a priori. It is 
sufficient, for us, to recognise the operation of the imagination and to recognise its 
importance in the way we make worlds. What is important here is to note that 
Kant saw imagination as the animating principle of thought. It is imagination, he 
tells us, that allows us to synthesise the world from our experience. But, it is also 
imagination that leads to poetic creation. It is imagination, Kant says, which 
allows us to synthesise things from our perceptions.254 Mary Wamock 
summarises Kant’s opinion thus:
[I]n Kant, the imagination is the very same image-making 
faculty which works in the depths of our minds to enable us to 
recognise objects in the world, and link the concepts of them to 
our actual experience.25̂
When it comes to the arts, we use our imagination to create the artistic object. We 
use our imagination to see the flattened plane of a painting as representing 
something — a person with a dog. However, our imagination is constrained in art 
by our judgment; were it not so, artistic creations would be simply free flights of 
fancy. Imagination is the source of poetic fancy. “Poetry,” Kant said, “expands 
the mind by giving freedom to the imagination.” Imagination “gives life to 
[the] concepts” of poetry.257 Yet, for Kant, imagination is more than just that 
which gives rise to artistic fancy; imagination is an essential tool to the mental 
life; poetry is imagination’s freest expression, but it is only one way in which the 
imagination expresses itself.
Thus, we can see that Kant uses the term “imagination” in a manner that is close 
to the way Shelley and I are using the term. I wish, now, to turn to the imaginative
Ibid., A78;. B152.
Mary Wamock, Imagination, London: Faber and Faber, 1976, p. 55.
Immanuel. Kant, Critique of Judgment (transl. James Creed Meredith), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, pl91, (no. 53).
Ibid., p. 185, (no. 51).257
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activity of interpretation of works of art and literature in particular. I will, in the 
process, examine a couple of well known theories of imaginative use of texts.
Imagination and Texts
We have previously considered, very briefly, some of the claims that Kendall 
Walton makes in his book, Mimesis as Make-Believe, and his discussion of the 
role of imagination in fiction; we did this when we were considering emotional 
responses to a story and Walton’s claim that such responses are “pseudo”. In his 
book, Walton presents a number of examples of imagination (or make-believe). 
He talks about, in some game, imagining that every stump is a bear. This game 
can be played with any number of players. The stumps act as “props”258 in the 
game of make-believe, that is, the game where the players imagine that every 
stump is a bear.
He also talks about the game of imagining we are in a rocket ship to Saturn. In 
this case, we play the game together, yet what is going on in each player’s mind is 
(almost certainly) very different. One person may imagine a control system with 
dials, indicators, levers and flashing lights; another may imagine stars flashing 
past (even though that is an impossibility, it would still count as imagining being 
on a rocket to Saturn). Some people might have a mental image (perhaps of the 
sort just described), some might not have an image at all. Yet we would agree that 
they were imagining the same thing (namely, a trip to Saturn). We would 
probably also assent to the suggestion that they were sharing an experience, 
namely, the experience of imagining they were on a rocket ship to Saturn.
258 Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 43.
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Walton says that fiction can be defined in terms of imagination. For Walton, a 
fiction is a work which is a prop in a game of make-believe. “[T]o be fictional is, 
at bottom, to possess the function of serving as a prop in games of make- 
believe.”259 Reading a novel is to play the make-believe game. “A work (or a 
passage of a work) with the job of prescribing imaginings is definitely a fiction in 
our sense.”260 It is imagination which produces the make-believe result. 
Imagination is required to play the game of make-believe; it may be that, for 
Walton, imagination has a wider role than just that but, if so, he does not say. 
Walton also, occasionally, talks of fictional worlds, but the major difference 
between Walton’s and our thesis is the question of make-believe and games. For 
Walton a fiction is, essentially, a tool (or, as he calls it, a prop) in a game of make- 
believe; for our thesis, it is a (means of creating a) world. These, it turns out, are 
different activities. For one, Walton is forced back to his “pseudo” emotions, for 
one cannot, he says, have “real” emotions in a game of make-believe, where our 
claim is that one can have real emotions in the face of a tragedy being enacted in a 
story-world.
Walton usually talks of “make-believe” rather than “imagination,” but, as we have 
observed, he seems to use the words “make-believe” and “imagination” 
interchangeably. Elsewhere, for instance, he describes the make-believe game of 
understanding pictures. He says that “the crucial perceptual experience ... is an 
imaginative ... one.” Walton uses the term “make-believe” to provide a 
definition of fiction, but he never provides us with a definition of quite what 
make-believe (or imagination) is (although he does provide a number of 
examples). Walton’s making-believe is roughly equivalent to our story-world 
making. To us the text operates as a story-world maker where, for Walton, it acts
259 Ibid., p. 102.
260 Ibid., p. 92.
Kendall L. Walton, “Depiction, Perception, and Imagination: Responses to
Richard Wollheim”, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60,
(2002), p. 26.
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as a prop in a game of make-believe. To interpret the text is, for us, to make the 
world; to interpret the text is, for Walton, to play the game or to make-believe. 
The player enters the world of bears in playing the game where every stump is a 
bear. As Walton tells us, we can step out of that game. This is true of our world 
making activity also; we can close the book and the story-world is, temporarily at 
least, closed, for us. The play (be it King Lear or the stumpplay) can always be 
stopped.
For Walton, anything that acts as a prop (while it is so doing) is a work of fiction. 
History can be such a prop. We can imagine being on campaign in Gaul with 
Julius Caesar. Walton is very clear that things which are true or in which the 
make-believer also believes are, nevertheless, fictional, when so used. Things that 
function as props are fictions. Walton acknowledges that we can imagine 
something that is “true” and truth, therefore, is not a barrier to something's 
being fictional. We also, have earlier acknowledged that history can act as a 
world maker. To read the history is to make the history story-world. That world, 
if the history is accurate and reliable, will represent our actual world at some 
time(s) and place(s). To understand a work of history, for example, clearly 
requires a very similar act of imagination to that required to understand a fiction. 
On this Walton’s argument and our thesis agree. However, we have suggested 
that fictionality has to do with the nature of the story-world: is it the same as, or 
different from, our actual world? This definition introduces a degree of authorial 
intentionality and, so, accords more with commonsense than does Walton’s since 
Walton’s definition makes “fiction” a shifting category.
Walton argues that the role of the Greek myths was always to serve as a prop in a 
make-believe game.263 Those Greeks who believed these myths would still play 
the game, while believing that the myth represented something about their actual 
world (in its past). Although, he does not say so, this would also be true, in the
262 Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 42.
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sense he means it, of most religious writings and activities. The Bible and 
religious rituals would be props in a game, even where the believer plays such a 
game believing in its truth. The Christian believer is drawn into the game; the 
believer makes-believe he or she stands at the foot of the cross. This kind of 
imagining is central to most religious disciplines. The icon, story, ritual or other 
religious symbol acts as a prop to imaginative religious devotion.
This thesis also accepts that the activity of story-world making takes place in such 
a religious setting, for it is an activity essential to the interpretation of any story. 
However, for us, it is not this which makes the story fictional. Our thesis also 
recognises that it is not possible to read a story without entering into the 
imaginative activity of story-world making, for to fail to make the world is to fail 
to understand the story qua story. Further, this thesis argues that understanding 
the real world and understanding the story are similar activities, where Walton's 
argument entails that they are different and that a text can oscillate between being 
a prop (and, thus a fiction) and being an historical account. I have no reason to 
think that Walton would shy away from this conclusion; it is one that he comes 
close to acknowledging. I am arguing, however, that the distinction is artificial. 
Of course, on our thesis, we can believe something to be fictional and treat it so, 
only to discover that it was (meant to be) a factual account, or vice versa. This 
result seems to concur with commonsense.
I am arguing that everything we do requires imagination. Walton almost concedes 
as much. “We are so deeply immersed in make-believe that it infects even 
theorising itself’,264 he says. However, he says that we need to “extricate 
ourselves enough to be able to see how pervasive it is.” To extricate ourselves 
is, I say, not possible, for to do so would be to extricate ourselves from the process 
of understanding altogether. Imagination is the game we are playing and we are
263
264
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unable to step out of it. But, Walton does not agree with this, for he identifies 
things (committee reports and economics textbooks) which, he says, are not 
fictions;266 these things, I take it, he thinks do not exercise our imagination. 
Therefore, he must contrast imagination (operating in a particular manner to create 
fictions) with whatever we do to understand non-fictional works. He never makes 
such a comparison; that was not his purpose.
For Walton, when we read (a fiction or some other work, qua fiction) we spin out 
an imaginary world (a world of make-believe). “Fictional worlds are associated 
with collections of fictional truths; what is fictional is fictional in a given world — 
the world of a game of make-believe.”267 So, it is true that Elizabeth married 
Darcy in the (fictional) world of Pride and Prejudice. This conforms to the claims 
we made earlier. Walton extends his arguments to cover all representational 
works, including paintings and other non-literary works. These are fictional in his 
sense; we use them as props to the imagination. We have used a small number of 
paintings as examples but we have not considered such works in any detail; 
however, Walton’s conclusions would, if legitimate, also clearly apply under the 
scheme we are using.
Walton argues that his scheme provides an explanation of our behaviour at the 
theatre or the cinema. In a game of make-believe we still get excited and our 
hearts may start to race, but we know the stump-bear will not harm us. We know 
that the world of the fiction and the actual world are two different worlds (I agree 
on that). Therefore, watching a horror film may raise our blood pressure and 
make our hearts race, but we stay in our seats rather than rush from the cinema in 
fear. Neither do we rush onto the stage to save the heroine during a play. 
However anxious we may become, however caught up in the game of make- 
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believe that the green slime destroying the world on the cinema screen will harm 
us; we do not believe the heroine will be killed by the wheels of the train. We do 
not really believe that the stumps are bears. These things are part of the make- 
believe and so, we know, we are safe. Our system also explains these things;268 
the explanation is similar but does not rely, as does Walton’s approach, on the so- 
called “pseudo” nature of the emotions, as we saw earlier.
Roger Scruton offers a different account of imagination. He starts by observing 
that imagination is a species of thought. However, he suggests that imagination is 
thought that is unaccompanied by belief. If we believe something we are prepared 
to assert that something (as true). His first cut at an understanding of imagination 
takes this idea of assertability and defines imagination as thinking that we would 
not be prepared to assert as true. “Imagination”, he says, “is essentially thought 
that is unasserted, while being entertained as ‘appropriate’ to its subject 
matter.”269 When we imagine, we think without asserting. When we think and 
are prepared to assert (either to ourselves or to other people) we are not, according 
to Scruton, imagining. Essentially, a fiction is a story we are not prepared to 
assert (as true) but its contents are appropriate to the subject matter, namely, the 
story.270 “The activity of imagination ... is”, he argues, “essentially contrasted 
with belief.” This is, for Scruton, an important point.
Ibid., p. 69.
We have not overtly discussed the case where every stump is a bear. In 
that case, we are using the stumps and ourselves as actors (it is peculiar in 
that we are acting ourselves or, at least, a surrogate) to make a world, the 
bearstump story-world. The action takes place in this world but the world 
represented by the game is a different world. Of course, should we fall and 
sprain our ankle, that happens in our actual world, just as an interruption to 
a performance of a play interrupts the performance, which is a thing in 
actual worlds.
Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind, 
London: Methuen, 1974, p. 91.
See ibid., p. 99. The reason for entertaining a proposition is to be found in 
the “subject matter and nowhere else.”
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Scruton is anxious, as it appears from later passages in his work, to distance 
himself from views such as that expressed in this thesis that imagination is 
operative in any synthesising operation including the most basic perceptions. He 
is very anxious to draw a distinction between thought and imagination. This 
thesis operates to close that gap, but, otherwise, Scruton’s approach and the 
approach put forward here are readily assimilated. We are not prepared to assert 
that what is true in the world of the fiction is true of our actual world, or, to put it 
in Scruton’s terms, we would not be prepared to assert that it is so of our actual 
world. Scruton is concerned with a definition that attempts to separate an 
imaginative activity, such as seeing a painting as “sad”, with one which does not 
take an aesthetic stance such as this. But, that is simply definition. Scruton 
admits that it is difficult to draw a distinction between imaginative activity and 
similar activity which is not imaginative, for he concedes that “[i]t may indeed be 
difficult to define the vanishing point of imagination where literal-mindedness sets 
in.”272
Nevertheless, Scruton’s approach has much to say of benefit to this thesis. He is, 
in fact, recognising the common ground of our response to stories; for him the 
difference seems to be in assertability, where, for us, that is not a problem; the 
question, as we have considered it, lies with the world about which assertions are 
made. Some beliefs we hold lightly; perhaps we would be prepared to assert 
“maybe”, and some we would have to say “not sure”. Scruton is not clear, but 
perhaps those things that we doubt could be non-assertable. But that does not 
make them a case of imagination (in his terms). For us, there are many sentences 
about our actual world and about any given story-world that we are uncertain 
about but could answer “maybe” without a difficulty.
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Scruton, Art and Imagination, for example, p. 115 where he specifically 
says that sensory experience is not a form of imagination and on p. 120, 
where he specifically distances himself from Kant.
Ibid., p. 99.272
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Yet Scruton agrees that imagination is a species of thinking and this, alone, moves 
a story into the realm of the understandable. Imagination is central to the way in 
which human beings think and understand their world. It is not that fiction (or 
literature) alone is an affair of the imagination. Everything is. We can imagine 
the impossible. Counterfactual thinking requires, as our earlier discussion 
implies, an act of imagination; we must synthesise the alternative world that is the 
subject of the counterfactual. That world may be possible or impossible and we 
can not be sure which. To understand a simple statement requires a supposedly 
simpler imaginative act than to understand a complex literary work. Since we are 
much practised at “reading” the actual world, we are able to perform the 
imaginative act required to interpret that world or, at least, many of the states-of- 
affairs that comprise that world, with ease. We do it so easily that we fail to 
recognise just what an imaginative, creative act it is. All thought and 
understanding requires an imaginative act and not just the understanding of 
fiction. This brings us back to Shelley and his claim that imagination is the means 
whereby we synthesise.
I have now concluded my general discussion on worlds and world making through 
the activities of symbolisation. In this chapter I have been concerned to show 
what a close relationship obtains between understanding a written text (a story) 
and understanding the world. We use the same mental processes (what is 
popularly called imagination) to make the different sorts of worlds and to integrate 
those worlds. We can, now, clearly see how it is that stories make sense. 
However, we have not really exploited the similarities between story-worlds and 
actual worlds and we have not said anything about learning from stories. Earlier, 
that problem was identified for consideration. In the next chapter, I want to make 
good the promise to shed some light on that problem.
CHAPTER 6
Story-Worlds as Metaphors
When we read a story we make a story-world. When we “read” the world, we 
make an actual world. We do the former when we give the story a meaning (that 
is to say when we attempt to understand the story). We do the latter when we give 
our experience a meaning (that is to say when we attempt to make sense of our 
experience). In each case, the activity of worldmaking is a symbolising activity. 
In the case of the story, we make the story-world from the symbolisation, which is 
the text, by resymbolising it as an interpretation of that text; in the case of the 
world we make our actual world, by symbolising our experience of the world. In 
each case there may not be a unique, right interpretation of the world or of the 
text. We make worlds (either story-worlds or actual worlds) using that 
synthesising ability that we call imagination.
We have seen how this allows us to make sense of stories. We have also seen 
why we react to stories as we do and how that is possible. We noted that the 
major difference between story-worlds and actual worlds is that we live in the 
latter. But story-worlds and actual worlds are, in many ways, similar. So, we 
react to story-worlds in ways that are comparable to, or the same as, the ways we 
react to our actual world. So stories can make sense.
In the introduction to this thesis, I said that I take it for granted that stories do 
more than just make sense. I stated that they can have value and can be important
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to us. Obviously, senseless stories could not have value, for they could not be 
used to make any sort of understandable story-world. However, we have not yet 
shown how stories, which can support the making of such story-worlds can be 
worth reading or have value or can teach us things. Neither have we yet explained 
why people attend the tragedy or read sad stories. Why do people willingly submit 
themselves to the distressing scenes of King Lear or Othello. Having sketched out 
a mechanism as to how we can understand stories, it is now time to turn to this 
further problem.
But, before we launch into these new questions, we should note some of our 
earlier findings. We have previously discussed the possibility of overlap between 
the story-worlds made from fictional stories and actual worlds. I wish to revisit 
this question briefly. I read a story and make the story-world. I take it that the 
story-world is like my actual world (in certain respects). This must always be so, 
for if the story-world were utterly unlike my actual world, the story would be 
incomprehensible to me. It is sometimes argued that we can get information 
(about this world) from stories. They give us information about places, for 
example, London, historical events, for example, the life and times of Ned Kelly, 
and people, for example, the emperor Claudius. But I have argued previously, that 
this is not so. I have argued earlier that a story gives us no warrant for “facts” 
about an actual world. Any warrant as to “facts” about my actual world must 
come from my actual world. If the author of a fiction tells me things, which are 
not true of my actual world, I have no claim against her on that account. Of 
course, I may take the author’s claims about the story-world as also being accurate 
claims about my actual world. But, if I turn out to be deceived, I have no claim 
against the author of a fictional story on that account.
Conan Doyle’s London is not the London of an actual world, for Sherlock Holmes 
lives in the story-world London (and he lives at 221B Baker Street in that London) 
but there is no such person living in any actual world London. These two places, 
the story-world London and my actual world London, share a common name and,
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no doubt, many characteristics: characteristics such as being cold and foggy, 
having a river called the Thames and so forth. In general terms, we have a warrant 
for supposing “facts” about the story-world London but not the reverse. The 
warrant for the story-world London goes only so far and that warrant arises from 
“facts” about our actual world London. Statements in the story (for example to 
the effect that there is a dwelling at 22IB Baker Street) defeat any presuppositions 
about the story-world London that arise from my understanding of my actual 
world London. Nevertheless, the warrant comes from an unstated agreement used 
by authors (but occasionally broken for effect).273 But that warrant goes in a 
single direction.
If we want to know about the climate of London, we would do better to consult a 
weather report than Conan Doyle. If stories teach us things, it must be in ways 
other than this.
Secondly, we can note that it is often argued that stories have entertainment value. 
I do not wish to dispute that. Stories are often very entertaining. There are many 
stories which are (almost entirely) exhausted by their entertainment value. Stories 
such as adventure stories are written and read for escapism. We often want to read 
a story that is easy to read and will carry us along with the action. I will contend 
in the next chapter that many romances (as well as adventure stories) fall into this 
category. Most, probably all, stories have some entertainment value, for who 
would read them if they had none? But, entertainment is not incompatible with 
some further value.
Collingwood talks of amusement as separate from art and life. By amusement he 
means what I am calling entertainment. Collingwood says that amusement is 
enjoyable “because there is a watertight bulkhead between its world and the world
273 For example in Offenbach’s operetta, Orpheus in the Underworld.
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of common affairs.”274 He suggests that a work, considered as an entertainment,
??275discharges its total emotional content “within this watertight compartment.” 
There is no residuum remaining from a work, considered as an entertainment. A 
work (if there is one) that had only entertainment value would be pure escapism. 
Collingwood was principally concerned with questions that are not within the 
scope of this thesis,276 yet it is clear that he is right (on this point): entertainment 
alone, is not sufficient to explain how a work can have any didactic value. But 
escapism and entertainment may well explain why certain stories are popular. 
This is not to say that there is no value in reading such stories. Obviously there is; 
to escape for a time, may be immensely valuable, but it would be, as we will see, 
an unusual story that could offer nothing at all beyond that.
As we have said, there is no need to eschew entertainment as a value in reading. 
Many stories are written and read primarily for entertainment and escapism. We 
will consider this further in our next, and final, chapter. In this chapter, however, 
we want to identify a mechanism that will explain why we think stories can teach 
us about this world. To do that, I want to turn to a consideration of metaphor. We 
will do this by way of Paul Ricoeur’s book, The Rule of Metaphor. It may seem, 
initially, that we have lost our way and diverted into some sort of byway. But, by 
the time we have finished this investigation, we will have shown how stories can 
have a didactic value, in addition to making sense. We will see why stories may 
be important.
R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p. 78.
He was primarily concerned with the question “what is art?”
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Metaphor
It is impossible to do a book of the scope and breadth of Ricoeur’s work justice 
here. I will, however, attempt to follow the major thread of his argument and to 
set out his major conclusions, so that we can relate them to our current problem. 
In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur traces the development of philosophical 
thinking about metaphor from Aristotle through to more recent work. In the 
process of doing so, he puts forward his own analysis of metaphor and how it 
operates. He makes great claims for the power of metaphor.
Ricoeur commences his discussion with Aristotle. Aristotle, he says, “defined 
metaphor for the entire subsequent history of Western thought.” Aristotle said 
of metaphor that it is the “application of a noun which properly applies to 
something else.”278 While Aristotle considered a good metaphor to be the sign of 
a great rhetorical style, Ricoeur argues that the discussion of metaphor that 
(usually) flows from Aristotle’s consideration is based upon the word. Metaphor 
becomes a verbal trick and is merely a rhetorical “ornament” having a 
“decorative” function. Aristotle is not in error in doing this, says Ricoeur, but 
he then argues that metaphor is more extensive than Aristotle's analysis admits. 
His own discussion widens the notion of metaphor to take in sentences, then 
complete works and, eventually, complete oeuvres.
Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies in the 
Creation of Meaning in Language (transl. Robert Czerny with Kathleen 
McLaughlin and John Costello), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1977, p. 3.
Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b.
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (transl. H. C. Lawson-Tancred), London: 
Penguin Books, 1991, 1405a8-9.
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 46-47.
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Max Black dubbed Aristotle’s approach to metaphor, a substitution approach. 
Substitution treats metaphor as relating to the word. The author of the metaphor 
has made a substitution of a word. The reader reverses that substitution, replacing 
the substituted word with the correct one to recover the true meaning. Consider a 
simple and hackneyed metaphor such as “Richard is a lion”. Substitution treats 
the word “lion” as a substitute for “brave”. The substitution is effected and the 
sentence becomes “Richard is brave”. The reader’s attention is momentarily 
arrested while the “puzzle” is solved and then the reader moves on, admiring the 
poetry of the writer’s metaphor. Treated thus, metaphor is merely a stylistic 
device.
Such an understanding of the operation of metaphor is, said Black, rhetorical and 
not philosophically interesting. This limitation led some writers to see 
metaphors as disguised comparisons or similes. Richard is being compared to a 
lion and may exhibit more than one quality. The rhetorical trick, now, is to decide 
which qualities and substitute those for the metaphorical word. A metaphor, thus, 
becomes a shorthand way of saying something a little more complex than the 
simple substitution view would imply.
Ricoeur’s philosophical project is to show, in The Rule of Metaphor, that language 
is itself creative; that it creates the content of what it says.283 Substitution or 
comparison theories of metaphor will not do that trick. A substitution is reversed 
without any linguistic remainder. Ricoeur does not argue that metaphor does not 
operate in this manner, merely that there is, or can be, more to its modus operandi 
than such schemes imply. Ricoeur next considered the writings of I. A. Richards.
Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 31.
Ibid., p. 45.
This thesis of Ricoeur’s follows, of course, from the argument put forward 
in chapter 3.
283
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Richards suggested that metaphor goes well beyond a simple substitution or 
comparison. In fact, Richards saw all language as essentially metaphoric. 
Language cannot be pinned down to the meanings of single words for words do 
not have stable and definite meanings. To think that they have is to be beguiled by 
what he calls the “Proper Meaning Superstition”.284 The Proper Meaning 
Superstition is the belief (beloved, he claimed, of rhetoricians and those who teach 
“proper” writing) that words have certain fixed meanings (preferably only one 
such meaning) of their own. Words, he said, “as they pass from context to 
context, change their meanings; and in many different ways.”“ Furthermore, that 
is their “duty and service.” If they did not do that, we would never be able to 
say so many different and subtle things with the resources (only a few thousand 
words) of language. Further, he observes that “we are extraordinarily skilful” in 
detecting and understanding the constantly shifting pattern. To emphasise this last 
point, Richards says, rightly I believe, that we are very good at detecting new or 
unusual uses of words; we are very skilled at attributing meaning to what is said, 
even if what is said is unexpected or phrased in an unusual manner.
Richards said, of metaphor in particular, that a metaphor consists of two parts or 
two ideas, in the case of our example, Richard and the lion. These two parts, he 
called them the tenor and the vehicle,288 interact to produce the metaphorical 
“truth”. The tenor is the thing being metaphorically described and the vehicle is 
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9RQ“borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts”. This approach to metaphor 
has become known as an interaction approach.290
Max Black took up Richard’s interaction approach in some influential writings on 
metaphor. Black said, using a different terminology, that the metaphor causes us 
to see one thing, which he called the focus, through the frame of the other. The 
metaphor organises our view of Richard; that is to say that the frame acts as a 
lens through which we see the focus. In our example Richard is the focus and 
the lion the frame. Black observes that a metaphor acts both ways. If we come to 
see the lion in Richard, we also come to see Richard in the lion. The more we 
consider the metaphor, the more information we find packed into it.
But not all metaphors are of the form “x is y.” Some metaphors seem to use a 
word which cannot be applied literally to the focus. This is the thrust of 
Beardsley’s article “The Metaphorical Twist”.294 Not all metaphors, Beardsley 
says, compare two things. Metaphors can apply an adjective oddly or describe an 
action in an unusual manner and still be, clearly, a metaphor. For Beardsley, 
metaphoricalness arises from the way language is used; the way language is used 
exhibits what Beardsley called a linguistic twist or, as he said, a metaphorical 
twist. The example of this that Beardsley put forward was “th’inconstant
Z8y Ibid., p. 94.
290 Black's term, Models and Metaphors, p. 38.
291 Ibid., p. 41.
292 Ibid., p. 236.
9Q9 In saying this, I am using the term literal in its common usage sense. I do 
not wish to be read as endorsing the view that there is such a thing as 
literal language in contradistinction to, so called, figurative language.
Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Metaphorical Twist”, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, XXII, (1962), p. 301.
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, line 109.
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The debate between Black and Beardsley led Mooij to look for a wider theory of 
metaphor, a theory that would encompass the metaphors put forward by Beardsley 
as well as those from Richards and Black.296 He proposed a way of looking at 
metaphor that combines three elements: reference to the primary object of the 
metaphor (Richard, the moon), reference to a secondary object (the lion), and 
surprise (inconstant). A metaphor might only exhibit some of these qualities. 
“Richard is a lion” has only a primary and a secondary reference; Mooij classifies 
that as a dualist metaphor (having two of his three elements) while “th’inconstant 
moon” has only a primary reference and is classified as monistic. Having said 
this, Mooij, nevertheless, suggests that dualist comparisons are the more common 
and more interesting form.~ They are the kind of metaphor that will be of most 
interest to us.
Mooij also notes that protagonists from both camps put forward, as exemplary, 
metaphors that are restricted in some way but support their particular claims. A 
metaphor that exhibits the full range of possibility would be Shakespeare’s 
metaphorical description of time as a beggar in Troilus and Cressida:
“Time hath ... a wallet at his back, Wherein he puts alms for oblivion.” ' This is 
one of Ricoeur’s favourite metaphors.
Davidson, writing after Ricoeur published his work, claims that a metaphor has a 
literal meaning and that meaning is false (for Richard is not a lion).299 This very 
falseness causes the interpreter to look for some way of understanding what the
296 J. J. A. Mooij, A Study of Metaphor: On the Nature of Metaphorical 
Expressions, with Special Reference to Their Reference, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976.
There is another form of trope, which possesses some of the properties of 
metaphor: namely, the obvious statement. “No man is an island” is a good 
example of this form.
9QR Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, Act 3, scene 3, lines 145-146.
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speaker wants us to understand. Davidson’s argument, of course, contradicts 
Richards' basic position, for Davidson’s claims presuppose The Proper Meaning 
Superstition. To Davidson, meanings are (relatively) fixed.
Davidson accuses Richards, Ricoeur and Black (with whom his debate is had) of 
arguing that “a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another 
sense or meaning.”’00 This is its metaphoric meaning. However, none of these 
writers makes such a claim. For Richards, the meaning changes. For Ricoeur, this 
process certainly creates a surplus of meaning, or a new meaning, but not an 
“additional meaning” in the way that Davidson claims. On this debate, it is clear 
that I am siding with Richards; meaning slides and cannot be fixed. Words must 
be allowed to vary their meaning for, otherwise, language would lose its shading 
and words would become precise and unambiguous tools, an outcome that some 
would like. In our quote from Troilus and Cressida, it is not that some words are 
used “literally” and others “metaphorically”. It is that the whole sentence is to be 
understood in a certain manner.
Black, in a reply to Davidson, accused Davidson of “providing no insight into how 
metaphors work and fails to explain why ... metaphor [is] an indispensable 
resource.’001 He suggested that Davidson’s explanation merely treats metaphors 
as “perversely cryptic substitutes for literal similes.”302 However, we cannot 
allow this question to sidetrack our entire discussion, which it could do. We must 
note the point and recognise the implications for our argument. To a large degree, 
the result is not important (we are not pursuing a linguistic argument as such), for 




Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, in Critical Inquiry, 5, (1978), 
pp. 31-47.
Ibid., p. 33.
Max Black, “How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson”, in 
Sheldon Sacks, On Metaphor, 1979, p. 189.
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He prefers to classify that accomplishment, not as part of the meaning of 
metaphor, but as “what they [words] are used to do.”303 He says that meaning and 
use are distinct. The concession that metaphor accomplishes the task that Ricoeur 
sets out to demonstrate will, if allowed, suffice for our purposes.
To return to Ricoeur’s analysis.
Black and Ricoeur consider that metaphor goes much further than simply 
comparing one thing with another or operating as a linguistic device. Substitution 
and comparison approaches to metaphor see metaphor as marshalling an already 
existing connotation. But, everything is like everything else, and everything is 
different from everything else. Metaphor does more than just notice and draw 
attention to similarities; it brings our thoughts to bear on the situation to actually 
create similarities.
For Ricoeur, metaphor “does not merely actualise a potential connotation, it
-J A i A AC
creates it.” Black also says of metaphor that it “creates the similarity.” 
Ricoeur says that language is creative. Richards says that metaphor depends upon 
an “intercourse of thoughts.”306 The ideas or linguistic tokens interact to create 
meaning. Interaction is a, potentially, unending process. The metaphor spreads 
like ripples on a pond. Meaning arises and new meaning can keep on arising; 
there are always new interactions to be found. Neither Richard nor the lion will 
stay the same and, as we reflect upon the metaphor, both the focus and the frame 
continue to change. We see the frame through the focus but we see the focus 
through the frame.
Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, p. 33.
Paul Ricoeur, “Word, Polysemy, Metaphor: Creativity in Language” in 
Mario J Valdes, A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, 1991, p. 
79.
Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 37.
Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p.94.
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Substitution and comparison are not a sufficient explanation for the power of 
metaphor. Richards comments that thought (which he equates, rightly, I believe, 
to language) is essentially sorting/07 This is not the place to attempt to produce a 
theory of mind, but Richards is saying that to recognise and select some 
impressions from the vast amount of data coming into the mind, it is necessary to 
sort those data and to select material to process. In abstracting qualities and types 
(qualities such as white) we must select certain aspects of things. In doing that, 
we tend to think of our intellectualisation of things as the recognition of some 
already existing “primordial abstractness.”308 This is, essentially, the same claim, 
couched in different terms, that we considered in chapter 3. I will argue that 
metaphor allows us to sort (in Richards’ sense) and select the impressions we 
have. This is, effectively, the operation of imagination as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Thus, not all metaphors arise from similarity. Some metaphors 
gain their potency from difference.309
It is not surprising that it is so difficult to get a grasp on metaphor. It is the very 
basis of all our language. “Thought is”, says Richards, “metaphoric.”310 
Metaphor is, he says, language’s “constitutive form.”311 We are always comparing 
and sorting, noting or looking for differences and similarities. The operation of 
our minds is metaphoric in Richards’ sense. We must balance our thinking 
against what we see; we must see the world through the focus of our linguistic 
resources and we must see our linguistic resources through the focus of the world.
We have already noted that metaphor is a common, indeed essential, part of our 
speech. Black himself uses metaphor to describe metaphor; I think that is 
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new, and, therefore, metaphoric, ways. As well as focus and frame, he talks about 
the metaphor as a “filter” or a “lens” and as “organising” the way we see 
things. Richards, with his “tenor” and “vehicle” terminology does the same. This 
leads Richards to claim that “metaphor is the omnipresent principle of 
language.”315
A metaphor does not revolve around just words. Its operation is, rather, a function 
of larger units of discourse. A change in either the focus or the frame produces a 
different metaphor. Use of what most people would call the same metaphor, in 
different contexts, can produce very different meanings. The discourse 
surrounding a metaphor is also part of the frame because it creates the overall 
setting of the metaphor. For example, Black suggests that, in a text about wolves, 
the metaphor “man is a wolf’ will, itself, be framed by the remainder of the 
discourse. What we learn about wolves in that discourse will influence our 
understanding of the part of the text that we usually call the metaphor. If we 
change the frame (in this wider sense), we change the metaphor.316
Similarly, the metaphor will work differently for different foci. The metaphor of 
Richard and the lion, applied to Richard I of England in an historical work, would 
be different from the “same” metaphor in some other work. It would be different 
applied to some one else. It would also be different appearing in a novel set in 
Africa and different again in a treatise on nature. We cannot expect to replace the 
“metaphorical” part of a discourse with a regular substitute to recover the real 
meaning. Sometimes the metaphor seen in isolation is just a puzzle; it may even
Ibid., p. 90.
Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 39.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid., p. 41.
315 Richards, The Philosophy o f Rhetoric, p. 92.
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mislead. A complete discourse or a “whole poem [may be] needed for the mind to 
invent or find a meaning.”317
Black puts it as follows. In discussing the metaphor: “man is a wolf’ he says that
o i o
the wolf-metaphor “organises our view of man.” Indeed, Black says it is not 
even important that our ideas or knowledge of a wolf be accurate for the metaphor 
to work, merely that they should be “readily and freely evoked.”319 A metaphor 
may not transport from one society to another because the ideas associated with 
the frame may be different in different societies. Black does not give an example 
of what he is thinking of here, but his “man is a wolf’ metaphor would surely 
convey different meanings to an Australian and an Inuit. “A memorable 
metaphor”, says Black, “has the power to bring two separate domains into 
cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one 
as a lens for seeing the other.”320
Consider the following lines from Shakespeare, mentioned earlier: “Time hath my
1
lord,” says Ulysses, “a wallet at his back, Wherein he puts alms for oblivion.” 
Ricoeur says that this sophisticated metaphor “opens [meaning] towards a 
dimension of reality that does not coincide with what ordinary language envisages 
under the name of natural reality” while still being “faithful to the profoundly 
human reality of time.”322 Much of the power of Shakespeare’s lines arises from 
the lack of similarities between time and a beggar. As we ponder the metaphor, it 
produces more meaning (or more shades of nuance). In this example, the 
interaction of apparently very different things produces a powerful metaphor.
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 82.
318 Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 41.
319 Ibid., p. 40.
320 Ibid., p. 236.
Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, Act 3, scene 3, lines 145-146. 
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 211.
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This power of metaphor to cause things to interact is how language operates to 
create meaning. Nietzsche put the operation of language as metaphor thus:
we believe that we know something about the things themselves 
when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we 
possess nothing but metaphors for things — metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities.
This is, of course, to argue, as we have with Goodman, that language (or, more 
generally, symbolisation) is the tool we use to make worlds. The way we use 
language to make worlds is, for Ricoeur, language’s basic metaphoricity. To 
change the way we have discussed world making and align it with Black’s 
terminology we can say that we learn to see the world through the lens of language 
and the demands of the language system; we interpret any given statement under 
the terms given within the system. We must learn how to see things, we must 
learn to see them in some manner; we have no option. The interaction of language 
and the world is not a simple one-way street but a dialectic where we come to 
reflect our experience of the world in our language, and come to see the world in 
terms of the language we use to describe it. Language and the world form the 
focus and frame of the whole language system. As I have already argued, by 
providing us with a means of describing the world we learn to see the world in just 
the manner that language requires. So, language operates as a metaphor for how 
things are.
Paul Ricoeur provides us with a subtle analysis of (metaphoric) language, an 
analysis where metaphoricity spreads from the word with Aristotle to the whole of 
a discourse. The meaning of the term “metaphor” has become more and more 
encompassing as we consider the ways in which language works. Language is 
metaphoric to the core. Haack comments that, if we are not careful, we run the
323 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, in Daniel 
Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, 1979, p. 83.
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324risk of allowing the term metaphor to mean so much that it means nothing. 
Maybe so. But, if all language is metaphoric, then the term encompasses more 
than the rhetoricians use it for. It may still be possible for rhetoricians, as opposed 
to philosophers, to restrict the term’s use, for certain purposes. But such a 
restriction is, we can see, arbitrary and not philosophically adequate.
Black still does not think that his account is complete, for he tells us that a full 
description of the operation of metaphor “remains tantalisingly elusive”. We 
lack, he says, “an adequate account of metaphorical thought.”326 This should not 
surprise us, for an adequate account of metaphorical thought would be an adequate 
account of the full functioning of language. That may, forever, escape us ,and is 
certainly beyond the scope of this thesis.
Story-Worlds as Metaphors
We have several ideas at work here. The first is the idea that a metaphor causes 
things to interact. The second is the idea that all language is metaphoric and that 
metaphor spreads to encompass complete discussions and all language. The third 
is the idea that metaphor teaches us things and creates (new) meaning. We give 
the metaphor meaning. For Ricoeur, the more one considers metaphor, the wider 
is its compass. These ideas build on and extend our discussion of world making. 
Language extends its power to make meaning and to make worlds.
Susan Haack, “Surprising Noises: Rorty and Hesse on Metaphor”, in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88, (1987), p. 181.
Black, “How Metaphors Work”, p. 192.
Ibid.326
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To build on these ideas, Ricoeur takes up the idea that stories are, themselves, 
metaphors. Roman Jakobson tells us that poetry has a referential function as well 
as a poetic function. This is what makes poetry ambiguous. He says that “the 
double-sensed message finds correspondence in a ... split reference.”327 This split 
reference is, he claims, “cogently exposed in the preambles to fairy tales.” We 
say, “once upon a time.” Jakobson tells us that the Majorcan’s say, “‘Aixo era y 
no era”’ (It was and it was not).”329 Even “once upon a time” seems to set the 
story everywhere and nowhere. There is a sense in which Davidson is right. A 
metaphor says something which, considered in a certain way, is false. Juliet is not 
the sun. But it also says something which, considered in a different way, is true. 
Juliet is, indeed, the sun. So, a story (text) refers to the story-world (in a literal 
manner). But the story-world, taken as a whole, can be treated as a metaphor for 
how things are, in an actual world. In a sense, it can be said of any metaphor, and, 
thus, of a complete story, that things are so, but are not so.
Ricoeur tells us that reference can be construed as relating to words but, at a 
second level, reference is a function of “entities that are larger than the 
sentence.”330 At this wider level we can be looking at complete works (or even 
larger entities, such as complete oeuvres) to identify the reference. We will limit 
this discussion to complete works (texts), and to stories in particular.
Ricoeur says, of texts, that a “text is a complex entity of discourse whose
331characteristics do not reduce to those of the unit of discourse, or the sentence.”





Roman Jakobson, “Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics”, in 
Thomas Sebeok, Style in Language, p. 371.
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components. Discourse exhibits that quality we call synergy; the effect of the 
totality of a discourse is created by the sum of its parts (namely, words) but it is 
not exhausted by those components. A text is greater than that. This is so of even 
the most humble discourse and is so with a story. The complete text allows us to 
make the story-world. So, if the complete text is metaphoric, what is the focus 
and what the frame?
At one level, the focus is the story-world and the action contained therein. That is, 
clearly, what the reader concentrates on. That is what we get excited about and 
why we cry for Anna. We read the story to see what will happen; we are unable to 
put the book down. But, with many works, we put the book down when we have 
finished reading, but the story continues to reverberate with us for some time, 
often measured in years or even lifetimes. We are doing more than allowing the 
story to make its world, we are, I will argue, applying that world, metaphorically, 
to this, our actual world. I have already argued that the text is a mimetic artefact 
and that it represents. It represents the story-world. But we are now in a position 
to take our analysis to another level and suggest that the story-world is itself the 
frame within which we focus on our actual world. That is Jakobson’s split 
reference. That is the “Aixo era y no era.” Poetry, Jakobson says, refers to this 
world, but ambiguously so.333 Just as it is not unambiguous exactly why “Juliet is 
the sun”, neither is the metaphoric meaning of the story-world unambiguous. If it 
were, it would be possible to rephrase the metaphor (that is the story) without 
remainder. Further, it is, says Ricoeur, “fruitless ... to look for something to 
justify the metaphorical application of a predicate.”334 He says that if we ascribe 
the predicate “sad” to a picture, we do so metaphorically. What grounds can we 
adduce to justify that ascription of that predicate? Yet, we see that the particular
Many things are synergistic: computer systems, the mind, collections of 
cells to make living organisms and so on.
Jakobson, “Closing Statement, p. 371.
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 236.
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ascription is right (or, we may say that it is not). The making of metaphor is a 
creative use of language.
Before completing this part of our discussion, we will follow Ricoeur as he makes 
an unexpected detour through Max Black’s discussion of (scientific) models. 
Black identifies three sorts of model. The first sort is the scale model: a model 
such as a model of the Queen Mary or of an insect (made larger). His next sort is 
an analogue model where the model “reproduce^] as faithfully as possible ... the 
structure or web of relationships in an original.”335 There is a mapping between 
the analogue model and the thing or process being modelled. A mathematical 
system is a good example of such a model. At the third level, Black identifies 
what he calls theoretical models. These he describes more by way of example 
than anything else. Electrical fields may be discussed as if they were rubber bands 
or a description of something, called ether, may be provided. Such models allow 
conclusions to be drawn and tested, but they are, essentially, no more than ways of 
talking about the matter and its attendant problems. They allow the user of the 
model to observe new connections and to derive new knowledge from the 
application of the model to problems at hand. Such models, Black contends, 
function like metaphors. In Ricoeur’s terms, following Mary Hesse, such a 
model, like a metaphor, is a “redescription”338 and functions, by this redescription, 
to reveal new truths.
No paraphrase of the situation can yield (quite) the same result. Models are, or 
may be, elaborate and have ramifications spreading a considerable distance. 
Further, Ricoeur points out, following Black, that only some things in the model
Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 222.
336 Ibid., p. 236.
Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in , Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1970.
Ricoeur, The Rule o f Metaphor, p. 242.
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are pertinent to its use for scientific purposes.339 It is important to grasp those 
aspects of the model and to ignore possible false leads arising from details that 
turn out to be irrelevant. Ricoeur quotes Black: “The heart of the matter consists 
in talking in a certain way.”340 The model is not simply a statement but a complex 
of ideas that are brought to bear on the phenomenon under investigation. We 
should note that the model redescribes the reality to which it refers (it may become 
part of how we see the world, which is to say, it may become part of our actual 
world). Black quotes scientific writers, Duhem and Braithwaite, for example,341 
who see such models as no more than a crutch for feeble minds, in the case of 
Duhem, or as a convenience but one not to be confused with the reality it models. 
There is, these physicists claim, a risk that the model will be projected as the thing 
modelled rather than as just a model. It might be argued that ether, the atomic 
model of the atom, or the idea of the soul, have done just that.
This brings Ricoeur back to Jakobson and the claim that a poem is about this 
world. We can now propose a method by which a story may function to tell us 
about this world and to do so in a powerful way. The story-world is, or may be, a 
metaphor for our actual world. Goodman says much the same:
Fiction ... whether written or painted or acted, applies truly 
neither to nothing nor to diaphanous possible worlds but, albeit 
metaphorically, to actual worlds.342
“Cervantes and Bosch and Goya”, he says, “... take and unmake and remake and 
retake familiar worlds, recasting them in remarkable and sometimes recondite but 
eventually recognizable ... ways.”343 Goodman, however, insists that fictions are 
not true. He says that “[although all fiction is literally false, some is
Ibid., p. 241.
Black, p. 229, quoted in Ricoeur, p. 241. 
Black, Models and Metaphors, pp. 233-236. 
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, p. 104. 
Ibid., pp. 104-105.343
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metaphorically true.”344 This last claim of Goodman’s sails very close to the 
claims made by Davidson; we do not wish to follow him there and we are not 
suggesting that fiction is “false”.
So stories tell us things. We should now recognise some of the things we have 
noted about metaphors. They do not tell us things from a point of no knowledge 
but, rather, from a perspective of knowing something. A metaphor brings 
recognition. We read a story and we recognise that is how things are. We cannot 
apply the “facts” in the story to our actual world but we recognise how things are 
just the same. We cannot simply apply the “facts” about the sun to Juliet; yet, 
Juliet still is the sun; certain things about the sun are not relevant to Juliet. The 
sun is approximately 150 million kilometres distant from the Earth; we cannot say 
that Juliet is 150 million kilometres distant from the Earth. Yet, she may be very 
distant; Romeo may consider that she is unattainably distant. The metaphor 
operates to produce new knowledge on an ever-widening basis. The more we 
think about the metaphor, the more we recognise; we recognise that Juliet is 
distant. We go to see a play and we can ponder on its “meaning” for a very long 
time. A rich metaphor has a widening circle of meaning where a poor one is 
quickly exhausted.
The metaphor operates to change the frame as it changes the focus and vice versa. 
We read the story; we make the story-world. The story-world operates as a 
metaphor for our actual world. As we ponder on the story, so we remake our 
actual world, but we also come to reappraise the story and we also remake the 
story-world. This process is, conceptually, unending. For a great story, a story 
such as King Lear, we may go on doing this all our lives. As we mature and 
increase our experience and the sophistication of our actual world making, we can 
return to such stories again and again to find fresh (metaphoric) meaning. It is, at 
this level of discourse, that the two worlds interact. Let me repeat, we see the 
story-world through the lens of our actual world (in many detailed ways and in its
344 Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, p. 124.
Story-Worlds as Metaphors - 210 -
general mode of operation) but we see this world through the lens of the story- 
world. This process is, potentially, unending. Story-worlds and actual worlds 
may interact, for they are the same sorts of things (intentional objects describing 
some external “reality”). A metaphor consists of (basically) two words joined 
with the copula and, the two things may be brought into a fruitful relationship. A 
story-world and an actual world may, similarly, be brought into a fruitful 
relationship.
Some metaphors operate as much through a wealth of detail as they do in a broad 
sweep where others operate more in a broad sweep and the detail must be treated 
as incidental (at least, to the major metaphoricity of the work). As Ricoeur 
suggests, the metaphoric use is implied and subtle; it may be recognised or it may 
be overlooked or ignored, although some works cry out to be treated 
metaphorically. For example, Endgame seems to demand such a treatment; it is 
hard to imagine that someone would want to read it, were they not prepared to 
treat it metaphorically. How can it mean anything otherwise? As with any 
metaphor, the details of the two worlds may become of overriding importance or 
the “truth” of the metaphor may be recognised in the broad generalisation of 
events and personages, or there may be recognition at both levels. Some stories 
operate more by allegorical application than through, what we normally consider 
to be, metaphor. The story-world represents, by some sort of (direct) analogy, 
truths, or supposed truths, about this world. The mediaeval romance or Arthurian 
legend345 is a good example of this type of thing; a modem example might be 
Arthur Miller’s The Crucible. The story-world parallels, in a fairly direct manner, 
how the world is (or is supposed to be). One may, on inspecting the world of the 
allegory, decide that the state-of-affairs in the actual world, is unsatisfactory. 
Ricoeur refused to grant this type of allegory the same status as metaphor. The
For example, The Quest of the Holy Grail (transl. P. M. Matarasso) 
London: Penguin, 1969. In this quest the details of the story have a direct 
analogy with, then, current theological perspectives. For todayis reader 
much of the allegorical detail is obscure.
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allegory has completed its work, and there is no residue, when the allegorical 
meaning has been unravelled.346 However, it is reasonable to suggest that a story 
which operates as an allegory, does so as if it were a detailed metaphor. Such 
analogical uses are, as so often, a matter of degree.
For Ricoeur an allegory is a parallel story about our actual worlds and not about 
the story-world at all. The allegorical treatment subsumes all the story details to a 
parallel in this world; it is a direct mapping onto this world. To draw the allegory, 
it is necessary to draw the map in terms, not of the story-world, but of this world. 
That is not to say that the allegory may not also be treatable as a story in its own 
terms. The Crucible is, at the same time, a powerful metaphor about “witch 
hunting” and also a powerful indictment of McCarthyism. The correct 
understanding of an allegory, qua allegory, may well depend upon certain 
knowledge of this world and even of authorial circumstances. To see The 
Crucible as an indictment of McCarthyism, it is, from this distance in time, 
necessary to see the situation being addressed by Miller. However, from this 
distance in time, the play is probably more usefully read as a metaphor of 
intolerance and suggestibility. Read that way, we make the The Crucible story- 
world and see its metaphoricity.
Ricoeur reaches back to Aristotelian mimesis. He argues, as have we, that 
mimesis is misunderstood as, simply, imitation.347 It operates through the 
complex metaphoric device we have mapped to give an imitation, but that is a 
metaphoric imitation. Or, we could put it in Aristotle’s terms and suggest that 
such an imitation reveals the universal.348 We see our actual world, as we have 
said previously, universalised through the metaphoricity of the story-world. The
Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning, Fort Worth, TX: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976, p. 
56.
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, pp. 37, 39.
Aristotle, The Poetics, 1451b.
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story does, indeed, hold up a mirror. What we see in that mirror is not simply a 
pallid reflection of some supposed reality but a powerful reflection of how things 
are, even if the image has been distorted to reveal that.
So we now have a mechanism whereby stories can teach us things. Even the most 
unlikely story (stories about men changing into beetles) can be productive 
metaphors. It is probable that stories which are less “realistic” and seem to be 
further removed from us operate more powerfully this way that do simpler and 
more direct stories by making unexpected juxtapositions.
Currie and Ravenscroft observe that we are sad for Desdemona and we want her to 
be saved. Yet we would not want to change the text.349 Therefore, we would not 
want to change the story-world to bring that about. Most people prefer 
Shakespeare’s King Lear, where Cordelia is lost, to Nahum Tate’s revision, where 
she is saved and there is a happy ending. That is, I claim, because the Shakespeare 
original is a better metaphor where the revision fails; it is (at best) a poor 
metaphor. This is why we “enjoy” the tragedy. We learn through the experience. 
We might note that few people would want a diet consisting only of such works. 
A life spent entirely with tragedies, however, much they might teach us, would be 
stressful indeed. Most of us feel quite wrung out by a night of such drama; we 
“enjoy” and appreciate King Lear but we still feel “wrung out” by it. A leavening 
of other works: comedies, murder mysteries, magazines, or whatever, is normal 
for us. The mix, of course, will be different for each of us. That is not to say that 
only tragedy can have the metaphoric effect. Of course a comedy can have that 
affect also. We learn from such as A Midsummer Night's Dream about ourselves, 
sexuality and so forth.
I am arguing that we attend the tragedy and we learn from the experience. As 
Aristotle claimed, the learning experience is enjoyable, despite the method of 
learning, because we are learning through it. Some forms of story — for example
349 Currie and Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds, p. 20, p. 196.
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the popular horror story discussed earlier — may appeal for this reason or for 
other reasons. Currie and Ravenscroft argue that the rewards of fiction are 
emotional ones, though the particular emotions evoked in a given case may not 
appear to be rewarding.”350 Emotions, they argue, are a form of awareness. 
Without them, I would add, our enjoyment of the story would be lessened and our 
understanding of its metaphoric (or other) impact would be severely reduced. We 
respond to stories in many different ways. That has already been observed and the 
claim of Currie and Ravenscroft adds to that argument.
Olsen argues that the metaphoric thesis advanced here is not the full story either.
o r  i
He calls theories such as ours, autonomy theories. Olsen argues that, in a 
metaphor, the interaction works between the parts: between Juliet and the sun. In 
a text, he says there are no such parts. There is no “other” part of the text against 
which the text can interact. But we have just shown that there is another part, 
namely, the actual world, which is to be found outside the text itself. Olsen
352further suggests that different readers will recover, or gain, a different “payoff’ 
from a text. He suggests that such a payoff may depend upon the level of 
sophistication of the reader. Of course that is so; different readers with different 
levels of understanding will react differently to the metaphoricalness of any text. 
A metaphor depends upon the background of the person interpreting it. A 
completely unsophisticated reader will just see King Lear as a sad story and may 
well prefer, as many have, the happy version. Olsen, further, identifies other 
reasons to enjoy something. In a poem, his example is D. H. Lawrence’s Piano, 
there are other features, stylistic ones or aesthetic ones, contributing to the work. 
There will always be many factors contributing to a work and contributing to our 
enjoyment of it. This thesis agrees with the points made by Olsen, but these
350 Ibid., p. 189.
Stein Haugon Olsen, “The ‘Meaning of a literary Work”, in Lamarque and 
Olsen, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The Analytic Tradition: An 
Anthology, 2004, p.177.
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points do not destroy our claims.353 We go to the theatre to enjoy a performance 
of a complete work and not to ruthlessly extract just some metaphoric meaning, 
but if there is no satisfactory meaning, I claim, the experience will be more 
shallow than if there is. That is all.
Stories are, we have just argued, such complex things that their operation cannot 
be restricted to just a single mode. A story may operate to beguile one’s attention 
as entertainment, require one to puzzle over details of the story-world (as does, 
say, a murder mystery — the classic who-done-it) while also providing a detailed 
analogue of this world as well as a more generalised metaphor for how things are. 
In fact, most stories, even the most banal, will be open to such a multiplicity of 
interpretive strategies. We have already commented on the dialectic operating 
between the story-world and our actual world. The dialectic we have noted 
previously is, in the context of this chapter, the operation of the interaction of the 
metaphor at a simple or a complex level. We may, thus, derive all sorts of details 
from stories and so, for example, stories are often used as case studies for moral 
questions. We can see why!
Story-worlds and actual worlds interact and the two sorts of worlds interanimate 
each other. If it were not so stories would be, as Bentham suggests they are, dead 
things and of no more than passing interest. A visit to a story-world would be 
diverting or entertaining, but could teach us nothing. On the metaphorical view of 
stories that is being considered here, we can hardly help but react to the story’s 
metaphoricalness. This can be why the metaphoricalness is so powerful. We are 
immersed in stories from childhood. We absorb their message and come to see 
the world in the manner described by stories. It is hard not to do so.
As children we read, and are read, fairy stories, often the same stories many times. 
Many of these stories operate to maintain and justify the status quo. If read 
uncritically (as children will), it is easy to see how they operate to do this. If we
353 Olsen does not argue that they do.
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consider the simple children’s story “The Princess and the Pea”, we will see that 
princesses are different from the rest of us. A real princess will not sleep because 
of a pea placed under many soft mattresses. A “commoner” will not notice. 
Similarly, a story such as “Bambi” reinforces the idea of primogeniture. If we 
consider Monteverdi’s opera, The Coronation of Poppeia, to which we referred 
earlier, we know that, in the actual world, the rest of the story of Nero and Poppeia 
proceeds in a certain way and we suppose that, in the story-world, they will 
proceed in a similar fashion. It is difficult not to apply that knowledge to the 
story-world and to derive suitable (metaphoric) conclusions. We need not, of 
course, do that; there can be no reason why, in the story-world, things could not 
turn out differently from the way the (related) events turned out in actual worlds. 
We will consider this aspect of our problem further in the next, and final, chapter.
Before we do that, I would like to consider some more complex story-worlds to 
see how they can operate metaphorically.
King Lear and Endgame as Metaphors
We have mentioned King Lear several times as we have pursued this work. I will 
say only a few brief words about it by way of illustration. Jan Kott is a Polish 
commentator on Shakespeare, who has, fortunately for us, been translated into 
English. His theme is that Shakespeare is always relevant and tells us about 
ourselves and our times, rather than just the times of Elizabethan England. The 
writings of Shakespeare are, in Kott’s opinion, as relevant to Poland as they are to 
England or Australia and as relevant to Kott’s time of writing (1964, his work is 
not recent) as to the Elizabethan era or to the twenty first century. His view is that
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“Shakespeare is truer than life.”354 Kott says of King Lear that the “theme of King 
Lear is the decay and fall of the world.”355 The blinded Gloucester is assisted to 
jump from a cliff into the abyss, in order to commit suicide. But, of course, there 
is no cliff; Edgar has deceived (with the best of motives) his father. Kott 
comments that “the precipice at Dover exists and does not exist. It is the abyss,
356waiting all the time. The abyss, into which one can jump, is everywhere.”
Harold Bloom, in a much more recent commentary, makes somewhat different, 
but not incompatible, claims. Bloom tells us that Lear’s torments are central to 
almost all of us, “since the sorrows of generational strife are necessarily 
universal.”357 We read King Lear and “[w]e are at once estranged and
o r  o
uncomfortably at home.” The characters are, he says, “ravaged by all the 
ambivalences and ambiguities of familial love and its displacements.”359 But the 
love is hardly redemptive; in Lear’s bleak world, not much survives. Bloom 
comments that “[ljove redeems nothing — on that, Shakespeare could not be 
clearer.”360 Again, Bloom observes that “Lear is not a study in redemption ... 
Mortality is the ultimate outrage we all of us must endure. All you can place 
against mortality ... is love.”361 If we expect to find some sort of divine justice, we 
will find the play “offensive”.362
Jan Kott, Shakespeare: Our Contemporary (transl. Boleslaw Taborski), 
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Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: the Invention o f the , London: Fourth
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So, we see that, for Kott, the play is a metaphor about the decline and fall of the 
world (that is, this world) and Bloom thinks in a similar way. For him the play is 
about the deprivations of mortality. There can be no redemption but love, always 
painful, offers us, not exactly hope, but a way of putting some value into our few 
years. Of course, each sees the play in slightly different ways and emphasises 
different aspects of its metaphoricity. But to each of them the "message" is, 
though metaphoric, clearly conveyed. So, too, is the message of "Juliet is the sun" 
clearly conveyed. Yet, the metaphorical meaning is not unambiguous or able to be 
pinned down. It is not that Kott is wrong or that Bloom is wrong (in fact their 
writings have a common core, but emphasise different aspects of the play). That 
is how metaphor operates, for we each see the world differently and, thus, our 
approach to a work at this level, will differ. This conclusion is entirely in accord 
with the whole thrust of the argument we have been putting.
Many people consider Endgame to be “difficult”. By that, they mean to imply that 
it is not readily interpreted. It is, by its very nature, ambiguous; that is to say, 
there are many things we are not told about the story-world. Many of these we 
would like to know. The ambiguity of the story opens the play up to a variety of 
interpretive strategies. David Hesla says that the play is “difficult, but by no 
means impossible, provided we respect its elliptical quality and its multifaceted 
character.” We have already noted that metaphor is uncontrollable and that it 
can spin off in ways not “intended” by the author.
There are problems with the construction of the Endgame story-world, but these 
are not the sorts of problems to which Hesla was referring. There are questions 
about what lies beyond the room; why are the characters “confined” to that space; 
what is on the face of the picture (we only ever see its reverse) and so on. Despite 
all of this, most people make the Endgame story-world similarly. We do not seem 
to find the significant differences between Endgame story-worlds that we found
363 David H. Hesla, “Metaphor in Endgame”, in Patrick A. McCarthy, Critical 
Essays on Samuel Beckett, 1986, p. 173.
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with the The Turn of the Screw story-worlds. In the case of The Turn of the 
Screw, we noted the existence of radically different constructions of the story- 
world (apparitionist and non-apparitionist story-worlds) but with Endgame, this is 
not the difficulty. In Endgame, there are unanswered questions but these are not 
the source of the difficulty; most interpreters agree on the main outlines of that 
world. The difficulty is, simply, how does the story-world operate as a metaphor 
for our actual world. There are many possibilities; so many that Endgame could 
be described as overdetermined. The play, with its bewildering multiplicity of 
interpretations, is elliptical in its metaphoricalness and provides a multifaceted 
metaphor. Ultimately, this leads to a fragmented understanding of the play as 
metaphor.
I am more concerned, here, to illustrate the thesis advanced here, by reference to 
some of the possibilities found by different commentators on Endgame, than I am 
to come to a conclusion about how to see the play and its application to our actual 
world. There are many possibilities canvassed by those commentators and I have 
made a selection from a small number of commentators to illustrate my claims. 
Many of the possible ways of understanding the play arise from the play's 
intertextualities and to the references that the text makes beyond itself.
Most people read Endgame as giving a pessimistic vision of human life. Many 
commentators see the play as about death and endings. Richard Coe sees this as a 
preoccupation of all Beckett's plays364 and Michael Robinson tells us that the 
characters are, not in Hell but in “Purgatory: a Purgatory of waiting on the verge 
of timelessness.” It is difficult not to notice the name of the play and recognise 
a reference to chess. Most commentators notice this. But not all agree on the 
implications. Hesla says that Nagg and Nell are captured pieces and are consigned
Richard Coe, “Molloy”, in Patrick A. McCarthy, Critical Essays on 
Samuel Beckett, 1986, p. 85.
Michael Robinson, “Belacqua”, in Patrick A. McCarthy, Critical Essays 
on Samuel Beckett, 1986, p. 34.
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to a bin, while Hamm and Clov are the king and another piece (perhaps the 
knight). He adduces the fact the Nag and Nell have faces which are “very white” 
where Hamm’s and Clov’s are “very red” to support this claim. James Acheson 
disagrees and says that red and white oppose black. He argues that all four 
characters are on the same side of the game and are opposing black, which is 
death.367
Many commentators, perhaps taking their clue from Waiting for Godot, see the 
metaphor as about endless waiting, so that one wishes the waiting (for death) 
would end but one is unable to bring that desideratum about. Worton points out 
that chess can get to the stage where we are in the endgame but no one can win.
O/TO
Bad players can find themselves moving around the board indefinitely. Again 
the waiting seems to be endless and the moves made by the players, senseless and 
purposeless; they merely defer the end (possibly indefinitely) but for no benefit. 
Clov threatens to leave but never does; he is always on the point of departure, but 
departure never takes place.
' l f . Q
For Cavell, the story-world is probably set after a nuclear war, not a unique 
suggestion.370 At the time of Cavell’s writing in the 1960s, this suggestion must 
have seemed natural. He adduces some evidence to support this suggestion: the 
room is referred to as a “shelter” and the players are incapable of leaving the 
room. Cavell also notes the similarity of the name “Hamm” to the name
366 Hesla, “Metaphor in Endgame”, p. 173.
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“Ham”.371 Ham was the son who saw Noah naked. Cavell suggests that the room 
is Noah’s ark (perhaps it has come to rest after the nuclear storm). He adduces 
various facts about the room and the props for the play to support this claim: the 
single high window — above water line, the view of the sea, the gaff. But, unlike 
Noah’s ark, there will be no repopulating of the world: we are in the endgame.
Hamm’s is not the only name subjected to the search for clues. Cohn runs through 
a considerable number of possible allusions. She also points to many 
intertextualities. Other commentators have suggested that the room is like a skull 
from the inside. Hesla suggests, on this basis, a Cartesian, dualist interpretation. 
The room is the interior of the head and the two windows are the eyes. Hamm is, 
then, the mind which is immobile in the centre of the skull. Clov becomes the 
body, the servant of the mind, able to perceive (looking out the window) for the 
mind and so forth.373 This is an intriguing way of understanding the metaphor.
Perhaps, we can leave this brief analysis of Endgame at this point; our purpose has 
been, merely, to illustrate the thesis that we are arguing.
No commentator takes the Endgame metaphor as unambiguous. This is what 
Ricoeur and Black tell us about metaphor, and complex metaphors in particular. 
The metaphor shifts and moves so that it cannot be pinned down. There is a 
surplus of meaning, so we can never say (quite) the same thing in any other way. 
We must note that we are not giving the story an “extra meaning” in Davidson’s 
terms. This kind of meaning is, however, what Hirsch calls “application” and 
what Davidson calls “what words are used to do”. As I have argued, I prefer to 
see this as part of the meaning of the text. Unless we do this, the text must be 
seen as thin. What we are doing here is to attempt to sketch out ways in which the
n n  1
Cavell is not the only one to see this possible connection. Ruby Cohn also 
notes this similarity. Ruby Cohn, Samuel Beckett: The Comic Gamut, 
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1962, p. 230.
Cohn, The Comic Gamut, pp. 226-242.
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metaphor operates to give meaning at the metaphoric level of discourse. The play 
would be bare, indeed, if it had no meaning beyond itself. All we can do is sketch 
out possibilities, for no metaphor is quickly exhausted (but we might give it scant 
attention); we can ponder on a story-world such as this for a very long time. 
Commentaries, thus, indicate approaches and, perhaps, make connections that 
many readers would not otherwise notice. Thus, they can enrich the reading 
experience and make the text more approachable. But they do not exhaust or 
replace it. To suggest that the meaning of “Juliet is the sun” arises from the life- 
giving force of the sun and from its bringing day and light, is hardly to exhaust the 
metaphor. But it is to indicate ways of considering it.
Further, we notice that the metaphor is not closed, meaning continues to arise. 
Not all aspects of the two parts of the metaphor are fit for exploration. Juliet may 
well be the sun, but, as we have already observed, she does not float 150 million 
kilometres from the surface of the Earth. The metaphor may operate to contrast 
things as well as draw likenesses. The room may well be the ark. The characters 
in the play may have ridden that ark through the nuclear tempest. But they will 
not repopulate the Earth. They have only two animals (a flea and a rat) and these, 
they kill.
This thesis shows that such meanings are a logical outcome of the way we can 
“read” the text as a whole and that this sort of meaning is continuous with the 
work as a whole. Further, the metaphoricity of a work runs through the whole 
work and the details of the world made from that work add, as we can see, to the 
complexity and detail, and, therefore, meaning, of the story-world as we draw 
parallels and interpret the work in a given way.
Probably all works operate metaphorically, at least to some extent. I have argued 
that a metaphor is a dialectical thing and that we see the lion in Richard as well as 
Richard in the lion. All works do this to some extent. They must because nothing
373 Hesla, “Metaphor in Endgame”, p. 175.
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can be sealed into its own watertight compartment. Everything overflows and 
everything must overflow if we are to make sense of our world and if we are to 
make that world (and our lives) into connected wholes. This discussion brings us 
back to Aristotle and to Plato, where we began. A metaphor does, in a sense, hold 
a mirror up to the world to reflect what is there. However, this reflection need not 
be a crude reflection as was Plato’s mirror but Aristotle’s “idealised” reflection. If 
there is genius in stories (plays and novels in particular) then that may arise from 
the power of the story to redescribe the “reality” it finds in the world. For 
Aristotle, metaphor, as a rhetorical device, is a key to the good use of language. 
Metaphor, he said, “involves clarity, pleasantness and unfamiliarity, and it cannot 
be drawn from any other source.”374 Where Aristotle may have been thinking of 
fine use of language, we can see that his admiration for a good metaphor did not 
go far enough.
Danto also comments on metaphor as a stylistic device. He suggests that, the very 
act of filling in and giving meaning has the effect of personalising that meaning. 
In modem terms we come to “own” the meaning we give. Danto observes that the 
enthymeme requires one to fill in the missing premise(s). In doing that, we take 
on ownership of those premises and we “draw our own conclusions” treating those 
conclusions as a personal acquisition. Thus, enthymeme is a more powerful 
rhetorical device than is the syllogism, where all is plainly stated. In the same way
'ynf.
he suggests that metaphor is a more powerful device than a mere telling. The 
whole story, thus acts as a powerful rhetorical way of saying, often, very simple 
things, things which, if said more “prosaically” would not seem worth the saying.
In fact, this is a point that Stolnitz makes, he thinks that it shows that an approach 
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?5377adduced from stories are, at best, “banalities ... garden variety truths.” He 
suggests that any metaphoric meaning we can give to Pride and Prejudice, his 
example, or King Lear, our example, will turn out to be trivial. However, his 
argument only serves to strengthen our claim. Banal and garden variety do not 
point to lack of importance. A meaning can be banal, yet true. The truth that we 
get old and decrepit and (eventually die) is hardly unimportant yet, when put thus, 
is certainly banal. To say “Juliet is the sun” is one thing; to say “I like Juliet” is 
another, yet similar, thing. We agree that Stolnitz makes a valuable point, namely, 
that the story can point up great and important truths, truths that, reduced to 
simple terms, would seem to be clear, obvious and not worth the saying. Perhaps 
we might say that the story also leads us to a better understanding of such truths 
and can show them to us in a new light. We often avoid this sort of knowledge 
but, when brought face to face with King Lear, we cannot do that. Further, the 
metaphor is vague, as Stolnitz says and the meanings extracted from works 
depend upon the reader. All this we agree with and has been implied by the 
discussion above. I can only repeat what Aristotle has told us: that to say 
something in a metaphor can elevate the saying and what is said; it can further 
bring to our attention important truths in a way that makes them matter and be 
important (even if, put otherwise, they would be banal).
Stories can be powerful and redolent with important meanings for us. Now we 
can see why and how. Their message can be inescapable. At least, John Carroll 
thinks so. He argues that the West has given up its myths and stories and 
succumbed to the scientific story.378 That story has, he claims, given us a sort of 
material prosperity, but taken away our human (that is spiritual) heritage leaving
Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art, in Peter Lamarque 
and Stein Haugom Olsen, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The 
Analytic Tradition: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p. 341.
John Carroll, Humanism: The Wreck of Western Culture, London: Fontana 
Press, 1993.
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us empty. He argues, in another book,379 that we must recover those stories that 
are of greatest importance to an understanding of our being as human (he calls 
these stories “archetypes”). We do not need to agree with the detail or the 
conclusions of Can-oil’s argument, to agree that stories are important and that they 
can shape us as human beings.
We noticed, at the very beginning of this thesis, Aristotle’s claim that the tragedy 
idealises and helps us to understand the commonplace. We now have a 
mechanism whereby we can see Aristotle’s idealisation operating through 
metaphor.
What stories can teach us, and how they achieve that, may be more important, not 
less. Further, it is not only tragedy that can teach important truths. Comedy does 
that also. If the lessons from King Lear are about age and decrepitude, the lessons 
from A Midsummer Night’s Dream are about sex: two topics of abiding 
significance, interest and importance for human beings.
Schier argues in a similar way suggesting that painful stories, his examples are
*2 0  1
King Lear and Winterreise, are worth the lesson. We get “into” the characters, 
Schier argues, in a story, in a way that we do not achieve otherwise. This was 
our earlier argument. We “see into” the story-world; we draw close to the 
characters and scenes represented there. We react in natural ways. But we learn 
something about the world as a consequence. The metaphor is more vivid than 
Stolnitz’s banal truth can ever be.
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In my introduction, I claimed the thesis that we are considering, is better able to 
“explain” the phenomena in question than are alternative hypotheses. Further, I 
claimed that the thesis applies to stories in a quite general fashion to provide a 
useful insight into the working of any story, fiction or otherwise. We have worked 
with numerous examples along the way. These have, I claim, demonstrated that 
the thesis is, indeed, able to achieve just what was promised. I now wish to put it 
to a final test. I want to use this final chapter to run a case study (of sorts). My 
aim here is, therefore, to show how this thesis can be applied to works which 
would normally be considered to inhabit different parts of the literary canon — the 
works (well, just one) of Jane Austen and those published by Mills and Boon. If I 
can do that, I have further advanced the claims of this approach.
I will start with a brief discussion of the works published by Mills and Boon, 
under the general title of Harlequin, and of Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, 
then I will attempt to apply the thesis to these works. To do this I will give a brief 
overview of a typical Mills and Boon story followed by a brief (but not scholarly) 
analysis of the novel by Jane Austen. We have, of course, referred to the Austen 
novel in passing more than once.
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Mills and Boon and Jane Austen
There are thousands of Mills and Boon novels published every year under the title
T O T
Harlequin. The genre, if not the publisher, of the Harlequin is hardly new, and 
it is possible to read no more than a very small selection of them, yet I comment 
on them as if they were assimilable one to the other. Further, the novels I have 
read were randomly selected rather than being a considered choice (I can randomly 
select them because I know, in advance, that they are all the same, yet people who 
read them in great quantity — and there are many — select them with care). I 
seem to be claiming to know what they all contain on the strength of a very small 
sample. I wouldn’t be so audacious with Jane Austen.
Here is how Tania Modleski characterises a typical Harlequin:
[A] young, inexperienced, poor to moderately well-to-do woman 
encounters and becomes involved with a handsome, strong, 
experienced, wealthy man, older than herself by ten to fifteen 
years. The heroine is confused by the hero’s behaviour since, 
though he is obviously interested in her, he is mocking, cynical, 
contemptuous, often hostile, and even somewhat brutal. By the 
end, however, all misunderstandings are cleared away, and the 
hero reveals his love for the heroine, who reciprocates.384
There is little doubt that her characterisation of these novels is accurate; the novels 
all seem to present the same plot with only simple and limited variations. So 
predictable are the plots of these works that Modleski comments, of the reader,
See, for example, David R. Shumway, “Romance in the Romance: Love 
and Marriage in Tum-of-the-Century Best Sellers”, in The Journal of 
Narrative Technique, 29, (1999), pp. 43-55. Shumway discusses some of 
the early romances and their importance in establishing the idea of the 
“love match”. Shumway’s discussion, incidentally, suggests that people’s 
actual worlds come to resemble the worlds of the stories.
Tania Modleski, Loving with a Vengeance: Mass produced Fantasies for 
Women, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 36.
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that she “already knows the story, at least in all its essentials” as she reads. But 
there are differences in detail in the stories and, so, the story-worlds made from 
these texts, although very similar, are all different.
The books are written very much to a formula. Modleski quotes the publishers 
guidelines on the matter:
Harlequins are well-plotted, strong romances with a happy 
ending. They are told from the heroine’s point of view and in 
the third person ... The books are contemporary in setting and 
the settings can be anywhere in the world as long as they are 
authentic.’86
The commentaries on these works do not treat of single works but consider the 
genre of the Harlequin romance as a whole. I have not encountered a single article 
or chapter of a book which treats any single complete Harlequin as, itself, a text 
for critical analysis or interpretation. The books are used interchangeably to 
illustrate the (usually sociological) points made by the authors of the articles and 
books. The commentator conflates all the works into one. This is, as I have 
already suggested, easy to do.
These commentators agree that the novels are simple in terms of their plot and 
simplistic in terms of the characters and scenes they present. They contain little 
descriptive content. Watson points out that the descriptive content is limited to 
describing the heroine’s appearance and dress together with her view of how she 
is presenting herself. The stories’ settings are described in terms of rooms and 
their furnishings; the stories, despite their exotic locations, could be set 
anywhere.387 Feelings are always running at extremes. Hearts don’t merely beat; 
they thud against breasts. She is either in agony or in ecstasy.
385 Ibid., p. 32.
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The sentences are short and crudely put together and their vocabulary is restricted. 
The plot is always presented in a simple, straightforward linear mode. If there is a 
subplot, it is restricted, and related directly to the two major characters.
The heroines are always beautiful and, when required, wilting; the heroes are 
always handsome and “superbly masculine” (whatever that means). The heroines 
are not stupid. Many have interesting jobs. Claire, in Woman to Wedl, is a 
teacher in a school for handicapped children and Lauren, in The Father of Her 
Child, is a publisher’s agent. Yet the heroes of the stories have better (and usually 
more glamorous) jobs and more money than the heroines. The heroine’s career 
seems to conveniently fade out as the hero moves to the centre of her life. The 
apotheosis of these works comes when the heroine realises that her life is fulfilled 
by the hero; her beautiful destiny as a human being is to love and be loved, 
protected and nurtured by a man, while herself being the passive recipient of his 
tender but masterful attentions.
The heroine is, thus, always on view and very self-conscious. She is, according to 
Amal Treacher, “throughout the narrative sexualised ... [and] ready for, and 
passively awaiting ... the next sensual charge with the man ... [who is] an icon of 
perfect sexual masculinity.”388 The stories are simple and told by an authoritative 
narrator in a serial mode. Consequently, the story is not open as is The Turn of the 
Screw, to the making of a multiplicity of different story-worlds. Any world made 
from the text must be one of a very close family. This is no criticism; it is also the 
case with the Austen novel.
I want, here, to look at three strands of critical comment: the Freudian analysis of 
Jon Cook and the feminist, sociological analyses of Daphne Watson on the one 
hand and those of Janice Radway and Tania Modleski on the other. None of these
388 Amal Treacher, “What is Life Without my Love? Desire and Romantic 
Fiction”, in Susannah Radstone, Sweet Dreams, 1988, p. 84.
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critics comments on particular novels; their critique is based on a syncretised, 
generalised Harlequin-type work.
Jon Cook talks of Harlequin romances in terms of Freudian patriarchal 
psychology. “The heroine of popular romance falls in love with the man of her 
dreams, but the man of her dreams turns out to be an emblem of patriarchal
■ 30Q
authority itself.” The man of her dreams is physically stronger and often treats 
the heroine badly early in the story because of a misunderstanding. He is attracted 
to her but sees her as a threat; the possibility of rape hovers in the background/90 
Michael wrongly believes that Lauren has destroyed his first marriage (through 
pushing feminist beliefs onto his first wife), so he makes vindictive and malicious 
claims about her. Brad wrongly believes that Claire is having an affair with her 
first husband’s sister’s husband (a wimp and a foil to the heroic Brad). “The 
rejection” Cook says, “... can only be temporary because the hero’s violence is an 
aspect of his strength, and it is the strength the heroine wants, because the 
definition and purpose of her desire is to be possessed by strength.” When the 
misunderstandings are cleared away, she is so possessed, attaining to both the state 
of daughter as well as the state of lover.
The heroes very often come from dysfunctional families, families where they are 
the father figure to their brothers and sisters. When Claire marries Brad, it is 
obvious that she is joining a family where Brad is the father and protector, a role 
he has had since his early adult years (due to the death of his and his siblings’ 
parents). Parents are either relegated to the background or, as in this case, 
conveniently disposed of. Parents would only interfere with the romantic 
denouement.
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The sociological critique of Watson and Radway and Modleski is feminist, but not 
unanimous. Harlequins are written by women for women; there is a different 
genre (no less ideologically unsound) for men. The first, and obvious, strain of 
the critique of these works is to attack the conservatism of these writings as 
upholding the romantic fairytale of patriarchy (the fairytale described by Cook). 
Daphne Watson says, of Harlequins, that “they offer a distorted picture of the 
world.”’92 She describes them as “pernicious” and as offering “all the challenge 
of a warm bath or a box of chocolates.” Her concern is that these novels put 
forward a patriarchal dream, where the heroine depends on the man for emotional 
(and other) fulfilment. The novels are, thus, cruel hoaxes holding out a false, 
unrealistic and, ultimately, undesirable possibility. Since the reader’s life cannot 
be like that of the heroine, the reader must end her reading dissatisfied. And, it is 
not only women who are subverted by these stories. Ann Jones suggests that the 
“ideology of masculinity in Mills & Boon may be more rigid (and oppressive to 
men) than the guidelines through which the heroines are produced.” ’94
There is another strain of feminist criticism which, Watson suggests, seems to 
baulk at the wholesale denigration of a genre which is popular with women. 
Watson suggests that some commentators are reluctant to appear to criticise the 
reading taste of a large number of women. Janice Radway and Tania Modleski 
view the Harlequin and its reader as a sociological phenomenon. Radway 
surveyed a group of these readers, asking them how they see the novels. She 
concluded that women read these romances as a way of escaping into a world 
which they recognise to be, in many ways, idealised. The Harlequin world is not 
how it is and the readers, Radway claims, are very much aware of this. “Romance 
reading”, she argues, “ releases women from their present pressing concerns in
Watson, Their Own Worst Enemies, p. 94.
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two different but related ways.” These ways are: firstly as an escape from the 
humdrum circumstances of their lives allowing them to “escape figuratively into a 
fairy tale”'96 and, secondly, as an entertainment. This is a sort of emotional 
catharsis. Thus, she suggests, that “romance reading originates in a very real 
dissatisfaction and embodies a valid, if limited, protest.”397 Tania Modleski talks 
of these novels as a sort of “revenge fantasy.’098 The plot usually portrays the 
man as hostile early in the story. The virtue, goodness and innocence of the 
heroine overcomes the superior strength of the dominating male. He is brought to 
his knees and we realise that all along he has been “internally grovelling, 
grovelling, grovelling.”399
Watson explicitly rejects the readings of Radway and Modleski. Readers of these 
works read extensively in the genre and, therefore, reread the same story 
constantly even if they only read each novel once. For Watson, the continual 
encounter with the conservative ideology contained in them must be damaging to 
women’s best interests. Radway disputes the effectiveness of Watson's view and 
argues that “the commonplace view that ... the romance[s] impose an alien 
ideology upon unsuspecting if not somnolent readers is a function of a particular 
theory and method.”400 Radway is prepared to concede that one theory may not 
apply to all readers. It may be that, for some readers, these novels do disarm the 
counter impulse.401 Even if this is so and readers do not succumb to the 
supposition that life could be as these stories portray it, it is difficult to evade
Janice A. Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and 
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seeing the popularity of these books as somehow arising from the supposed 
desirability of the fantasy presented.
- 0 -
Modleski’s outline of the plot of the typical Harlequin, cited above, is very much 
an outline of the main plot of Jane Austen’s novel, Pride and Prejudice. Pride 
and Prejudice is a tale told in serial mode; the story is a “well-plotted, strong 
romance with a happy ending ... told from the heroine’s point of view and in the 
third person[;] ... it is contemporary in setting.” Its contemporary setting is, of 
course, that of early nineteenth century England, when it was written. It seems to 
(but, later, I will suggest that it does not) accept the social and moral contingencies 
of the day. In Austen’s day, a young woman without means depended on an 
advantageous marriage to maintain her position in society and the world. The 
happy ending of Pride and Prejudice does see Elizabeth happily settled in a most 
advantageous marriage.
We have already noted the dearth of critical analysis of individual Harlequins. 
This is not true of Austen and her works. There is an immense literature on all 
aspects of Austen’s work: her life and times, her letters, the corpus of her work as 
well as the individual novels and comparative analyses of these and other writers’ 
work. Reginald Farrer goes so far as to say of this novel that it is “the greatest 
miracle of English literature.”402
But, it is not my purpose here to survey the canon of English literature and the 
high place occupied in that august canon by Austen’s novel. My concern is to 
attempt to suggest why Austen’s novel receives such critical acclaim compared to
402 Reginald Farrer, quoted from B. C. Southam, Jane Austen: Sense and 
Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park: A Casebook, 
London: Macmillan Press, 1976, P. 159.
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the Harlequin. This difference does not lie in the main outline of the plot. This is 
why I wish to compare the worldmaking of the two: one is so highly regarded 
while the other has become only a vehicle for sociological comment.
Elizabeth Bennet is a woman with a lively and independent mind. She certainly 
marries above herself, if we look at social position and money, but she has married 
an equal (or even below herself) if we take intellect and personal characteristics 
into account. Lauren Magee, in The Father of Her Child, is a woman with a good 
and interesting career who marries above herself in terms of money but also in 
terms of wit. It would be difficult to describe her mental states; all we ever know 
about them are her extravagant feelings of love and hate and her view of herself 
and her clothing (seen in the mirror).
It is easy to see the marriage of Elizabeth to Darcy as a Harlequinesque 
capitulation and endorsement of the status quo. Yet, Lloyd Brown suggests that 
Austen had a “decidedly unromantic and realistic perception of marriage.”403 He 
points to the number of marriages displayed in the novels (in Pride and Prejudice, 
there are several established marriages as well as several new ones) and to the 
frequent failures of those marriages. Mr. and Mrs. Bennet are not a happily 
married pair. Pinion, on the other hand, suggests that “Pride and Prejudice 
illustrates Jane Austen’s feeling that true love is based not on wealth or rank but 
on natural attraction”404 — a much more romantic conclusion. Vivien Jones, 
writing in the introduction to the Penguin edition of Pride and Prejudice, 
compares the ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft with those of an evangelical religious 
writer of the day, Hannah More. “Elizabeth,” she says, “is clearly much closer to 
Wollstonecraft’s rational femininity and ‘independence of mind’ than to More’s
Lloyd W. Brown, “The Business of Marrying and Mothering”, in Juliet 
McMaster, Jane Austen s Achievement, 1979, p. 27.
F. B. Pinion, A Jane Austen Companion: A Critical Survey and Reference 
Book, London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1976, p. 95.
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ideal of a ‘submissive temper’ and ‘forbearing spirit.’”405 It is not that Austen is a 
feminist in Wollstonecraft’s meaning but she has her own ideas about behaviour.
Harlequins have a single story line and two characters (any others are merely 
props), and these characters are flat and uninteresting. Harlequins are set in exotic 
and affluent situations around the world, but these settings are irrelevant to the 
story and can be altered at whim without any effect. Austen’s novels, however, 
are populated with characters and situations. The characters interact. We see 
them in many lights. The stories abound in subtle insights and ironic descriptions. 
The settings are limited but tightly and carefully drawn; the settings are integral to 
the story. An anonymous review suggested in 1813, when the novel was first 
published, that:
Instead of the whole interest of the tale hanging upon one or two 
characters, as is generally the case in novels, the fair author of 
the present introduces us, at once, to a whole family, every 
individual of which excites the interest, and very agreeably 
divides the attention of the reader.406
For Austen, the characters are the lifeblood of the novel. They are set off against 
each other to present many aspects of personality and many types of person. Some 
of Austen’s characters, Mr. Collins for example, are rich caricature (yet there are 
people like that) where others are more realistic. Walton Litz suggests that the 
“sense of completeness [of Austen’s novels] has much to do with the way in 
which she invents, establishes and develops the characters.”407 He comments on 
the balance, within the works of schematic and realistic characters and the ways in 
which they are like us.
Austen, Pride and Prejudice, editor’s introduction, p. xvii.
Quoted from Southam, Jane Austen, p. 148.
A. Walton Litz, “'A Development of Self: Character and Personality in 
Jane Austen's Fiction”, in Juliet McMaster, Jane Austen's Achievement, 
1976, p. 75.
407
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Harlequin romances sometimes use an ordinary marriage as a foil to the 
spectacular marriage of the heroine and hero. Claire had an unconsummated prior 
marriage and Lauren and Michael both had failed and unhappy prior marriages. 
Michael’s client, Evan, who has a small supporting role in the novel, is a 
contented, happily married, but dull character. We learn little about such 
characters or their circumstances. This is not what Austen shows us. Her 
marriages are part of the kaleidoscope of life that she presents. The “other 
marriages” are more than a foil (although they do act in that capacity); they 
contribute to the “meaning” of the work.
Marriage, in Austen’s world, regulated society. Yet, there is an inner tension in 
the novel. The marriages we see (both established and new) bespeak an irruption 
of disorder into an ordered world. Lydia’s elopement is the most obvious 
example. This tension pervades the novel in various ways. Julia Prewitt Brown408 
comments that the narrative voice itself speaks in terms of order, where the many 
dialogues speak in anarchical terms.
Tanner weaves together a number of ideas.409 He suggests that the novel is about 
recognition. Recognition is also a theme in Oedipus Rex and King Lear. But in 
Austen’s novel the result is happy and we have a comedy, for recognition comes 
to Lear and Oedipus too late, but to Elizabeth and Darcy recognition comes in 
time. Things are, thus, not always as they seem and we must balance conflicting 
evidence (Elizabeth, for example, takes Wickham’s comments about Darcy at face 
value but later recognises their falsity). Our opinions derive from our perceptions. 
Yet often those opinions are not correct (for our perceptions are limited) and we 
must revise them. We cannot know that our first impression is wrong; often first 
impressions are quite correct (no one misjudges Mr. Collins).
Julia Prewitt Brown, Jane Austen's Novels: Social Change and Literary 
Form, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
Tony Tanner, Jane Austen, Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1986.
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Tanner also talks of performance. There are many dialogues in the book and 
people are often performing. Mrs. Bennet, for example, adopts her role (of the 
mother finding husbands for her daughters) and performs with thoughtless ease. 
Elizabeth does not perform as demanded; this is what wins Darcy over but sets 
others tut-tutting. There is the question of social and mental space: distances 
between people socially and mentally as well as the space occupied by the 
protagonists. Lady Catherine and Elizabeth are set far apart both socially and 
mentally, but to different advantage in these two spheres.
Worldmaking
We have considered some critical and some sociological comment on these 
novels. How does the discussion of two novels assist our overall discussion of 
worldmaking? The claim being made is that two novels represent, at least, two 
story worlds. So we want to consider how Pride and Prejudice makes the Pride 
and Prejudice story-world. We will select one of the Mills and Boon Harlequins, 
Emma Darcy’s The Father of her Child, to consider the The Father of her Child 
story-world. I want to show how these two works make their own particular story- 
worlds. and what benefits a reader might obtain from the making. I will attempt to 
show how the previous critical comment fits into the worlds being made from the 
texts. That should indicate how our thesis operates against various strains of 
critical comment. It should also illuminate the way we can make story-worlds 
appropriate to the works and also how the overflow from the story-worlds 
contributes to the metaphoric effect.
We make the story-world from the text. There may be many ways of interpreting 
any given text. But, if we do not make the story-worlds in similar ways we can
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not talk about the novel. In the current cases, there do not seem to be many 
alternative ways of making the story-world. I suspect that, opposed to our 
findings with the The Turn of the Screw story-worlds, all Pride and Prejudice 
story-worlds will be similar and so too will be all The Father of her Child story- 
worlds. If I do not understand that Elizabeth rejected Darcy’s first proposal, then I 
have (certainly) misunderstood the text. How could we discuss it if you 
understand it to be about intergalactic space travel and I understand it to be about 
people living in 19th century rural English towns? Neither could we discuss The 
Father of her Child, unless we make the story-world in similar ways. But they do 
not have to be identical for us to understand. In fact, if we discuss a text, you 
might point out things that I had overlooked; I might then revise my story-world. 
We see this occur when we are confronted with a very complex text. The Divine 
Comedy, represents a very complex story-world. It is very difficult to be sure of 
the geography of hell in detail and much critical comment has been devoted to just 
this matter.
We notice that the texts (in both cases) present different sorts and amounts of 
information about different characters. That is how it is. We know a lot about 
some people and only a little about others. What we know about Mr. Collins, for 
example, is little and much of that is a caricature. We do not learn to like Mr. 
Collins from what we are told. But he is the heir presumptive to, what many 
think, ought by rights to be the inheritance of the Bennet girls. He is, assuredly, 
an uncouth pig; what we learn about him does not dispose us to like him. This 
happens in any world. We do not learn much about Lauren’s first husband, 
Wayne, either. And that little does not predispose us to like him.
We also notice that Austen’s landscape is richer. It has more characters and 
situations (but Pride and Prejudice is four times the length of The Father of Her 
Child) and, so, is able to provide that richness. We have noted already that it 
displays many marriages all in different states. But richness is not always 
desirable; consider the bleak and denuded landscapes of Beckett or of
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Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea. We could, of course, continue to 
elaborate on the landscapes shown by either novel. That process would take 
longer and be more detailed with the richer landscape. There is probably little 
purpose to be gained in such an exercise.
We might liken the making of the story-world to a holiday. We visit a new world 
(like going to Europe or, maybe a tropical island, or maybe, in the case of Samuel 
Beckett, some bleak lunar-type land). This is a possibility in either case. To some 
extent we always do that; we read with greater fixity as we near the climax of 
most stories. We have noted the claim of Janice Radway that women enjoy the 
adventure and return to “normal” life refreshed from the romantic, but unrealistic, 
trip. They know that they are on holiday and do not expect any more than a brief 
respite. This is certainly a possibility; it comes under the general term 
“entertainment”. The nature of the story-world will, surely, dictate the nature of 
the escape; it is easy to escape to the The Father of her Child story-world or the 
Pride and Prejudice story-world, but the Endgame story-world would not seem to 
offer escapist holidays! And holidays can be of different kinds (from the idle time 
in the tropics to an exploration of the great art galleries and cathedrals of Europe).
We may see the story-world as like our actual world. We may, then, attempt to 
see our actual world through the lens of the story-world. We may say that our 
actual world ought to be like that. This is Daphne Watson’s claim. The novels, 
she says, subvert women by projecting a dream world. They go there often and 
start to think that their actual world could be like that and should be like that. 
This may have the effect of making them dissatisfied or of reinforcing “the 
patriarchal dream”. This leads her, as we have seen, to describe the novel (or its 
genre) as “pernicious”. It seems reasonable to suggest that frequent reading of 
these novels will lead the reader to see her actual world in terms suggested by a 
plethora of Mills and Boon story-worlds, all very similar. If this can be shown to
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be so, we could argue, with Plato, that, indeed, these novels are dishonest.410 
However, that is not agreed by all commentators. Modleski, as we have seen, 
does not agree, allowing the reader to simply visit the world as an escape. Even if 
it offers no more, surely there is escape value and simple entertainment value in 
Pride and Prejudice and also in the Mills and Boon publications. The holiday, 
then, becomes refreshing.
However, it is difficult to read the Austen novel and simply shrug off the 
implications. A reader might read the novel and consider that Elizabeth and her 
sisters have been treated unjustly by the legal system. The legal system in the 
Pride and Prejudice story-world is, of course, the same as that applying in 19th 
century England. The novel, if read that way, might seem to be a powerful 
indictment of that system. We may see Elizabeth as showing that her good sense 
puts her above the horrid Lady Catherine, despite Lady Catherine’s superior social 
position. We may agree that the social arrangements as they affected young 
women were appalling.
But, we may see it very differently; we may see it as the triumph of the status quo, 
where the attractive heroine receives society’s just reward (a good marriage) for 
her modesty and conclude that, in such a world, things work out well. We have 
noted that metaphor can operate at many levels and in a widening circle to show 
us how our actual world might be. But we read a metaphor against a backgrounds, 
our own background. We learn from our visit to the story-world. We have 
previously considered other works as metaphor.
“It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good 
fortune, must be in want of a wife.”411 This is the well known opening sentence of 
Pride and Prejudice. It is difficult to read the novel without taking some notice of 
this remark. It falls into that category of remark that we earlier called authorial
Which may not lead us to wish, with Plato, to suppress them. 
Austen, Pride and Prejudice, p. 5.
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comment. This remark might simply be ignored because, after all, it does not 
(directly) contribute to the making of the story-world. Yet, we might take it into 
account as a tongue-in-cheek comment (as I do) or we might take it seriously and 
use it to support the kind of happy outcome suggested.
This is a case where authorial comment is ambiguous. Consider, however, the 
authorial comment included in, say, Aesop’s Fables. If we consider the fable of 
the “Tortoise and the Hare”, my copy412 has an extended “application” which is 
the moral. Now, clearly, the moral is the way the fable can be applied, 
metaphorically, to this world. This is a rather clear case of authorial comment. In 
a similar, but more complex, vein we could consider the parables of Jesus.
We notice that interpretation at this level turns the story back onto this world and 
then the manner of its being understood can be varied. This is what Ricoeur tells 
us to expect. We interpret any metaphor according to our own beliefs and 
understandings (prejudices). The things they teach us are things that we already 
(partly) know but which come forward from the story-world making exercise. 
That is a real lesson, because things are pointed out to us. We saw that Tanner 
describes Pride and Prejudice in terms of recognition and also of performance. 
We might suggest that, for him, the novel is “about” these ideas. So, here is a 
metaphoric reference. The Pride and Prejudice story-world can, on this 
interpretation, be seen as a metaphor for the actual world. Such a metaphor sets 
off ideas about, inter alia, recognition and performance. That is not to limit it to 
those. The two worlds interact (they must do this to some extent on the above 
analysis) but here they provide a powerful interaction to set up a metaphoric 
tension. None of the commentary on the Harlequin novel sets up any similar sort 
of tension.
412 Thomas Bewick, The Fables of Aesop with Designs on Wood by Thomas 
Bewick, London: The Paddington Press, 1975, pp. 221-222.
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We can see, from this brief exposition, that the thesis is able to hold up to the 
critical requirements of a thesis on stories. We get excited, sad, anxious and so on 
in turn as we make the world and see the various developments that take place 
there. We are able to relate the story-world to our actual world in detailed and 
practical ways as well as on a larger, metaphoric, level.
It is tempting to see the kind of world made by a story as, somehow, determining 
the “value” of that story. Any such consideration would go well beyond the thesis 
put forward here. If it is possible to compare works for value, such a comparison 
would need to include factors well beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
Nevertheless, this thesis may contribute to such an enterprise.
This completes the major part of our work. We can see how stories make sense 
and we can see why (some of them) are important artefacts and how we can leam 
from them. In my conclusion, I want to show how this work fits into that wider 
enterprise broadly known as hermeneutics.
CONCLUSION
The Hermeneutics of Fictional Discourse
There are three things remaining to do in this conclusion. These are: firstly to 
quickly survey the argument we have been putting; secondly to recognise some 
other approaches to stories as worldmakers, in particular, that of Roman Ingarden; 
thirdly, to show the consonance between the work presented here and that broad 
stream of study called hermeneutics, and the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in 
particular.
To tackle the first of these first. We will remember that our purpose was to put 
forward a number of ideas that, together, show how a story, fictional or not, can 
make sense. Our purpose was to make a simple faqon de parier philosophically 
respectable. We have done that. We make sense of our world by making an 
actual world and we make sense of stories by making story-worlds; these activities 
have certain similarities. We then showed why we react to stories as we do, how 
we can talk meaningfully about them, why they are worth reading and how they 
can teach us things. We started this thesis with a consideration of Aristotelian 
mimesis and moved in an arc to an understanding of Aristotle’s claim that 
metaphor is the crown of linguistic excellence. But we did not finish quite where 
we began, for our finishing place has moved the discussion to a new level. 
Metaphor turns out to be no mere ornament to language but a pervasive feature of 
language and, consequently, of stories. Stories, we discovered, operate
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metaphorically to generate new knowledge. That may be important, at least to 
some readers.
I have argued, with Aristotle, that stories are mimetic. I have argued that mimesis 
is best understood as representation rather than, as is common, “copy” or 
“imitation”. I have argued that what is represented is a world: the world of the 
story or, as I call it, a story-world. When we read a story we make a story-world. 
That is what it is to understand the story.
The emphasis of our argument falls upon the reader and what she does when she 
reads a story. This thesis has hardly considered the role of the author; to do that 
would require a separate, and different, thesis. The making of story-worlds is a 
creative activity requiring the reader to do the making from the text. The text, 
thus, represents the story-world; the reader’s task is to read the text and make the 
story world from that text. Different readers will, thus, discern the story-world in 
different ways, for no one way is privileged. This leads us to conclude that there 
are many possible story-worlds which can be made from any text. Even the 
simplest text will support (slightly) different makings but some texts can support 
radically different story-worlds. Unless one appeals to something beyond the 
story-text itself (and, thus, to something which is not the story) there can be no 
final resolution of such differences. However, a text cannot support just any story- 
world making; a world made from a text must be consistent with that text.
This is also the case with our experience of our own world. We make an actual 
world from our experience of the world and it is this actual world, as we make it, 
in which we live and have the experience from which we, initially, made that 
actual world in the first place. We do not, of course, live in a story-world. In 
considering our actual worldmaking activity, I am following Goodman fairly 
closely; he is also, even though he would disavow it, the inspiration behind the 
idea of the story-world. I argue that story-worlds and actual worlds are different
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things but also, in some critical ways, are similar sorts of things. Further, we 
make both sorts of worlds by an exercise of the imagination.
This leads directly to our major result. Of course, we can talk about story-worlds 
and react to events that occur there in ways that are similar to the ways we can talk 
about our actual world and react to events that take place there, for, as we see, 
these worlds are not so very different after all.
But Aristotle said that stories are cathartic. We used this claim to argue that 
mimesis is correctly understood as representation, for we argued that a copy or an 
imitation could not produce the cathartic effect that Aristotle was seeking. We, 
therefore, needed to ask how the cathartic result can arise. It is because they teach 
us things, things that we could not learn in some other way, that stories are such 
valuable human artefacts; that is why, we argued, Bentham was wrong to write 
them off. The catharsis operates, I suggested, following Paul Ricoeur, by a 
metaphoric effect. We traced the lineage of metaphor through a widening circle of 
meaning which eventually engulfed whole discourses and stories in particular. 
Metaphors, and also stories, have the property of being true and not-true (for Juliet 
is not the sun, yet Juliet is, indeed, the sun). Just as a simple metaphor operates 
between two things (the focus and the frame), so a story sets up a tension between 
story-worlds and actual worlds. When I read a story, I interpret that story to make 
a story-world (and, perhaps react to that story-world and talk about it and its 
denizens and the things that happen there). But I also make my actual world by 
interpreting my experience. The two worlds so made, sit in a dialectic relationship 
to each other that is well seen as metaphoric. Each feeds on the other.
When we read a story, we may draw comparisons, in detail or in broad terms, 
between the story-world and our actual world. We may come to see our actual 
world in ways derived from the story. We may just use the story-world as an 
escape from our actual world but, I suggest, we often come to see each sort of 
world in terms that characterise the other. And in the case of a powerful
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metaphor, we learn from our reading. Our actual world is utterly unlike the King 
Lear story-world, yet our actual world is curiously like that world in so many 
ways, that we learn about our actual world from our experience of the King Lear 
story-world. We learn, as we have seen, for example, about familial love and its 
displacements and about the deprivations of mortality from King Lear. Thus, we 
see a way in which stories and worlds interact to create meaning. This is our 
second major conclusion. This brings us back to Aristotle’s catharsis. Stories 
turn out to be simple and simply understood but, at the same time, may be 
powerful. The catharsis can operate at many levels, as Aristotle seems to have 
allowed. The catharsis may be refreshment and escape or we may learn from our 
(cathartic) experience of the story-world.
This implies that any story will, or can, operate in this metaphorical way. This 
thesis does not claim that every story does, in fact, so operate at every reading. 
We read stories for reasons other than intellectual catharsis and we, almost 
certainly, choose stories to suit our moods and inclinations at the time. Few of us 
could live with a diet consisting of only “great” tragedies but most of us desire 
something to “bite into” at least on occasion. Of course, following Aristotle, there 
is no claim that all stories are equally powerful as metaphors.
My claim for this thesis is that it explains the phenomena under investigation. I 
have argued that the most we can ask of any theory is that it cohere and that it 
does, in fact, answer the problems it sets out to solve. In this case, these problems 
are the problem of our reactions to stories and the problem of how we are able to 
talk meaningfully about stories; there is the further problem of how such things 
can have any value or any ability to teach us. We can see that the thesis addresses 
these questions successfully. There will always be competing possibilities and, 
therefore, other answers given to solve the same set of problems; this follows from 
the thesis itself. The justification for the approach to stories argued here, has been 
that this approach is simple and elegant and that it does answer the questions it set
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out to answer. Further, the answers provided conform to our commonsense 
expectations. It is these qualities that constitute this theory’s claims to acceptance.
This thesis does not explore questions of interpretation of other art forms, such as 
painting.413 It is fairly clear what path might be taken to develop such a theory, 
but, in this thesis, the temptation to take that path has been, largely, avoided. It is 
also clear that the thesis opens up a path for exploring questions of value in 
stories. Again we have, perhaps without complete success, avoided going there.
Of course, this is not the only study which has developed a theory of stories as 
world makers. The second thing that we must do in this conclusion is to point 
towards some other work in this area. Nicholas Wolterstorff talks of literary 
works as worldmakers. Wolterstorff describes worldmaking as an action on the 
part of the creator; in the case of a story that worldmaker is the author, of the 
work. Mimesis, he argues, is a particular kind of speech act,414 a speech act of 
worldmaking on the part of the author. In saying this, he falls into the tradition 
established by Austin and Searle, rather than that of Goodman, for writing is a 
speech act. This debt he freely acknowledges.415 He tells us that “[b]y inscribing 
words on paper ... Gogol performed the action of fictionally projecting a world. 
Likewise, by applying paint to canvas and thus creating his Birth of Venus 
Botticelli performed the action of fictionally projecting a world.”416 Much of what 
Wolterstorff says is quite compatible with our present thesis. The speech act of 
the author is one of world “projection”. For us, the act of writing or saying the 
story is one of representing the projected world, where for Wolterstorff it is a
Although it does use paintings as examples to progress the argument.
We have noted earlier in this study, other writers, Gregory Currie for 
example, who have described story making in terms of speech act theory. 
For us, mimesis is a form of representation. Our thesis and his need not be 
incompatible (one relates to what authors do, the other to what readers do).
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980, p. 200.
Ibid., p202.416
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mimetic act of world projection. It is already clear that Wolterstorff s focus is on 
the author; this focus is not ours. Further Wolterstorff seems to be unconcerned 
with the creative act of the reader; worldmaking acts are, for him, authorial acts. 
“Walton’s [and Goodman’s] theory”, he argues, “grounds picturing in what 
beholders do. Mine grounds picturing in what artists do.”417 Wolterstorrf’s 
approach would seem to privilege the intention of the author against that of the 
reader, for the object of artistic endeavour seems to be an intentional object in the 
mind of the author. We do not do that. We have earlier discussed this aspect of 
the problem.
A writer more in tune with the thesis argued here is the Polish phenomenologist, 
Roman Ingarden. Ingarden was concerned with the phenomenology of literary 
works and the way they are understood, rather than with explicating a method to 
be employed to come to that understanding. We will find a great deal of common 
ground between Ingarden’s phenomenology and the conclusions of this thesis. In 
fact, this commonality, when the method of study is as different as his and ours 
have been, adds further weight to the conclusions we have drawn. For Ingarden, 
to read a story is to project a world.
In addition to essays, Ingarden produced two major works: The Literary Work of 
Art and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, on this aspect of philosophy. 
In the first he describes what a literary work of art is, and in the second he is 
concerned with what the reader does when he or she reads (cognises) that work. 
Ingarden talks of a text, but here, as previously, we can treat a story as a text; 
Ingarden’s claims have obvious correlates with a story, which is spoken, and he 




Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, p. 12.
The Hermeneutics of Fictional Discourse -248-
attempts to account for any work,419 while we have restricted our discussion to 
stories. He is also concerned with questions of aesthetics, questions which we 
have largely ignored. I will very briefly summarise the claims that Ingarden 
makes that are most relevant to our thesis (the rest of his work, we must ignore). 
We will see almost immediately the similarities we wish to note.
Ingarden, as do we, consistently describes a work as representing.420 He argues 
that works create worlds and, from this, he comes to conclusions similar to some 
of ours. For example, he argues that historical personages such as appear in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (his example) or War and Peace (our example) are 
not representations of the historical personages, Julius Caesar or Napoleon.421 
The characters in novels and plays are “foregrounded” and the original (historical) 
personage is, therefore, in the background. He says that this kind of representation 
can never achieve complete “concealment” of the original character 422 This thesis 
has suggested that what the reader knows about the original (historical) personage 
infuses his or her making of the character in the story-world.
However, Ingarden’s basic claim is that, in understanding a story, the reader 
“projects” a world. But, before we can do that we must read the story. For 
Ingarden, a literary work is “polyphonic”;423 by this he means that the work is a 
“many layered formation”424 consisting of a number of significant strata. Reading, 
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the text itself. This is the level of the “ink spots”,425 in the case of a written text, 
and the sounds of the words, for a spoken text. It is at this level that we must 
make out the words. For a well-printed text this is usually easy. For some texts 
(poorly written or faded) this may be very difficult.426 Some texts distract us at 
this level by the use of poetic devices such as rhythm and rhyme. Those texts 
draw attention to the marks on the page and the sound of the words. We have 
noted this sort of distraction in our discussion of Willie Master's Lonesome Wife. 
Such an observation does not, of course, denigrate this level, or works which 
operate primarily at this level; it is, after all, the very stuff of much poetry.427
At the second level, we have the “meaning” of the words, sentences and, 
ultimately, the work itself. This is the semantic level. The sounds of the first 
level build up to create units with meaning, for, generally, a single sound on its 
own, has no meaning. Sounds build into words and words into meaningful 
sentences. Individual words and sentences “reach out” to other words and 
sentences to construct larger and larger units of meaning.428 However, in a literary 
work, as opposed to, say, a scientific work, the sentences do not represent genuine 
judgments; they are, says Ingarden, quasi-judgments. This confers a very different 
status on scientific works as opposed to literary works 429 This is, partly, I think, 
how Ingarden sees a “work of art”. It is constituted from quasi-judgments. He 
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Further, Ingarden tells us that “real” personages are determined in every respect, 
where this is not so of characters in a written work.431 “Real” personages, and 
objects, exist independently and, conceptually, any question about them is 
answerable. Most commentators take this to be so. However, in this thesis, we 
have concentrated on the reader’s relationship with fictional characters and 
likened that relationship to the reader’s relationship with actual world personages. 
I have argued that, even if actual world personages are completely determined, as 
Ingarden claims, our knowledge of such personages, as our knowledge of the 
characters in a story-world, is only ever partial and can only ever be partial; it can 
never, in practice, be completely determined. Ingarden would agree with that 
claim. The difference between us arises, at least to some extent, from the different 
perspectives we are bringing to the question. Nevertheless, it is differences such 
as these that lead Ingarden to describe judgments about characters in stories as 
quasi-judgments,432 a description we have rejected. The thesis put here explains 
how reactions to stories and judgments within and about characters in stories are 
genuine; a position which better accords with our common understanding.
In a later essay, Ingarden offers a further treatment of judgments which appear in a 
story 433 He argues that we may analyse any judgment from two different points of 
view: we can consider (many) judgments as being contained within the story. 
These are pseudo-judgments. Other judgments may be drawn by the author as 
relating in a more general fashion.434 Such judgments are either right or wrong in 
the same way as they would be in any “normal” discourse. This treatment is 
completely consistent with the argument put in this thesis, which is to say that 
when a story is not treated as a story, but as something else, our story-world
Ibid., p. 246.
Ibid., p. 181-2.
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making thesis does not apply. Nevertheless, Ingarden still argues that the 
statements in a story are to be contrasted with the statements in, say a scientific 
treatise; this is, as I have said, a view which we have rejected.
Ingarden attempts to enlist Aristotle’s support for his view.435 Aristotle, in The 
Poetics, says that it is not the form, but the content, which differentiates science 
from poetry.4’6 It follows, says Ingarden, that Aristotle would agree that there is a 
gulf between the two forms. But we have argued that they are different, not on the 
basis of a linguistic gulf (for Aristotle does, in this passage, agree that science can 
be cast in verse form), but on the basis of the world under consideration. There 
seems to be no reason to accept that Aristotle would, inevitably, side with 
Ingarden and his pseudo-judgments against the worldmaking thesis as argued in 
this thesis.
At the third level, Ingarden talks about “manifold schematized aspects and aspect 
continua” and at the fourth level he talks of “represented objectivities and their 
vicissitudes” 437 The fourth level is the world represented by the text. That world 
is made up from the objectivities identified at the third level. These objectivities 
are subjected to the vicissitudes of the plot to project a world. The objectivities 
are objects as represented by the text.
According to Ingarden, an object is a determinate thing. That object is represented 
by the text under some aspect; it is, then, no longer determinate and is, what he is 
calling an objectivity. A vase of sunflowers is a determinate object. However, 
when painted by Van Gogh (Sunflowers, Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam), the 
vase of sunflowers in the painting (as opposed to the painting itself) is 
schematised and is, as a schematised object, not determinate, for the painting
Roman Ingarden, “A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle’s P o e t ic s in 
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represents the sunflowers in a particular manner. Any representation must do this. 
Such things and events as Netherfield Park, Mr. and Mrs. Bennet, Elizabeth’s 
dinner at Rosings and so forth are objects but are presented to us by the text in a 
certain manner; in this sense, they are objectivities. For example, Mr. Collins is 
presented in a certain manner; the way he is presented to us is the way the author 
has schematised that particular object. Objectivities have some abiding sense in 
terms of the work and, so are not fixed but may change (as a person develops) in 
that world. Objectivities are subjected to the vicissitudes of plot and, thus, 
schematised (by the author) under some sort of aspect to bring about movement in 
the plot. The distinction between Ingarden’s levels is not one this thesis has 
drawn, but is one that is in sympathy with the discussion we have followed. It 
certainly does no violence to the thesis put here. We have, of course, integrated 
the concept of time and events as occurring in the time-frame of the story-world, 
into our very definition of what a story is.
No text can say everything that might be said about the characters or events in the 
story-world. For, however much detail was provided, more would be needed to 
cover any possible question. As we have noted, we are not told how many 
children Lady Macbeth had, but if we were told that, there would be other 
questions (their relative ages, how well they fed and so forth) that we would not be 
told. To tell everything would require an infinite text. We must, therefore, said 
Ingarden, “concretise”438 the work if it is to be (or become) a story, or (to use 
Ingarden’s term) a literary work of art. The work contains “potentiality”439 which 
is, thus, realised when the work is read. Further, we all concretise a work 
differently. That will be, partly, a result of our own lives and times. This 
concretisation brings the text into a meaningful whole rather than leaving it as 
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task.441 Ingarden’s concretisation is our story-world making. For Ingarden, as for 
our thesis, the text awaits the reader to concretise it. Story-world making is an 
certainly active task and can be a difficult one.
There are many other aspects of art works that we have glossed over, which are of 
interest to Ingarden. Ingarden is very interested in the ontology of artworks, where 
this thesis has, apart from a brief discussion of the ontological status of story- 
worlds, largely ignored ontological issues surrounding artworks themselves. As 
we have already noted, Ingarden argues that the artwork is an intentional object 
rather than being coterminous with its physical realisation. He makes this claim 
for all artworks, including architectural works.442 This thesis has considered 
stories rather than some general category of “artwork”. Yet our findings are not 
unsympathetic to findings such as Ingarden’s (at least for stories), for the story- 
world is made by the reader from the text. This is true of Ingarden’s 
concretisation. This thesis, while using, as examples, other “art” forms, has not 
attempted a broad theory and certainly not a general theory of art or aesthetics.
To summarise Ingarden’s approach. A text is polyphonic, consisting of different 
levels at which it must be read. At the first level, we read the marks on the page; 
at the second, we attribute meaning to words and groups of words so that, at the 
third level, we can project objectivities which we then, by the process of 
concretisation, build into projected worlds (story-worlds). Although, we have 
found important areas of difference between Ingarden’s philosophy and our 
findings, we see, in this short statement, a remarkable consonance of results.
The final task of this conclusion is to show how the thesis put here merges into 
that broad stream of philosophising about the interpreting of literary texts, known
Ibid., p. 37-41.
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as hermeneutics. The hermeneutic field is a vast area of work. Our discussion 
with Paul Ricoeur on metaphor, has already opened up the hermeneutic approach 
to texts. In what remains of this conclusion, it is impossible to do any more than 
point towards some important thinking in this field, thinking that intersects with 
the approach outlined here. To do this, we will very briefly survey some thinkers 
in the field but concentrate our attention on the important work of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer.
The hermeneutic tradition stretches back to Augustine, who frankly acknowledged 
the difficulty of interpreting that, to him, most important of all works: The Bible, 
Holy Scripture. “I struggle hard to understand it”, he tells us.443 A correct 
interpretation of those writings was, to Augustine, most important. Augustine 
continues by looking to God for interpretive help. Alas, many of us feel that we 
will not receive interpretive assistance from that source and we will have to rely 
on human help for the enterprise. Hermeneutics may have begun its life with the 
question of biblical interpretation, but it has broadened its concerns, firstly, to the 
understanding of the texts of classical antiquity and, more recently, to the question 
of understanding any text. The traditional objective of hermeneutics was to 
propose a method for coming to a (correct) understanding of a text. We have not 
taken that course and this thesis has proposed no particular method. In fact, we 
have argued that there can be no single correct interpretation, in this we agree with 
modem hermeneuticists such as Ricoeur and Gadamer.
Schleiermacher is credited with being the first to introduce a general theory of 
hermeneutics. “Hermeneutics”, he said, “does not apply exclusively to classical 
studies, ... it is to be applied to the works of every author.”444 In fact,
Schleiermacher argues that interpretation is an activity required for any
443 Augustine, Confessions (transl. R. S. Pine-Coffin), Harmondsworth: 
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communication task. Even at the market place, we need to interpret. But this is 
easy for we know “almost immediately and with certainty what the other [person] 
will respond, and language is tossed back and forth as a ball.”445 This may be a 
simple hermeneutic task but, it is an hermeneutic task nevertheless.
For Schleiermacher, essentially, we interpret a text by getting into the mind of the 
author of that text. “In interpretation it is essential”, he says, “that one be able to 
step out of one’s own frame of mind into that of the author.”446 This is no easy 
task. In fact Schleiermacher frequently commented that it is difficult, so difficult 
and time consuming that “understanding [a text] is an unending task.”447 
Furthermore, commentaries and other writings cannot solve this difficulty for us 
for they must, themselves, be interpreted.448 This is a point that we made earlier 
and many of Schleiermacher’s claims are quite in line with the claims made in this 
thesis.
However, Schleiermacher, like Hirsch more recently, argued that “meaning” is an 
intentional object in its author’s mind. It is this towards which the hermeneutical 
task is oriented. Schleiermacher observes that we are not free to choose any “kind 
of interpretation”.449 In the same place, he says that hermeneutics needs to 
become a “systematic, self-contained discipline”450 in order to avoid the 
“problem” of random interpretation. While agreeing that a text may not be 
understood in just any fashion, we have consistently argued that understanding
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts 
(ed. Heinze Kimmerle, transl. James Duke and Jack Forstman), Missoula, 
MT: Scholars Press, 1977, p. 180.
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need not be oriented towards some sort of authorial intention. That is not to say 
that the historical method is completely without merit. In fact, such an approach 
to, say, The Bible, has, in recent times, yielded great dividends in understanding 
that work. But, then, modem biblical scholarship does not treat The Bible as a 
story, but, rather, as a text for study.
Dilthey saw Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics as “masterful”,451 yet even he 
observes that Schleiermacher’s method analyses understanding as “a re­
experiencing or reconstruction in its vital relationship ... [of] the process of literary 
production”.452 In other words, Schleiermacher’s method restricts how we can 
approach a work of literature. We have also made that point. If a story is to 
remain fresh and alive for readers today, it is because reading (and writing) are 
creative activities and meaning is made, and made ever fresh and new, rather than 
being simply recovered.
This was something that Gadamer clearly saw. We are never able to fully carry 
out Schleiermacher’s interpretive project. We can never recreate the author’s 
intention for we are, Gadamer argued, radically historically positioned and it is 
never possible to attain to the mindset of the author of a work. Gadamer also 
argued that this is not even desirable; to do so would be of no value for “a 
hermeneutics that regarded understanding as reconstructing the original would be 
... dead.”453 We have an encounter with a work in time and our historical 
circumstances condition the nature of that encounter. Were it not so, the 
encounter would be worthless, a mere throwback to some other historical time. 
We must understand any text in our own way as a “productive”, rather than a
Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics”, in Gayle L. Ormiston and 
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merely “reproductive” activity.454 The alternative, Gadamer claims, is not to 
“understand at all.”435
Even our brief discussion above shows that Schleiermacher was not as confident 
in the achievement of his goal as is often supposed. For Schleiermacher, the goal 
of hermeneutics was to arrive at a correct understanding of a text. A correct 
understanding of a text is a knowledge of the intentional object of the author of the 
text. That may require a great deal of reconstruction of the times and 
circumstances of the creation of the work for the reader. Thus, for the Scriptures, 
this approach would allow the student to get ever closer to a true understanding of 
the meaning of the text, where the meaning just is that intentional object; we 
would need to undertake (exhaustive) historical and other related studies, to move 
close to achieving such an objective. But Schleiermacher doubted that his 
objective could ever be fully achieved, at least with a text as complex as The 
Bible. He accepted that one could get close, ever closer, but seemed to think that 
a full achievement of the goal would be impossible. This thesis concurs with that 
conclusion. I am not arguing that there is no value in textual and historical studies 
such as Schleiermacher seems to be advocating. Of course, there is. However, we 
have argued in this thesis that interpretation of a story-text must be conducted on 
the basis of that text, qua story. Taking other material into account is to interpret 
something wider than (just the text in question); the question of the author’s 
meaning (if there was one) is a different question from question the meaning of 
the work itself. Of course, historical and related studies can be of great value — 
that is not being questioned. But this thesis agrees with Gadamer; an 
interpretation, if it is to be of relevance to a living interpreter, must be alive, it 
must be an interpretation that is not merely a reconstruction.
It might well be suggested that the thesis advanced in this dissertation is the 
obverse of the coin of Gadamer’s thesis, for there is much general ground that is
454 Ibid., p. 296.
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common to both approaches, even if the manner of their discussion and definition 
are very different. In the few words left, I wish to point to some reasons why such 
a claim merits serious consideration. Our purpose is not to merely point to the 
many places where there is a sympathetic concurrence of thinking; to do that 
would be tedious. We want to select the major themes running through 
Gadamer’s work and this thesis, to illustrate this claim.
Gadamer’s major argument is that we are beings in an historical situation and that 
we cannot escape that situation (as if we would wish to) and go back to the 
situation of the author of a work as Schleiermacher said we should. As 
historically situated beings, we must interpret any work from within our own 
historical situation. There can be “no understanding that is free of all 
prejudice.”456 Gadamer talks of our situation as tradition. If we were not 
embedded in some such tradition, we could never make sense of anything, for 
“belonging to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics”.457 Gadamer also says 
that the tradition in which we live is “essentially verbal in character”; that is to 
say it is symbolised. Gadamer, therefore, as do we, rejects the notion that there 
can be one correct interpretation, namely, that intended by the author of a work. 
Any interpretation must be contemporary and relevant and arise from the 
circumstances of the interpreter (his actual world).
Gadamer then argues that a work poses a question and that any form of 
understanding must be in response to some question that we ourselves pose. In 
fact, he argues, that this is the essence of understanding 459 There is, he says, 
always a question at the root of any knowledge or judgment. By this, I take it that 
he is saying that, to know or believe anything, there must be a subject matter about
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which that knowledge or belief is held. That subject matter implies a “question”; 
elsewhere he calls this the horizon of the work.
Gadamer says that we also have a horizon. We encounter any work from within 
our own horizon. Our horizon is, he tells us, “the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.”460 But our horizon is 
“continually in the process of being formed.”461 As we live and have experiences, 
so we test our understanding of the world; this understanding is our horizon. As 
we make our actual world we are forming, reforming, and extending our own 
horizon (which is essentially the vantage point from which we see the world, that 
is to say, it is how we see the world). We have noted that we experience a work 
from our world. When we understand a work, the work and its horizon comes 
together with our horizon and, so, our horizon extends.462 Gadamer talks of the 
fusion of horizons.
Interpretation is, thus, an encounter of horizons within a wider and widening 
horizon. Our historical situation (our tradition) sets a (general) horizon within 
which we operate. Gadamer tells us that our horizon is the breadth of our 
understanding and that, as we advance, our horizon constantly expands. It is, I 
take it, implicit within his philosophy, that the expansion and advance of our 
horizon is a worthwhile thing. Gadamer talks of works as having a horizon also. 
He talks of our participation in the work as a joining of our horizon with that of 
the work (a fusion of horizons) and that leads to our knowing new things; things 
the author may not have known. This implies that the author’s horizon is not 
simply added to ours but something new is created from the fusion. Since our
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horizon is not that of the author, what we learn may be something that he could 
not teach directly. This seems to be implicit in what Gadamer tells us.463
A horizon is, he says, “the range of vision.” 464 He then observes, in the same 
passage, that a horizon can “expand” and we can “open up new horizons”.465 He 
earlier tells us that a “horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves 
with one and invites one to advance further.”466 Gadamer uses the concept of 
horizon because, he says, “it expresses the superior breadth of vision”.467 
Gadamer, thus, talks of the horizon in positive terms. It is Gadamer’s metaphor 
for our vision or view of the world and this is how he describes the process 
outlined above. Our horizon, at any given time, is not a new view (as if we 
suddenly opened our eyes and saw the horizon spread out). It is a result of our 
historical circumstances and our experience. As our experience expands our 
horizon expands, a result of our past and a fusion of the horizon of the past with 
our new experience. Our past horizon is a result of our collective past or our 
tradition.
When I answer the question posed by the text, then my horizon fuses with that of 
the text (but not necessarily with that of the author of the text). This fusion can 
only come about by pursuing the question posed by the text. We ask, for 
ourselves, the question that the text is posing. We must answer that question, 
even if we do so from the text. In answering the question, the question (and 
answer) become our question and our answer. Thus, Gadamer says, we expand 
our horizon towards the horizon posed by the text in answering its question.
This also follows from our discussion of metaphor. 
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It is doubtful that any of us can ever exhaust a text (and certainly not a text as 
great as, say, King Lear) and, I would argue that Gadamer’s fusion could never, in 
fact, be complete (for the text will always have something new to teach us). 
Gadamer might agree. In a similar fashion we can never exhaust Schleiermacher’s 
project. This is simply to say that some texts can withstand a significant and 
continuing encounter (or study) without being exhausted thereby. That should not 
surprise anybody.
As we have said, although each of us operates with a horizon of our own, that 
horizon is not completely of our own making. It is, partly at least, conditioned by 
our (shared) historical and cultural circumstances. We are heirs to the tradition of 
our forefathers. We have considered actual worlds and their making; we have also 
recognised that actual worlds are, at least in part, conditioned by our cultural and 
historical circumstances and that they are modified as a result of reading and 
similar encounters with stories and other works of art. That is how, for Gadamer, 
reading functions as a worthwhile, human activity.
Not that Gadamer was prepared to go as far as saying that a work can mean just 
anything we want it to; it cannot. He locates meaning within the tradition,468 for, 
as we have said, we cannot escape our historical circumstances; these are the 
tradition from which we operate. “I must”, he says, “allow tradition’s claim to 
validity ... in such a way that it has something to say to me.”469 If it were not so, 
Gadamer suggests that meaning would be ungrounded. Tradition maintains a 
“continuity of meaning” 470 In this, Gadamer has been accused of conservatism.471 
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tool for the hermeneutist. Even in conceding that sometimes we overturn 
tradition, he argues that such an overturning is, itself, a response to the very 
tradition being overturned. “Alteration of the existing conditions is”, he says, “no
??472less a form of connection to tradition than is a defence of existing conditions.”
To translate into the terms we have been using, the tradition is our actual world. 
In large measure, we inherit our actual world from our predecessors. I have 
already argued that the training we receive when we are young is importantly 
formative in our own actual world making.
As we come to grips with a work, our horizon is extended and it will eventually 
fuse with the horizon of the work. Thus, he says, our encounter with a work is a 
life changing experience. Such (metaphoric) talk is quite consistent with the 
claims put forward in this thesis. But the questions of the role of tradition and the 
possible extent of the fusion of horizons are questions we need not resolve now. 
Obviously, we are historically positioned; that historical position arises from our 
personal and cultural circumstances and, in turn, will strongly influence our 
understanding of a text. Consider our earlier discussion of The Turn of the Screw. 
Even from within a particular culture and tradition, different people are still led to 
differing constructions of the story-world and, thus, to very different 
understandings of the text. We can recognise this much without arguing the case 
for or against Gadamer. We simply note that his position is closer to the position 
that we have developed, at least in this respect, than is the position of 
Schleiermacher.
Further, Gadamer says that “hermeneutic experience is verbal in nature.”473 We 
certainly accept that claim (or one even stronger), but we would prefer to say that 
hermeneutic understanding is symbolic in nature. We have gone further and
Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Reply to My Critics”, in Gayle L. Ormiston and 
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suggested that all understanding is hermeneutic. We must always interpret. 
Gadamer suggests as much, when he discusses language as the bearer of
474concepts.
So, for Gadamer and his hermeneutic, as with us, a text operates within a 
dialectical or tension with our (human) circumstances which can only be described 
as metaphorical. For Gadamer, as for Aristotle and us, our encounter with a story 
operates metaphorically, to produce an intellectual catharsis.
For Gadamer, we are always interpreting and must always interpret. Our total 
experience requires interpretation. This is a theme that has strongly emerged 
within this thesis. The making of actual worlds is a form of interpretation. 
Gadamer discusses translation475 as a form of interpretation leading to the resaying 
of something in another language. But that resaying must be an interpretation 
rather than some sort of pure translation for the resaying of a text amounts to an 
interpretation of that text. We agree and have argued in a similar vein in our 
second chapter. Consequently, Gadamer has been accused of relativism (as if that 
were a crime). It seems difficult to argue that Gadamer’s interpretive scheme is a 
sort of relativism. Bilen argues that there is a significant difference in the position 
that our understanding is relative (to our historical circumstances) and the position 
that the world itself is relative.476 He suggests that Gadamer holds the first 
position but not the second. We can accept either position.
For Gadamer, a text is not an aesthetic object to be “appreciated” from a distance. 
He talks about standing back, he describes the person who “merely gapes at
Ibid., pp. 383-491.
Ibid., pp. 384-89.
Osman Bilen, The Historicity o f Understanding and The Problem of 
Relativism in Gadamer s Philosophical Hermeneutics, Washington, DC: 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2000.
The Hermeneutics of Fictional Discourse -264-
something.”477 Such a person is not entering into the world of the work (or object) 
but is charmed by it and curious about it. For Gadamer, one must become 
immersed in the work; the work must become contemporaneous with the 
interpreter, but not vice versa, and, thus, of immediate concern to the reader. That 
is to visit the story-world and to become emotionally involved with the lives of 
those who live there. That is a major theme of this thesis. We can see the 
importance, to modem hermeneutics, of story. This is an importance echoed by 
this thesis. To make one final, irresistible, observation: Gadamer, perhaps 
following Ingarden, talks of interpretation as the “concretion of meaning itself.”479
Thus, we can see, from just this brief discussion, a continuum in the work of 
Gadamer and our results. We have moved from a consideration of the nature of 
mimesis, as a representation through an explanation of the nature of the 
represented. That discussion has shown how stories make sense and explains 
many of the difficulties traditionally associated with them. We then considered 
the idea of metaphor as a way of extending our findings to give stories a way of 
telling us things, showing us new truth. That demonstrated the power of many of 
Aristotle’s claims for tragedy.
Now, finally, we have seen how the findings of this thesis support, and are 
supported by, recent developments in hermeneutics, thereby, showing that the 
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